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Family firms are an important part of the U.S. economy. Using a comprehensive sample of 
publicly traded family firms in the U.S. this dissertation looks into various aspects of their 
corporate structure. Specifically, this dissertation studies the industry distribution, capital 
structure choices, and performance and survival after Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 of family 
firms. The chapter on industry distribution presents evidence that family firms are less likely to 
exist in industries where the optimal firm size is larger and more likely to exist in industries with 
greater amenity potential. Moreover, they are more likely to exist in more mature industries, less 
likely to exist in industries with more growth opportunities, and less likely to exist in industries 
with more volatile earnings. The evidence suggests that families choose to set up their companies 
in industries that require less wealth for control and in industries with less risk, which is 
consistent with families’ higher risk aversion compared to atomistic shareholders. The chapter on 
capital structure choices presents evidence that family firms carry more debt on average than 
non-family firms. This is consistent with the agency argument that large shareholders are able to 
better monitor the company and reduce the agency costs of free cash flow; and therefore, 
increase the capacity for debt financing. There is also evidence that family firms borrow 
significantly less of highest and lowest priority debt and significantly more of debt with 
intermediate priorities than non-family firms. This is consistent with higher risk aversion of 
families compared to atomistic shareholders. Furthermore, family firms carry significantly less 
short-term debt and significantly more long-term debt. Moreover, they hold significantly less 
cash and short-term securities while they pay out significantly more of their earnings as 
dividends. The chapter on performance and survival presents evidence that family firms 
significantly outperformed non-family firms during the 2.5 years before Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 and this outperformance disappeared during the 1.5 years after the Act. There is also 
evidence that family firms were less likely to delist from exchanges after the Act irrespective of 
whether the delisting was via acquisition or via other reasons. 
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1 Introduction 
Articles in the popular press have documented the importance of family firms in the U.S. 
economy. The Economist reports that family firms make up 40% of the U.S. GDP and 60% of 
U.S. workforce.1 Among other notable articles, The New York Times article argues that family 
firms have the ability to train family members in the business from a young age2 while one Wall 
Street Journal article talks about the feud among family members over control of the company3 
and another Wall Street Journal reports the dilemma between wealth maximization and utility 
maximization among family members over the sale of their publishing company.4 
Family firms have a number of unique characteristics compared to non-family firms. Family 
firms on average have both a high level and high degree of concentration of inside ownership 
relative to non-family firms. Moreover, for 70% of the family firms in the sample, one of the 
family members is the CEO. The combination of a high ownership stake, a top-level managerial 
position, and the fact that other family members are employed in the company makes for a 
situation where the family’s portfolio is highly inefficient from a diversification point of view. 
Consequently, risk preferences are likely to be different for family firms than for non-family 
firms. Finally, risk preferences in family firms may also be different because of ex ante 
determined succession plans and therefore less scrutiny from the market for corporate control. 
                                                            
1 “The family connection,” Economist, 5 October 1996, 62. These ratios are typically higher for other industrialized 
countries. 
 
2 “Do families and big business mix?” The New York Times, 24 April 2005, 3.1. 
 
3 “Strained relations: At News Corp., a bitter battle over inheritance splits family,” The Wall Street Journal, 1 
August 2005, A1. 
 
4 “Dynasty’s dilemma: For Bancrofts, Dow Jones offer poses challenge,” The Wall Street Journal, 12 May 2007, 
A1. 
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Families are similar to company insiders and large stakeholders as they occupy managerial and 
directorial positions and hold significant voting and cash flow rights in their companies. 
However, families differ from typical insiders and large stakeholders to a significant extent. 
First, families see their companies as an asset to pass on to their descendants and therefore, they 
have a longer term interest in their companies than a typical atomistic shareholder. In relation to 
this, families also desire to maintain control of their companies through large ownership stakes 
as well as holding key managerial and directorial positions in the company. Second, families are 
less diversified than a typical atomistic shareholder as most of family’s wealth is tied to the 
wealth of their companies. Their likely higher risk aversion affects their business choices to 
maintain survivability of their companies. 
Despite their importance and unique characteristics, family firms have recently started to receive 
attention in the academic literature.5 This is likely due to the difficulty in setting up a 
comprehensive sample of such companies. Lacking a clear-cut definition of what constitutes a 
family firm in the academic literature a family firm is defined in this dissertation as a firm in 
which at least two members of the same family are either a manager, director, or a five-percent 
owner of the firm, as stated in the firm’s proxy statement. Using this definition a comprehensive 
sample of 1,123 publicly traded family firms is constructed and various aspects of their corporate 
structure – specifically their industry distribution, their capital structure choices, and their 
performance and survival after Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 – are studied. 
The dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 describes the setup of the family firm sample. 
Chapter 3 presents the study on the industry distribution of family firms. Chapter 4 presents the 
study on the capital structure choices of family firms. Chapter 5 presents the study on the 
                                                            
5 See, for example, Anderson and Reeb (2003a, 2003b), Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2003), Bhattacharya and 
Ravikumar (2001, 2004), Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003), Villalonga and Amit (2006), and Miller et al. 
(2007). 
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performance and survival of family firms after Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Chapter 6 
summarizes the findings and concludes. 
 
 
2 Family Firms Sample 
Public companies generally use two expressions in their proxy statements in order to inform their 
shareholders that no familial relationships exist in the company. The more common of these 
statements is similar to “There are no family relationships among any directors or executive 
officers of the company.” The less common of these statements is similar to “Neither the director 
nominee nor any director nor any of the principal executive officers are related by blood, 
marriage or adoption in the degree of first cousin or closer.” This suggests that familial 
relationships in or closer than the degree of first cousin are worth being reported in a company’s 
proxy statement and the companies that report such relationships can be considered good 
candidates as family companies. 
Panel A of Table 2.1 summarizes the procedure followed in order to identify the family firms 
sample used in this dissertation. A family firm is defined as any public company, in which there 
are at least two related people in or closer than the degree of first cousin in a managerial, 
directorial or five-percent ownership position. Therefore, an array of familial relationships in or 
closer than the degree of first cousin such as father, daughter, aunt, brother, son-in-law, nephew 
and their plural forms (full set of these relationships is listed in Panel A of Table 2.1) is set up. 
Then, entering this array of keywords into Thomson Research Database the “full filing”6 of all 
                                                            
6 Most of the companies report familial relationships in the “officers/directors” section of their proxy statements. 
However, “full filing” search also allows capturing the companies that prefer reporting familial relationships in other 
parts of their proxy statements. One example is Ford Motor, which reports the familial relationships in the “security 
ownership” section of its proxy statement. 
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proxy statements submitted to the SEC between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2003 are 
searched (company data is thus from 2002). This initial search returns 6,330 matches. However, 
many of these matches are companies, in which managers or directors share portion of their 
ownership with their family members who are not related to the company in other aspects.7 
Therefore, each of these 6,330 matches is searched through in order to eliminate such irrelevant 
cases. This elimination process leaves 1,401 companies. 19 trusts and funds are further removed. 
Then, the remaining 1,382 companies are matched with Compustat database, the process of 
which leaves 1,160 companies. Finally, the companies incorporated outside the United States 
and companies that have zero assets reported on Compustat for their 2002 fiscal year are 
removed. The final sample consists of 1,123 family firms.8 For each of these firms, information 
about the people who are related to each other, namely their first affiliation with the company 
and cash flow right, voting power and position in the firm, and degree of familial relationship to 
each other, are collected. Moreover, information about the top executive of the firm (who carries 
the CEO title most of the time and the President title if a CEO title is not used in the firm), 
namely his/her relationship to the family, the year s/he assumed the position, identity of his/her 
ascendant in the firm, are identified.9 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
7 One example is a statement like “(1) Includes 875,000 shares subject to currently exercisable options; and includes 
95,942 shares and 60,000 shares subject to currently exercisable options owned beneficially by Mr. Millar’s wife, as 
to which Mr. Millar disclaims beneficial ownership.*” Here, Mr. Millar’s wife is not related to the company in a 
managerial, directorial or five-percent ownership position but shares part of the ownership reported for her husband. 
 
8 Some companies, albeit not many, append their proxy statements to their 10-Ks and do not submit a separate proxy 
statement. Also, some companies do not report the type of familial relationships that exist even though there are 
members of the same family employed in the company. One example to the latter group of companies is Washington 
Post, which is owned by the Graham Family and employs the Family’s three members. However, how these three 
people are related to each other is not reported in the proxy statement. Because this dissertation only looks into 
proxy statements and uses an array of familial relationships as keywords, it is not able to capture neither group of 
companies in the sample of family companies. 
 
9 For example, the Levin Family holds 22.87% of the voting power at Spherix Inc. Gilbert Levin holds 10.70% of 
the voting power and is chairman, chief executive officer and treasurer of the company.  He is also the husband, 
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The remaining companies on Compustat are classified as non-family firms, which serve as the 
control group in this dissertation. To make both samples comparable similar criteria are applied 
to this group. Panel B of Table 2.1 summarizes the procedure. The number of public companies 
on Compustat for the fiscal year 2002 turns out to be 9,258. Then, the 1,261 companies that are 
incorporated outside the United States, the duplicate entries of 19 companies, and the 78 
companies with zero reported assets are removed. The final Compustat sample consists of 7,900 
companies for the fiscal year 2002, 1,123 of which are family firms and the remaining 6,777 of 
which are non-family firms. 
Because the process to setup the sample of family firms uses all exchange-listed public 
companies in the United States, the family firms sample used in this dissertation is significantly 
more comprehensive than the family firms samples used in studies such as Anderson and Reeb 
(2003a, 2003b), Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2003), Villalonga and Amit (2006), and Miller et al. 
(2007). This, in turn, increases the reliability of the results and reduces the biases related to 
sample selection. 
 
 
3 Industry Distribution of Family Firms 
The differences between family firms and non-family firms as well as between families and 
typical insiders and large stakeholders discussed in Chapter 1 make it interesting for a case 
whether family firms differ from non-family firms in their industry characteristics. Specifically, 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
father, and uncle of Karen Levin, Carol Sanchez, and Richard Levin, respectively. Karen Levin holds 11.20% of the 
voting power and is a director and vice president of the company. Carol Sanchez holds 0.86% of the voting power 
and is a director of the company. Richard Levin holds 0.11% of the voting power and is vice president and chief 
financial officer of the company. The company has single class of shares so cash flow right of these individuals is 
the same as their voting power. Also, Gilbert Levin has been the chief executive officer of the company since the 
company’s inception in 1967. 
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this chapter tests whether certain industry characteristics such as industry’s maturity, optimal 
company size, growth opportunities, profitability, earnings volatility, and amenity potential 
explain family firms’ existence in that industry. 
Main findings of the chapter are summarized as follows: Family firms are more likely to exist in 
more mature industries. This can be related to families’ ability to train their descendants in the 
family business and this early-on training’s greater value in traditional industries compared to 
modern industries. Family firms are also more likely to exist in industries where the optimal 
company size is smaller. Families desire to maintain the control of their companies and with their 
limited wealth this may be easier if their company’s size is small. There is also evidence that 
family firms are more likely to exist in industries with fewer growth opportunities, higher 
profitability and lower earnings volatility. These observations can be due to families’ higher risk 
aversion compared to atomistic shareholders. Finally, family firms are more likely to exist in 
industries with greater amenity potential (publishing and broadcasting industries). Companies in 
industries with greater amenity potential offer utility beyond wealth maximization and such 
companies may be more important for families as they see their companies as not just a business 
but an asset to pass on to their descendants.  
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.1 briefly describes the sample. Section 3.2 describes 
the theory and associated predictions while Section 3.3 describes the experimental design that is 
used to test them. Section 3.4 presents and discusses the results. Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.1 Sample Setup 
The process used to setup the sample in this chapter is described in Chapter 2. Briefly, an array 
of familial relationships in or closer than the degree of first cousin is used to search through 
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proxy statements to the SEC during 2003 to identify family firms. After matching with 
Compustat, there are 1,123 family firms and 6,777 non-family firms in the sample. 
Table 3.1 presents the industry distribution of family firms as measured by the total book value 
of assets in an industry accounted for by family firms. Panel A1 of Table 3.1 presents the 50 
industries as defined at the 4-digit SIC-code level where the family firms hold the largest portion 
of industry assets. The distribution suggests that family firms hold more of the industry assets in 
industries which are composed of relatively smaller companies; industries with fewer growth 
opportunities; and industries with greater amenity potential. Panel A2 of Table 3.1 presents the 
50 industries as defined at the 4-digit SIC-code level where the family firms hold the smallest 
portion of industry assets. The distribution suggests that family firms hold less of the industry 
assets in industries which are composed of relatively larger companies and industries with more 
growth opportunities. Panels B1 and B2 of Table 3.1 present industry distribution of family firms 
where family’s voting power is at least 25%, and the distribution is similar to that in Panels A1 
and A2 of the same table. 
 
3.2 Theory and Predictions 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that in order to maintain effective and concentrated ownership a small 
group of owners need to commit more wealth to their company as it grows and the need for capital 
increases. They emphasize that these owners should only purchase new shares at risk-compensating 
prices, which discourages them from attempting to maintain highly concentrated ownership in larger 
companies. Families desire to maintain control in their companies and it is difficult to do so in larger 
companies with a limited amount of wealth. Therefore, family firms should be more likely to exist in 
industries where the optimal company size is smaller. 
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Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that large shareholders are likely to value uncertain cash flows lower than 
atomistic shareholders, which suggests that large shareholders are more risk averse. Stein (1989), on the 
other hand, demonstrates that shareholders with longer investment horizons help reduce the myopic 
decision making by the management, i.e. such shareholders would prefer market value rules more than 
atomistic shareholders. Insofar that most of their wealth is tied to the fortunes of their companies, families 
are more risk averse than atomistic shareholders. Thus, it can be expected that they prefer less uncertainty 
both in their business and in the cash flows of their business. Therefore, family firms should be more 
likely to exist in industries with fewer growth opportunities, higher profitability and lower earnings 
volatility. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that companies, in which owners can get utility from being able to 
influence the type of goods produced, can be considered to have greater amenity potential and they 
identify professional sports clubs and mass media firms as such companies. Families see their companies 
as an asset to pass on to their descendants and it can be argued that families’ connection to their 
companies increases with the company’s amenity potential even though there is no systematic way to 
identify this. Therefore, family firms should be more likely to exist in industries with greater amenity 
potential. In line with Demsetz and Lehn (1985), this chapter identifies newspaper publishing, periodical 
publishing, radio broadcasting, and television broadcasting (SIC codes 2711, 2721, 4832, 4833, 
respectively) as industries with greater amenity potential. 
 
3.3 Experimental Design 
Portion of industry’s book value of assets accounted for by family firms can proxy for the level of family 
firms’ existence in an industry. Because this ratio is between 0 and 1, it is more appropriate to utilize 
censored Tobit regressions. Also, analysis developed by Fama and MacBeth (1973) will be used in order 
to check for the consistency of coefficients over time. Median number of years a company existed in an 
industry (Log(mnYear)) and number of companies in an industry (Log(nFirm)) can proxy for industry’s 
maturity. Median book value of assets in an industry (Log(BVA)) can proxy for industry’s optimal 
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company size. Median market-to-book assets ratio (mMVA/BVA) can proxy for industry’s growth 
opportunities. Median operating income before depreciation-to-book value of assets (OIbD/BVA) can 
proxy for industry’s profitability. Median 5-year standard deviation of operating income before 
depreciation-to-book value of assets (mEarnVol) can proxy for industry’s earnings volatility. Finally, a 
dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the industry is one of newspaper publishing, periodical 
publishing, radio broadcasting, and television broadcasting industries; and 0 otherwise (AmeDum) can 
proxy for industries with greater amenity potential. The empirical results of the univariate and 
multivariate analyses are discussed in the next section. 
 
3.4 Results and Discussion 
Panels A and B of Table 3.2 present the univariate results between the industries where the 
family firms hold nonzero portion of industry assets and industries where there are no family 
firms. In Panel A, the comparison is between industries with family firms and industries with no 
family firms while in Panel B, the comparison is between industries with family firms where the 
family’s voting power is at least 25% and industries with no such family firms. Industries with 
family firms are grouped into quartiles based on family firms’ presence in that industry. Thus, 
the groups are industries where family firms hold up to 25% of industry assets; industries where 
family firms hold between 25% and 50% of industry assets; industries where family firms hold 
between 50% and 75% of industry assets; and industries where family firms hold more than 75% 
of industry assets. 
Univariate results suggest that industry’s maturity is not significantly different between 
industries with family firms and industries with no family firms except for relatively few 
industries where family firms hold more than 75% of industry assets. These industries are 
significantly more mature than industries with no family firms. The optimal number of 
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companies in industries with family firms is significantly greater than that in industries with no 
family firms except for industries where family firms hold more than 75% of industry assets. 
Actually, there seems to be an inverse-U relationship between optimal number of companies in 
an industry and family firms’ holdings in that industry. 
Univariate analysis further suggests that optimal company size in an industry is not significantly 
different between industries with family firms and industries with no family firms. The median 
growth opportunities measure is, on the other hand, significantly greater in industries with no 
family firms than those with family firms. The median profitability measure is significantly less 
while the median earnings volatility measure is significantly greater in industries with no family 
firms than those with family firms. Finally, industries with greater amenity potential all have 
family firms. 
Panels A and B of Table 3.3 present the results of multivariate analysis of industry distribution of 
family firms. In Panel A, the dependent variable is portion of industry assets accounted for by 
family firms while in Panel B, the dependent variable is portion of industry assets accounted for 
by family firms where the family’s voting power is at least 25%. The analysis utilizes censored 
Tobit regressions because the dependent variable is restricted between 0 and 1 and also Fama-
MacBeth style regressions run annually between 1992 and 2006 in order to check the consistency 
of coefficients over time. 
The results in Panel A of Table 3.3 suggests that family firms are more likely to exist in more 
mature industries. The coefficient on Log(mnYear) is significant in 10 of 15 years at least at 10% 
while the average coefficient (0.0877) is significantly different from zero at 1%. There seems no 
relationship between the optimal number of companies in an industry and family firms’ holdings 
in that industry. The coefficient on Log(nFirm) is not significant in any of the sample years; 
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however, the average coefficient (0.0183) is significantly different from zero at 1%. There is 
strong evidence that family firms are more likely to exist in industries where the optimal 
company size is smaller. The coefficient on Log(BVA) is significant in all years at least at 10% 
while the average coefficient (-0.0442) is significantly different from zero at 1%. There is also 
some evidence that family firms are more likely to exist in industries with fewer growth 
opportunities, higher profitability and lower earnings volatility. The coefficients on mMVA/BVA, 
mOIbD/BVA, and mEarnVol are significant in 9, 5, and 7 of 15 years, respectively, at least at 
10% while the average coefficients (-0.0477, 0.2599, and -0.6745, respectively) are significantly 
different from zero at 1%. Finally, there is strong evidence that family firms are more likely to 
exist in industries with greater amenity potential (publishing and broadcasting industries) as the 
coefficient on AmeDum is significant in all years at least at 10% and the average coefficient 
(0.4956) is significantly different from zero at 1%. 
The results in Panel B of Table 3.3 are somewhat different from those in Panel A. However, the 
average coefficients in Panel B are similar to their counterparts in Panel A. The results suggest 
that family firms where the family’s voting power is at least 25% are more likely to exist in more 
mature industries. The coefficient on Log(mnYear) is significant in 14 of 15 years at least at 10% 
while the average coefficient (0.0854) is significantly different from zero at 1%. The results also 
suggest that such family firms are more likely to exist in industries, where the optimal number of 
companies is greater and the optimal company size is smaller. The coefficients on Log(nFirm) 
and Log(mBVA) are significant in 12 and 15 of 15 years, respectively, while the average 
coefficients (0.0426 and -0.0499, respectively) are significantly different from zero at 1%. There 
is also some evidence that family firms where the family’s voting power is at least 25% are more 
likely to exist in industries with fewer growth opportunities but there is not much evidence that 
12 
 
such family firms are more likely to exist in industries with higher profitability and lower 
earnings volatility. The coefficients on mMVA/BVA, mOIbD/BVA, and mEarnVol are significant 
in 10, 3, and 3 of 15 years, respectively, at least at 10% while the average coefficients (-0.0535, 
0.2272, and -0.5690, respectively) are significantly different from zero at 1%. Finally, there is 
strong evidence that family firms where the family’s voting power is at least 25% are more likely 
to exist in industries with greater amenity potential (publishing and broadcasting industries). The 
coefficient on AmeDum is significant in 14 of 15 years at least at 10% and the average 
coefficient (0.3924) is significantly different from zero at 1%. 
The observation that family firms are more likely to exist in more mature industries can be 
explained by the families’ ability to raise their descendants in the business from early on. This 
family-initiated business experience is more valuable in traditional industries such as food and 
apparel than in modern industries such as computers and biotech, where formal education is 
required. Family firms are also more likely to exist in industries, where the optimal company size 
is smaller. This can be due to families’ desire to keep control of their company with limited 
wealth. Having limited wealth it is easier for families to maintain control of a smaller company 
and thus, industries where small companies are optimal form of business organizations are more 
attractive for family-owned firms. There is also evidence that family firms are less likely to exist 
in industries with more growth opportunities, less profitability and higher earnings volatility. 
This observation can be due to higher risk aversion of families compared to atomistic 
shareholders as most of families’ wealth is tied to their company’s fortunes. Therefore, families 
may prefer industries where business risk is relatively lower. Finally, family firms are more 
likely to exist in industries with greater amenity potential (publishing and broadcasting 
industries). Such industries offer utility beyond wealth maximization such as through the ability 
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to create and affect public opinion, which may be more important for families as they see their 
companies as not just a business but an asset to pass on to their descendants. 
 
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter concentrates on the industry distribution of an important segment of U.S. economy. 
The industry distribution of public companies, in which families hold ownership stake and 
managerial and directorial positions, is studied. The empirical results are summarized below. 
There is strong evidence that family firms are more likely to exist in industries where the optimal 
company size is smaller. This can be related to the limited wealth of a family and their desire to 
maintain control of the company. Moreover, family firms are more likely to exist in industries 
with greater amenity potential such as publishing and broadcasting industries. 
There is also evidence that family firms are more likely to exist in mature industries. This can be 
related to family members’ ability to get involved with company business at an earlier age and 
the experience requirement in mature industries. Evidence also suggests that family firms are less 
likely to exist in industries with more growth opportunities and with larger earnings volatility. 
This can be related to higher risk aversion of families compared to atomistic shareholders as 
more of their wealth is tied to their company’s fortunes. 
Overall, the evidence in this chapter suggests that families prefer setting up their companies in 
industries where less wealth is required to maintain control; in industries with greater amenity 
potential; and in industries with less business and cash flow risk. 
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4 Capital Structure Choices of Family Firms 
The differences between family firms and non-family firms as well as between families and 
typical insiders and large stakeholders discussed in Chapter 1 make it interesting for a case 
whether family firms and non-family firms have systematic differences when it comes to their 
capital structure choices. Specifically, this chapter studies the level of debt, the maturity and 
priority structure of debt and the cash holdings and dividend policy based on a set of hypotheses 
developed in the literature. 
Anderson and Reeb (2003a) analyze whether founding-family ownership is correlated to the 
firm’s capital structure using non-utility and non-financial companies in the S&P 500 Index. 
They observe that founding-family ownership has little association with the firm’s capital 
structure. They also observe that founding family’s control of board seats is not associated with 
the corporation’s financing decisions. Combined with their finding that family firms are more 
valuable on average than non-family firms, they conclude that family ownership, in fact, reduces 
conflicts of interest within the company in contrast to the common perception that families 
expropriate wealth from minority investors. This chapter extends their work in the following 
ways: 
First, Anderson and Reeb concentrate only on the companies in the S&P 500 Index. The family 
firm sample in this chapter is derived from all exchange-listed public companies in the U.S. and 
is, therefore, more comprehensive. S&P 500 Index is performance based, i.e. companies have to 
satisfy certain performance criteria in order to be included in the Index. It is likely that capital 
structure of companies that satisfy such performance criteria is systematically different from that 
of companies in a more comprehensive sample. Therefore, this chapter will provide more 
comprehensive tests of the above-mentioned hypotheses. 
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Second, Anderson and Reeb measure an average level of debt, defined as long-term debt divided 
by book value of assets, of 19.0% for family firms and 18.4% for non-family firms in their 
sample and the difference is statistically not significant. Using the same leverage definition the 
sample in this chapter provides an average leverage (winsorized at 95%) of 17.5% for family 
firms and 19.0% for non-family firms for the years 1993 through 2002 and the difference is 
statistically significant at 1%. This result suggests that there is more to say about leverage in 
family firms than what is offered in Anderson and Reeb. 
Last but not least, Anderson and Reeb report higher densities of family firms in all of the one-
digit SIC codes than this chapter (except 0 and 9, in which they do not have any observation). 
Overall, 37% of 319 companies in their sample carry founding-family ownership while 14% of 
7,900 companies in this chapter are family firms. Systematic differences in capital structure 
likely exist due to within and between industry variations; therefore, composition of samples 
may have an impact on the results. For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that 
corporations determine their capital structure by trading off the benefits against the costs of debt. 
In this framework, for example, industries, in which the asset substitution problem is more 
limited, likely have higher leverage. The family firms in this chapter seem to concentrate in such 
industries while such an observation is not obvious for Anderson and Reeb’s sample. 
The main findings of this chapter are summarized as follows: Agency theory suggests, on the one 
hand, that in the companies with concentrated ownership majority owners can extract private 
benefits from the company at the expense of minority owners. On the other hand, large 
shareholders are able to better monitor the management and reduce the agency costs of free cash 
flow. There is evidence that family firms carry more debt on average than non-family firms, 
which suggests that monitoring benefit of family ownership outweighs the likely expropriation. 
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Underinvestment argument suggests that companies with high growth opportunities tend to 
borrow at shorter maturities. Better monitoring ability, on the other hand, increases the family 
firms’ ability to borrow at longer maturities as it decreases the underinvestment and asset 
substitution problems. Consistent with the monitoring argument, the evidence suggests that 
family firms use significantly less amount of short-term debt and more amount of long-term debt 
than non-family firms. However, this result is sensitive to the period used to define short- and 
long-term debt. 
Consistent with the argument that large shareholders are more risk averse, there is evidence that 
family firms borrow significantly less of high priority debt and significantly more of low priority 
debt than non-family firms. In line with this argument, family firms also use significantly less of 
preferred stock financing than non-family firms. 
Pecking order of financing suggests that companies use equity financing as a last resort and 
cover their financial deficit by issuing debt if internal cash flow is not sufficient. Neither debt 
financing nor equity financing seems desirable for family firms. Using debt to cover financial 
deficit may increase company’s financial risk while using equity may dilute family’s control in 
the company. Therefore, internal cash flow may be more valuable to a family firm than a non-
family firm. If so, family firms are expected to accumulate more cash and short-term securities 
and pay out less of their earnings as dividends. Inconsistent with this argument, however, the 
evidence suggests that family firms hold significantly less cash and short-term securities on their 
balance sheets while they pay out more of their earnings as dividends. 
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 4.1 briefly describes the sample. Section 4.2 presents 
the analysis of capital structure choices of family firms and non-family firms. Specifically, each 
subsection of Section 4.2 provides the theory behind one of level of debt, maturity structure of 
17 
 
debt, priority structure of debt, and cash holdings and dividend policy and derives associated 
predictions and then describes the experimental design and finally presents and discusses the 
results. Section 4.3 concludes. 
 
4.1 Sample Setup 
The process used to setup the sample in this chapter is described in Chapter 2. Briefly, an array 
of familial relationships in or closer than the degree of first cousin is used to search through 
proxy statements to the SEC during 2003 to identify family firms. After matching with 
Compustat, there are 1,123 family firms and 6,777 non-family firms in the sample. 
Capital structure literature uniformly uses panel data for analysis. Following this, this chapter 
uses panel data in multivariate settings. This is justifiable in the sense that family firms are long-
term investments of families and thus, they do not change hands frequently. Therefore, family 
and non-family sample of 7,900 companies set as of 2002 is used as a basis and two samples of 
these companies, one that spans the 1993-2002 period (thus, making sure every firm survives in 
the sample) and the other that spans the 1996-2005 period (thus, the sampling year is almost 
equidistant from endpoints), are used in the univariate and multivariate analyses that follow. 
Table 4.1 reports statistical distribution of the variables used in univariate and multivariate 
settings throughout this chapter. Panels A1 through A4 report statistics from 1993-2002 period 
while Panels B1 through B4 report statistics from 1996-2005 period for level of debt, maturity 
structure of debt, priority structure of debt, and cash holdings and dividend policy, respectively. 
The statistics, on average, suggest that there are many outliers in the sample. For example, return 
on assets (ROA) among 7,876 companies is -186% for the 1993-2002 period even at the 5th 
percentile (same statistic is -205% for the 1996-2005 period). Having many outliers have two 
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implications: (1) Comparison of medians should be preferred over means in univariate statistics, 
(2) Winsorization, trimming, or averaging over longer time series should be utilized in 
multivariate analyses. This chapter, therefore, concentrates on medians for univariate comparison 
of family firms and non-family firms while winsorization at 5% and 95% is utilized for some 
variables in multivariate analyses. 
 
4.2 Capital Structure Choices 
There has been extensive academic research to explain the variation in capital structure since the 
irrelevance theorems of Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963). One of such explanations 
concentrates on the contracting costs that arise between shareholders and creditors. How 
ownership is structured in a corporation may be related to the likelihood that such potential 
conflict exists between these two stakeholders. 
General perception is that large shareholders have greater incentive to monitor the company; 
however, they also have the ability to expropriate wealth from minority investors. Families share 
the same interests as other large shareholders to a significant extent. They also have some unique 
interests, though. One such interest is that families are likely less diversified than other large 
shareholders, i.e. most of their wealth is tied to the wealth of their company. This suggests that 
they are more risk averse than other large shareholders. Another unique interest is that families 
are more concerned about the survival of their companies. They see their corporations as an asset 
to pass onto their descendants. This implies that they likely have longer investment horizons than 
other large shareholders. Added to the similar interests shared with large shareholders, these 
unique interests of families may affect the capital structure choices their companies make as will 
be discussed in the following subsections. 
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4.2.1 Level of Debt 
4.2.1.1 Theory and Predictions 
Families like other large shareholders have the ability to better monitor the management. 
Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) recognize that concentrated ownership makes it 
privately rational for the shareholder to monitor the management because the benefits of 
monitoring will be borne by fewer individuals. However, the fact that corporations with 
dispersed ownership structure also exist in the market, they argue, suggests that there are also 
costs associated with concentrated ownership. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) model that large 
shareholders are able to achieve two tasks through the ability to better monitor the management: 
(1) They discipline inefficient managements, (2) They increase the price paid in the case of a 
takeover. Jensen (1986) states that monitoring ability of large shareholders is likely to prevent 
the management from undertaking investments with returns below the corporation’s cost of 
capital and thus reduce the agency costs of free cash flow. Therefore, large shareholders offer the 
benefit of better monitoring of the management, which, in turn, reduces non-pecuniary 
consumption and also increases free cash flow. Assuming that family firms have more 
concentrated ownership structure on average due to families’ ownership,10 this monitoring 
benefit will be greater and thus likely increase the debt capacity in such companies. One would 
then expect to see higher leverage for family firms than non-family firms. 
Families like other large shareholders may choose to use their control to expropriate wealth from 
minority investors. Faccio, Lang and Young (2001) study wealth expropriation by large 
shareholders through lower dividend payouts in East Asia and argue that expropriation is 
especially severe if large shareholders’ control rights are greater than their ownership rights. This 
                                                            
10 This assumption begs for further analysis, though. Anderson and Reeb (2003a) report an average outside 
blockholder ownership of 11.75% for non-family firms and 8.08% for family firms in the S&P 500 Index and the 
difference is statistically significant at 1%. 
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relative control of a large shareholder can be strengthened if the top executive is related to 
him/her (as suggested by Anderson and Reeb (2003a)) and/or if there are more people related to 
him/her, who are employed in the company. Consequently, relative control is likely stronger for 
family firms because they are generally identified with a dual class ownership structure with the 
family holding the high voting class shares and family members usually occupying the top 
management positions. If families then aim at expropriation, one would expect to see lower 
leverage for family firms than non-family firms as this increases their free cash flow. However, 
if they want to signal that expropriation is not their goal, then family firms are likely to carry 
more debt on average. 
Ellul (2008WP) reports that control motives influence capital structure decisions. Family firms, 
on average, have higher leverage than non-family firms and this differential increases in 
countries with weakest legal protection of minority shareholders. On the other hand, family firms 
use less debt when the family holds the control of the firm either through ownership or through a 
mechanism. Ellul, Guntay and Lel (2006WP) argue that family firms that originate in weak 
investor protection environments have higher cost of debt than non-family firms while family 
firms that originate in strong investor protection environments have lower cost of debt than non-
family firms. 
How large shareholders and thus families affect the investment decisions of companies is not 
quite clear. On the one hand, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that large shareholders likely value 
uncertain cash flows lower than atomistic shareholders due to higher risk aversion of large 
shareholders. Then, they will aim to reduce financial risk and thus increase the probability of the 
firm’s survival. Another implication of high risk aversion of large shareholders could be that 
they become like creditors in the firm. Harris and Raviv (1990) have a similar view: In their 
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model, debt mitigates the problem that managers will not accept to liquidate the company even 
though it is more profitable to do so by giving the creditors the option to force liquidation. On 
the other hand, Stein (1989) demonstrates that shareholders with long investment horizons help 
reduce the myopic decision-making by the management, i.e. such shareholders would prefer 
market value rules more than atomistic shareholders. If the survival of their firm is a family’s 
prior goal or they do not want to be forced to liquidate their firm, then one would expect to see 
lower leverage for family firms. Also, family wealth is tied to the fortunes of the business the 
family is in to a significant extent. Therefore, it is to family’s advantage to mitigate any costs due 
to suboptimal decision-making in the company. If families then use market value rules better 
than atomistic shareholders, family firms will be valued higher on average and this, in return, 
implies lower leverage for family firms for a given level of valuation. Thus, an observation that 
family firms carry less debt than non-family firms can be consistent both with families’ high risk 
aversion and their ability to use market value rules better. 
Overall, a high leverage for family firms when compared to non-family firms is consistent with 
family’s ability to better monitor the management and thus to reduce non-pecuniary consumption 
of company insiders and increase company’s debt capacity. A high leverage is also consistent 
with the family signaling the market that wealth expropriation is not their goal or committing 
itself to reduce the agency costs of free cash flow. A low leverage, on the other hand, is 
consistent with family’s intention to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders. A low 
leverage is also consistent with family’s higher risk aversion as most of their wealth is tied to the 
fortunes of the company. 
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4.2.1.2 Experimental Design 
Harris and Raviv (1991) suggest that variables that proxy for firm size, growth opportunities, 
profitability, risk, and free cash flow are related to leverage. Common predictions are that 
leverage increases in firm size and risk and decreases in growth opportunities while its relation to 
firm profitability and free cash flow depends on the trade-off between agency cost and 
asymmetric information approaches. Leverage decreases in profitability and increases in free 
cash flow in the agency cost approach and these predictions are reversed in the asymmetric 
information approach. 
Leverage measure will be based either on book value or market value even though market 
leverage is preferred in the literature. In either case, book value of debt is used in the numerator, 
which is sum of short-term debt and long-term debt. Book leverage then normalizes book value 
of debt by book value of assets while market leverage normalizes book value of debt by market 
value of assets. The natural logarithm of book value of assets is a proxy for firm size. Tobin’s q 
ratio, which is measured as market value of assets divided by book value of assets, is a proxy for 
the company’s growth opportunities. Return on assets is used to proxy firm’s profitability. 
Firm’s free cash flow can be measured using the formula in Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and 
normalized by book value of equity. Because the goal of this chapter is to see whether family 
existence has additional explanatory power in capital structure, a family firm dummy (1 for 
family firms; 0 otherwise) will be included in the multivariate settings.  
4.2.1.3 Results and Discussion 
Panels A1 through B3 of Table 4.2 present the univariate results of the variables used in the 
analysis of level of debt. Panels A1 through A3 report statistics from 1993-2002 period while 
Panels B1 through B3 report statistics from 1996-2005 period. The results are similar in either 
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period; therefore, only results from 1993-2002 period will be discussed below. Contrary to the 
common perception Panel A1 of Table 4.2 suggests that family firms are larger than non-family 
firms at the median. The median family firm has a book value of assets of $163.1 million while 
the median non-family firm’s corresponding value is $149.5 million. Furthermore, family firms 
have fewer growth opportunities than non-family firms as measured by Tobin’s q ratio (market-
to-book assets). Median Tobin’s q ratio for family firms is 1.31 while the corresponding ratio for 
non-family firms is 1.70. Family firms are also more profitable at the median than non-family 
firms. Median return on assets for family firms is 1.6% while it is 0.4% for non-family firms. 
Finally, family firms generate 16 cents of free cash flow per dollar of book equity while non-
family firms generate 12 cents. The differences in the above variables are all statistically 
significant at 1%. 
Book leverage and market leverage in Panel A1 of Table 4.2 have opposite results, however. 
Book leverage, defined as total debt divided by book value of assets, is less for family firms 
(19.9% at the median) than for non-family firms (22% at the median). Market leverage, defined 
as total debt divided by market value of assets, on the other hand, is greater for family firms 
(13.6% at the median) than for non-family firms (10.9% at the median). Both differences are 
statistically significant at the 1%. As the numerator is same in both ratios, this seemingly 
conflicting result suggests that family firms are valued less on average in the market than non-
family firms. Multivariate analysis that follows may clarify this issue better. 
Panels A1 through B2 of Table 4.3 present the results of various multivariate specifications, in 
which book leverage (Panels A1 and B1) and market leverage (Panels A2 and B2) are the 
dependent variables and they are regressed on proxies for size, growth opportunities, profitability 
and free cash flow plus a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is a family 
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firm. The sample period is either 1993-2002 (Panels A1 and A2) or 1996-2005 (Panels B1 and 
B2). The results in each panel are presented separately for the overall sample in models 1-3, for 
the sample that excludes utilities and financials in models 4-6, and for the sample that excludes 
utilities and financials and where family’s voting power is at least 25% in models 7-9. Year 
controls and industry controls (either SIC manual divisions as defined in Kahle and Walkling 
(1996), or Fama-French 38 industries, or 2-digit SIC codes) are included in each model. 
Book leverage regressions (Panels A1 and B1) produce mixed results regarding level of debt in 
family firms. The coefficient on FFDum is significant in only four models in either panel and the 
significance disappears as more restrictive industry controls are applied. The coefficients on 
FFDum become more significant as they become more positive and lose significance as they 
become close to zero or negative. This suggests that family firms carry on average more book 
debt than non-family firms. Also the coefficients on FFDum become more positive if the sample 
is restricted to non-utilities and non-financials and where family’s voting power is at least 25%. 
Market leverage regressions (Panels A2 and B2), on the other hand, quite strongly suggest that 
family firms carry more debt on average than non-family firms. The coefficient on FFDum is 
positive and highly significant in all models in either panel ranging from 0.5% to 2.8% for 1993-
2002 period and 0.5% to 2.7% for 1996-2005 period. The coefficients increase as the sample 
becomes more restrictive; however, they decrease as the industry controls become more 
restrictive. This is consistent with empirical evidence that documents strong industry effects in 
debt ratios (Schwartz and Aronson (1967)). The results in the most restrictive sample (Model 9 
in both time periods) suggest that family firms carry about 1.05% more debt than non-family 
firms at the mean (using 1993-2002 period). Considering that 14.85% of non-family firms’ 
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market value of assets is debt on average a coefficient of 1.05% on the FFDum implies that 
family firms carry about 7.07% more debt on average than non-family firms. 
Overall, the multivariate specifications suggest that family firms carry more debt, on average, 
than non-family firms and the difference becomes larger when utilities and financials are 
excluded. The evidence that family firms carry more debt than non-family firms is consistent 
with the agency hypothesis that family existence decreases the free cash flow problem and thus 
increases the company’s debt capacity as well as the signaling hypothesis that commits families 
from wealth expropriation of minority shareholders. 
4.2.2 Maturity Structure of Debt 
4.2.2.1 Theory and Predictions 
The choice for the maturity structure of debt for any company seems to be related mainly to its 
informational asymmetries. Myers (1977) demonstrates that the underinvestment problem is 
more severe for corporations with more growth options. Using restrictive covenants, setting a 
low leverage level or borrowing at shorter effective maturity can help mitigate the 
underinvestment problem. Therefore, other things being equal, companies with more growth 
opportunities either carry lower debt in their capital structures or borrow at shorter terms, as 
evidenced in Barclay and Smith (1995a). Moreover, Flannery (1986) argues that companies with 
large informational asymmetries tend to carry debt with shorter maturities as long-term debt has 
larger information costs. Family firms also likely prefer debt with fewer restrictive covenants as 
covenants may restrict the amenity potential of the business for the family. Moreover, insofar 
that family ownership helps reduce agency costs between shareholders and creditors, as 
evidenced in Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2003), or informational asymmetries thereof, family 
firms will be able to carry more debt or borrow at longer maturities than non-family firms. 
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Overall, use of less short-term debt and more long-term debt in family firms compared to non-
family firms is consistent with the ability of family ownership to reduce informational 
asymmetries and thus to borrow at longer maturities. Use of more short-term debt and less long-
term debt, however, can be attributed to more growth opportunities of family firms compared to 
non-family firms. (Family firms have significantly lower Tobin’s q ratios than non-family 
firms;11 therefore, this latter argument is not likely to be supported.) 
4.2.2.2 Experimental Design 
In their study of determinants of maturity structure of debt, Barclay and Smith (1995a) use 
Tobin’s q ratio, market value of assets, abnormal earnings and term structure in order to explain 
the characteristics of companies that carry debt with longer maturity.12 First, firm’s growth 
opportunities are related to its various policy choices, namely financing, compensation and 
dividend policies as evidenced by Smith and Watts (1992). Companies with more growth 
opportunities are likely to issue short-term debt in order to reduce the possible underinvestment 
and asset substitution problems. Second, issuing public debt has substantial fixed costs; 
therefore, larger companies can benefit from economies of scale. Smaller companies tend to 
borrow from banks, which generally lend at shorter maturities. Third, companies with larger 
informational asymmetries tend to issue short-term debt because of the larger information costs 
associated with long-term debt. Finally, Brick and David (1985) suggest that upward sloping 
yield curve increases the tax benefits of long-term debt over short-term debt and vice versa. 
Insofar that family ownership helps reduce informational asymmetries between the company and 
various stakeholders, family firms are able to increase their debt capacity with longer maturity. 
                                                            
11 See Panel A1 of Table 4.4. 
12 They also use a regulation dummy to identify regulated industries, but this variable is not relevant for the sample 
period used in this chapter. 
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Including a family firm dummy (1 for family firms; 0 otherwise) in the multivariate settings will 
help to answer this empirical question. 
4.2.2.3 Results and Discussion 
Panels A1 through B2 of Table 4.4 present the univariate results of the variables used in the 
analysis of maturity structure of debt for manufacturing firms (SIC codes 2000 through 5999). 
Panels A1 and A2 report statistics from 1993-2002 period while Panels B1 and B2 report 
statistics from 1996-2005 period. The results are similar in either period; therefore, only results 
from 1993-2002 period will be discussed below. The results in Panel A1 suggest that the choice 
for maturity structure of debt weakly differs between family firms and non-family firms. The 
choice is only different if short-term debt is defined as debt due in the next year and long-term 
debt is defined as debt due after next year.  Under such definition family firms carry less short-
term debt at the mean (33.8% vs. 35.9%) and more long-term debt both at the mean and the 
median than non-family firms (72.4% vs. 69.8% at the median). These numbers are significantly 
different at 5%. Using other periods to define short-term debt and long-term debt produce 
insignificant results as presented in the panel. 
Panels A and B of Table 4.5 present the results of several multivariate specifications for 
manufacturing firms (SIC codes 2000 through 5999), in which various definitions of short- and 
long-term debt are regressed on proxies for growth opportunities, size, informational asymmetry, 
and effective marginal tax rate plus a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is 
a family firm. The definitions of short- and long-term debt vary from the traditional one, in 
which short-term debt is portion of debt due within next year while long-term debt is portion of 
debt due after next year to the less traditional ones, in which short-term debt is portion of debt 
due within the next 2 or 3 years while long-term debt is portion of debt due after 2 or 3 years. 
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The sample period is either 1993-2002 (Panel A) or 1996-2005 (Panel B). The results in each 
panel are presented separately for the overall sample and for the sample where family’s voting 
power is at least 25%. Year controls and industry controls (2-digit SIC codes) are included in 
each model. 
The results in Table 4.5 are mixed and depend on the definition of short- and long-term debt. The 
most consistent results are from the traditional definitions, in which short-term debt includes debt 
up to one year and long-term debt includes debt beyond one year. Irrespective of the period or 
the sample used in the regressions, family firms carry significantly less short-term debt and 
significantly more long-term debt than non-family firms. The coefficient on the FFDum is -
1.92% in short-term debt regression while it is 2.60% in long-term debt regression (using overall 
sample during 1993-2002 period). Considering that 35.91% of non-family firms’ debt is short 
term on average a coefficient of -1.92% on the FFDum implies that family firms hold about 
5.35% less short-term debt than non-family firms. Similarly, considering that 60.79% of non-
family firms’ debt is long term on average a coefficient of 2.60% on the FFDum implies that 
family firms hold about 4.28% more long-term debt than non-family firms. These results are 
consistent with families’ ability to reduce underinvestment and asset substitution problems 
through better monitoring and thus to borrow at longer maturities. Using other periods to define 
short- and long-term debt produce mostly insignificant results (except for the regressions for the 
overall sample during 1993-2002 period, in which coefficients on short-term debt are still 
significantly negative while they are significantly positive on long-term debt). 
Overall, family firms tend to use less short-term and more long-term debt than non-family firms, 
which is consistent with their better monitoring ability. 
 
29 
 
4.2.3 Priority Structure of Debt 
4.2.3.1 Theory and Predictions 
The choice for priority structure of debt seems to have multiple determinants as discussed in the 
literature. In their analysis of industrial companies, Barclay and Smith (1995b) observe that the 
choice among debt with different priority structures such as capitalized leases, secured debt, 
ordinary debt, subordinated debt and preferred stock is strongly related to contracting hypothesis 
while there is limited support for tax hypothesis and low support for signaling hypothesis. They 
argue that companies that face underinvestment and asset substitution problems to a larger extent 
are more likely to issue senior debt – usually in the form of secured debt and capitalized leases. 
Companies in higher effective marginal tax brackets are more likely to issue low priority debt in 
order to benefit from the tax shield of interest payments. Finally, undervalued companies are 
more likely to issue high priority claims and overvalued companies are more likely to issue low 
priority claims. There is no reason to believe that family firms will be systematically in different 
effective marginal tax brackets or more/less undervalued than non-family firms. However, 
insofar that family ownership in firms helps reduce the agency costs related to underinvestment 
and asset substitution problems, family firms likely have more room to issue less senior debt than 
non-family firms. Also, higher risk aversion of families is likely to prevent family firms from 
issuing higher priority claims such as capitalized leases or secured debt or fixed claims with 
likely voting rights such as preferred stock. 
Overall, both families’ ability to reduce underinvestment and asset substitution problems through 
better monitoring and higher risk aversion than an atomistic shareholder suggest that family 
firms prefer issuing claims with lower priority. Their higher risk aversion also suggests that 
family firms refrain from issuing preferred stock as it may dilute their control of the firm. 
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4.2.3.2 Experimental Design 
Barclay and Smith (1995b) use Tobin’s q ratio, abnormal earnings, tax-loss carryforward dummy 
and market value of assets to explain the variation in priority structure of debt obligations.13 
First, companies with more growth opportunities can reduce the likely underinvestment and asset 
substitution problems by committing to debt with higher priority claims. Second, undervalued 
companies tend to issue debt with higher priority and overvalued companies tend to issue debt 
with lower priority. Third, companies with higher effective marginal tax rates tend to issue debt 
with lower priority and vice versa. Finally, larger companies are able to issue debt with lower 
priority due to their lower informational asymmetries. 
If family existence helps to reduce underinvestment and asset substitution problems, family firms 
are able to issue more claims with lower priority than non-family firms. Also, if families are 
more risk averse than an average investor, family firms are likely to issue lower priority claims 
than non-family firms. Including a family firm dummy (1 for family firms; 0 otherwise) in the 
multivariate settings may test whether this is the case. 
4.2.3.3 Results and Discussion 
Panels A1 through B2 of Table 4.6 present the univariate results of the variables used in the 
analysis of priority structure of debt for manufacturing firms (SIC codes 2000 through 5999). 
Panels A1 and A2 report statistics from 1993-2002 period while Panels B1 and B2 report 
statistics from 1996-2005 period. The results are similar in either period; therefore, only results 
from 1993-2002 period will be discussed below. When compared to non-family firms, family 
firms use significantly more of secured debt (23.8% vs. 17.9%) and ordinary debt (64.6% vs. 
51.5%) at the median while they use significantly less of preferred equity (5.6% vs. 11.3%) at the 
                                                            
13 They also use a regulation dummy to identify regulated industries, but this variable is not relevant for the sample 
period used in this chapter. 
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mean. The significance level is 1% for all three variables. The usage of capitalized leases and 
subordinated debt does not seem to differ between family and non-family firms. 
Panels A and B of Table 4.7 present the results of several multivariate specifications for 
manufacturing firms (SIC codes 2000 through 5999), in which claims in each priority class as a 
fraction of total fixed claims are regressed on proxies for growth opportunities, informational 
asymmetry, effective marginal tax rate and size plus a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
the observation is a family firm. These claims are capitalized leases, secured debt, ordinary debt, 
subordinated debt and preferred stock, ranked from highest to lowest priority. The sample period 
is either 1993-2002 (Panel A) or 1996-2005 (Panel B). The results in each panel are presented 
separately for the overall sample and for the sample where family’s voting power is at least 25%. 
Year controls and industry controls (2-digit SIC codes) are included in each model. 
The results in either panel of Table 4.7 suggest an inverted-U shape for family firms in their 
choice for claims with varying priority structure and they become stronger for the sample where 
family’s voting power is at least 25%. Family firms use significantly less capitalized leases 
(highest priority claim) and preferred equity (lowest priority claim). Less use of capitalized 
leases is consistent with family’s lower propensity towards financial risk while less use of 
preferred equity is consistent with family’s unwillingness to dilute or lose control as preferred 
equity usually comes with voting and/or convertibility rights. Moreover, preferred equity has 
priority over common equity in dividends; therefore, families may prefer not losing their cash 
flows to preferred equity investors. The remainder of the results suggest that family firms also 
use significantly more secured debt, ordinary claims and subordinated debt (from second highest 
priority claim to second lowest) with ordinary claims having the largest coefficient. This 
altogether may be consistent with the ability of family ownership to reduce conflicts among 
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various stakeholders of the company; and therefore, family firm’s ability to raise more debt. 
However, family firms prefer using ordinary claims (64.6% of total fixed claims at the median) 
to secured debt (23.8% of total fixed claims at the median), which suggests that there is still 
some component of higher risk aversion for families. 
The coefficient on the FFDum in capitalized leases regression is -0.56% (using overall sample 
during 1993-2002 period). Considering that 3.63% of non-family firms’ fixed claims is 
capitalized leases on average a coefficient of -0.56% on the FFDum implies that family firms use 
15.43% less capitalized leases on average than non-family firms. Similar analysis suggests that 
family firms use 7.45% more secured debt, 9.41% more ordinary claims, 8.39% more 
subordinated debt while they use 15.96% less preferred stock on average than non-family firms. 
Overall, family firms use significantly less of highest and lowest priority claims and more of 
priority claims that lie in between. They prefer using ordinary claims, which has a medium 
priority, to any other fixed claim. 
4.2.4 Cash Holdings and Dividend Policy 
4.2.4.1 Theory and Predictions 
Choice of financing for family firms is mainly a tradeoff between their willingness to carry more 
debt, which may be inconsistent with the family’s higher risk aversion, and their willingness to 
issue equity, which may threaten family’s control of the firm. The traditional pecking order of 
financing (Myers and Majluf (1984)) suggests that corporations cover their financial deficits by 
issuing debt and equity only comes to picture when issuing debt is near impossible. The tradeoff 
theory, on the other hand, suggests that corporations have a target capital structure and adjust 
their capital structure to that target over time. The evidence is mixed at best leaning towards the 
tradeoff theory (Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Chirinko and Singha (2000), Fama and 
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French (2002), Frank and Goyal (2003)). It is likely that family firms refrain from issuing neither 
debt nor equity because issuing debt may increase the company’s financial risk and issuing 
equity may weaken the control of the family. This further suggests that family firms may rely 
more on their internal cash flow, which in turn may reduce their ability to pay dividends. 
Overall, family firms’ lower propensity to cover financial deficit using external financing is 
likely to lead them to accumulate more cash and short-term securities on their balance sheets 
than non-family firms. Moreover, if family firms rely more on their internal cash flow, their 
ability to pay dividends will be reduced; therefore, they will have lower dividend payout ratios 
than non-family firms. 
4.2.4.2 Experimental Design 
Smith and Watts (1992) develop a simple model to explain the variation in dividend policy of 
corporations. Firms retain part of their earnings to be reinvested and pay out the rest as 
dividends. Therefore, they argue that the greater the amount of investment in a given period, the 
smaller the dividend. That is, firms with many growth opportunities will have lower a dividend 
payout ratio. They use Tobin’s q ratio to proxy for growth opportunities. They also use firm size 
as the other explanatory variable even though they admit that they have no reason to expect a 
relationship between firm size and dividend policy. 
If family firms are more reluctant to use external financing because they are concerned about the 
increase in financial risk by issuing debt or the dilution of control by issuing equity, they will 
rely more on internal financing. This implies that (1) family firms will carry more cash and 
short-term securities on their balance sheets than non-family firms, and (2) family firms will 
have lower dividend payout ratios than non-family firms. Including in the model above a family 
firm dummy (1 for family firms; 0 otherwise) may clarify this empirical question. 
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4.2.4.3 Results and Discussion 
The univariate results in Panel A1 of Table 4.8 show a significant difference between the cash 
holdings and the dividend policy of family firms and that of non-family firms. Family firms hold 
less cash and short-term securities than non-family firms (8.18% versus 9.33% at the median) 
and this difference is significantly different from zero at 1%. Moreover, family firms offer higher 
dividend yield than non-family firms (0.02% versus 0.00% at the median) and family firms pay 
out more of their earnings as dividends than non-family firms (5.68% versus 0.00% at the 
median) and both these differences are also significantly different from zero at 1%. (Common 
dividend is quite sticky while net income fluctuates year over year. Therefore, the dividend 
payout ratio tends to be a volatile number. If, in order to reduce this volatility, dividend payout 
ratio is redefined as common dividends-to-operating income before depreciation, the results 
persist. That is, family firms pay out significantly more dividends as a portion of their operating 
income before depreciation than non-family firms (1.76% versus 0.00% at the median) and this 
difference is significantly different from zero at 1%.) 
Panels A1 through B4 of Table 4.9 present the results of various multivariate specifications, in 
which cash and short-term securities-to-book value of assets (Panels A1 and B1), dividend yield 
(Panels A2 and B2), dividend payout ratio (Panels A3 and B3) and common dividends-to-
operating income before depreciation (Panels A4 and B4) are the dependent variables and they 
are regressed on proxies for size and growth opportunities plus a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if the observation is a family firm. The sample period is either 1993-2002 (Panels A1 
through A4) or 1996-2005 (Panels B1 through B4). The results in each panel are presented 
separately for the overall sample in models 1-3, for the sample that excludes utilities and 
financials in models 4-6, and for the sample that excludes utilities and financials and where 
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family’s voting power is at least 25% in models 7-9. Year controls and industry controls (either 
SIC manual divisions as defined in Kahle and Walkling (1996), or Fama-French 38 industries, or 
2-digit SIC codes) are included in each model. 
The cash holding regressions (Panels A1 and B1 of Table 4.9) suggest that family firms carry 
less cash and short-term securities than non-family firms. The coefficient on FFDum is 
significant at 1% in all the models in both time periods. The results in the most restrictive sample 
(Model 9 in both time periods) suggest that family firms carry about 1.54% less cash than non-
family firms at the mean (using 1993-2002 period). Considering that non-family firms hold 
22.16% on average of their assets in cash and short-term securities a coefficient of -1.54% on the 
FFDum implies that family firms hold about 6.95% less cash on average than non-family firms. 
The dividend payout regressions (Panels A2 through A4 and B2 through B4 of Table 4.9) 
suggest that family firms have higher dividend payout ratios than non-family firms. The 
coefficient on FFDum is highly significant in all but 3 models. The results in the most restrictive 
sample (Model 9 in both time periods) suggest that family firms’ dividend payout ratio is about 
1.46% more than that of non-family firms at the mean (using 1993-2002 period). Considering 
that non-family firms pay 13.92% of their earnings as dividends on average a coefficient of 
1.46% on the FFDum implies that family firms pay about 10.49% more of their earnings as 
dividends on average than non-family firms. 
Overall, in contrast with the expectations in this section that family firms will hold more cash 
and short-term securities and have lower dividend payout ratios than non-family firms, the 
multivariate specifications suggest that family firms actually hold significantly less cash and pay 
out significantly more of their earnings as dividends. 
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4.3 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter concentrates on an important segment of U.S. economy with respect to its capital 
structure choices. Public companies, in which families hold ownership stake and managerial and 
directorial positions, are studied in regards to their choices in level, maturity structure and 
priority structure of debt as well as cash holdings and dividend policy. The empirical results are 
summarized below. 
First, evidence suggests that family firms carry more debt on average than non-family firms. 
Higher leverage is consistent with the family ownership’s better monitoring ability and thus 
ability to reduce the free cash flow problem as well as the commitment of families not to 
expropriate wealth from minority shareholders. 
Second, there is evidence that family firms use less short-term debt and more long-term debt 
even though this evidence is sensitive to the period that is used to define short- and long-term 
debt. This finding is consistent with family firms’ ability to borrow at longer maturities insofar 
that family ownership better aligns the incentives of shareholders and creditors, i.e. reduces the 
underinvestment and asset substitution problems. 
Third, the choice for debt with varying priority structure offers an inverted-U shape for family 
firms. Evidence suggests that family firms use less of capitalized leases (highest priority claim) 
and preferred equity (lowest priority claim) and more of secured debt, ordinary claims (whose 
coefficient is largest) and subordinated debt, whose level of priority lie in between. The evidence 
on capitalized leases provides support for family’s desire to protect company’s assets as they are 
intended to pass onto their descendants while the evidence on preferred equity provides support 
for family’s desire to keep the control of the company as preferred equity is usually issued with 
voting and convertibility rights and it has priority over common equity in dividends. Higher use 
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of the remainder claims is consistent with family firm’s ability to raise more debt through better 
monitoring of the company and thus reducing the agency problem. However, the preference of 
ordinary claims to secured debt suggests that there is still a higher risk aversion component. 
Fourth, in contrast with the expectations in this chapter, family firms carry significantly less cash 
and short-term securities while they pay out significantly more of their earnings as dividends 
than non-family firms. 
Overall, the capital structure choices of family firms differ significantly from those of non-family 
firms. These choices can be explained by the ability of family ownership to reduce agency 
conflicts as well as family’s higher risk aversion regarding company’s assets and control. 
 
 
5 Performance and Survival of Family Firms after Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
The differences between family firms and non-family firms as well as between families and 
typical insiders and large stakeholders discussed in Chapter 1 make it interesting for a case 
whether family firms and non-family firms react differently to a significant change in 
government regulation. Specifically, this chapter analyzes whether family firms and non-family 
firms differ in their performance and survival after Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (heretofore, the 
Act) as the Act is expected to have a significant impact on the workings of both family firms and 
non-family firms, details of which is below. 
The Act is one of the most significant attempts in the name of protecting investors better since 
the establishment of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1934. It aims at increasing 
the transparency of the financial statements and the accountability of managements and boards of 
directors. In addition, the Act sets up Public Company Accounting Oversight Board in order to 
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audit the audit firms and the costs associated with the Board are to be borne by the public 
companies in the United States in ratio to their market capitalization. The Act also prohibits 
companies from receiving audit and non-audit services from the same audit firm. Moreover, the 
Act holds the CEO and the CFO as well as the accounting committee of the company, which is 
to be composed of independent directors, financially responsible for the accuracy of the 
company’s financial statements. Finally, the Act requires all material off-balance sheet 
transactions to be filed with the SEC and prohibits companies from extending credit lines to their 
managers and directors. In line with the spirit of the Act, NYSE and Nasdaq administrations 
require boards of directors of listed companies to be composed of majority independent directors. 
The success of the Act is expected to affect the performance of family firms compared to non-
family firms. Because of their prolonged interest and frequent holding of top managerial 
positions in their companies, families are likely to act as better monitors in their companies than 
the counterparties in non-family companies. This, in turn, will reduce the various agency-related 
costs and thus, suggest that performance of family firms will be better than that of non-family 
firms. If, on the other hand, the Act achieves its goal of greater transparency, the differential 
better performance of family firms over non-family firms is expected to diminish as the Act 
becomes a monitoring agent for non-family firms. 
Among the substantial material costs (i.e. fixed costs estimated at around half a million dollars at 
least in during the initial couple of years) and the immaterial costs (such as requirements about 
committees and boards of directors) of the Act, the latter is expected to affect the family firms 
significantly as family members occupy managerial and directorial positions in these companies. 
The choice for those companies that do not wish to be subject to the requirements of the Act is to 
delist from stock exchanges either via an acquisition or via an ordinary delisting. However, an 
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acquisition ends the survivability of the family firm and an ordinary delisting is likely to lead to a 
negative market reaction that will destroy family wealth since the firm reveals that it is not 
wishing to adhere to the higher standards of the Act. The tradeoff between the immaterial costs 
of the Act and the immaterial costs of an acquisition or the material costs of an ordinary delisting 
is then expected to determine the family firm’s decision to stay public and listed on an exchange. 
Main findings of this chapter are summarized as follows: First, family firms significantly 
outperform non-family firms up to 2.5 years before the Act. This better performance, however, 
disappears during the 1.5 years after the Act. However, use of longer intervals (up to 4.5 years 
before and after) does not reveal any significant results. Second, family firms are significantly 
less likely than non-family firms to delist from exchanges in the post-Act period suggesting that 
family firms are more concerned of survival and wealth effects of delisting than the immaterial 
costs of the Act. This lower likelihood is consistently significant in delisting via acquisition and 
is somewhat mixed in delisting via a reason other than an acquisition. 
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 5.1 briefly describes the sample. Section 5.2 presents 
the analysis of performance of family firms and non-family firms around the Act. Section 5.3 
presents the analysis of survival of family firms and non-family firms after the Act. Section 5.4 
concludes. 
 
5.1 Sample Setup 
The process used to setup the sample in this chapter is described in Chapter 2. Briefly, an array 
of familial relationships in or closer than the degree of first cousin is used to search through 
proxy statements to the SEC during 2003 to identify family firms. After matching with 
Compustat and CRSP, there are 1,053 family firms and 5,133 non-family firms in the sample. 
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Panel A of Table 5.1 presents an aggregated distribution of survival of family firms and non-
family firms between January 2002 and December 2006 while Panel B of Table 5.1 presents a 
disaggregated distribution. According to the data, 792 family firms (75.21% of total) and 3,647 
non-family firms (71.05%) survived through December 2006. 145 family firms (13.77% of total) 
and 824 non-family firms (16.05% of total), on the other hand, delisted via acquisition while 116 
family firms (11.02% of total) and 662 non-family firms (12.90%) delisted via other reasons 
between January 2002 and December 2006. Initial evidence suggests that family firms are less 
likely to delist either via acquisition or via other reasons. Detailed analysis of survival takes 
place in Section 5.3. 
 
5.2 Performance 
5.2.1 Theory and Predictions 
Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003) relate the quality of legal protection of outside investors to 
monitoring activity done by the family and look at that relation’s impact on the choice of 
management in the company. Their model leads to following predictions: (1) Monitoring is not 
required in environments with good legal protection of outside investors and thus widely held 
professionally managed company becomes optimal; (2) With moderate legal protection of 
outside investors, family stays as the large shareholder and monitors the professional manager; 
(3) In environments with weak legal protection of outside investors, family’s monitoring ability 
is limited; therefore, management stays with the family. 
Empirical evidence about the valuation of family firms, on the other hand, is sensitive to how a 
family firm is defined. Anderson and Reeb (2003a) observe that family firms are valued at higher 
multiples than non-family firms. However, their sample includes founder-owned companies as 
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family firms as well. Villalonga and Amit (2006) report that family firms are valued at higher 
multiples if the founder is also the CEO or in the case of a descendant being the CEO, there are 
control enhancing mechanisms adopted. Miller et al. (2007) argue that when lone founder 
companies are not considered as family firms, there is no valuation differential between family 
firms and non-family firms. 
If, as suggested, family ownership acts as an additional monitoring device on behalf of outside 
investors, performance of family firms is expected to be better than that of non-family firms 
during weaker legal protection of outside investors and this better performance is expected to 
diminish once the legal protection of outside investors becomes stronger. The goal of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 is to make company executives more responsible about company financials 
and company financials more transparent especially after a period of corporate scandals. The 
enactment of the Act, therefore, can prove to be a point where protection of outside investors 
becomes stronger. If this is the case, the performance of family firms should be better than that 
of non-family firms before the Act and this better performance should diminish or disappear 
once the Act is passed into law as the Act removes the marginal benefit of having family 
ownership as a monitoring agent on behalf of outside investors. 
5.2.2 Experimental Design 
Single-factor model that uses a proxy for the market portfolio has been utilized extensively in the 
academic literature to adjust for risk until Fama and French (1992) evidenced that the single 
factor was not sufficient to explain the variation in returns and Fama and French (1993) offered 
three factors that explain such variation significantly better. These three factors are a proxy for 
the market risk premium (MKTRF) and size (SMB) and book-to-market (HML). Carhart (1997) 
argues that momentum is a fourth factor. This study investigates whether the portfolio of family 
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firms outperformed the portfolio of non-family firms before the Act and if that is the case, 
whether this better performance diminished after the Act. Therefore, in addition to the factors 
mentioned above, a dummy variable (FFDum) that takes the value 1 if the observation is a 
portfolio of family firms and 0 otherwise, a dummy variable (SOXDum) that takes the value 1 if 
the observation is in post-Act period and 0 otherwise, and an interaction term (FF*SOX) of these 
two dummy variables are going to be utilized. Therefore, family firm dummy will measure the 
excess performance of family firms over non-family firms during the pre-Act period while the 
sum of family firm dummy and the interaction term will measure the excess performance of 
family firms over non-family firms during the post-Act period.14 
5.2.3 Results and Discussion 
Panel A of Table 5.2 compares the unadjusted average daily returns for various portfolios (all 
firms, survivors, delistings via acquisitions, delistings via other reasons) of family firms and non-
family firms while Panel B of Table 5.2 compares the unadjusted average daily returns for 
various portfolios of family firms where the family’s voting power is at least 25% and non-
family firms over periods 0.5 years through 4.5 years at one-year intervals before and after the 
Act. The evidence does not show any significant difference except for the portfolios of family 
firms and non-family firms in both panels that delisted between January 2002 and December 
2006 over 0.5 years before the Act. Family firms in this case generated 0.08% daily return while 
non-family firms generated -0.1% daily return and the difference is significant at 10%. Family 
firms where the family’s voting power is at least 25% generated 0.12% daily return and the 
difference between this and the average daily return of non-family firms is significant at 5%. 
                                                            
14 To see this, consider the model: R = β0 + β1 x MKTRF + β2 x SMB + β3 x HML + β4 x FFDum + β5 x SOXDum + 
β6 x FFDum x SOXDum. If we take the partial derivative with respect to FFDum, we have ∂R/∂FFDum = β4 + β6 x 
SOXDum. Then, during the pre-Act period, i.e. when SOXDum = 0, we have ∂R/∂FFDum = β4 and during the post-
Act period, i.e. when SOXDum = 1, we have ∂R/∂FFDum = β4 + β6. 
43 
 
Even though the remaining differences show no significance, the returns tend to be greater for 
family firms than non-family firms for the periods before the Act and they tend to be equal or 
less for the periods after the Act. 
The different industry distributions of family firms and non-family firms suggest that these two 
portfolios of firms may be carrying different levels of risk; therefore, risk-adjusted returns may 
give a better picture as to whether there are any differences between the performances of family 
firms and non-family firms before and after the Act. Single-factor model that utilizes the market 
return, Fama-French three-factor model that utilizes size and book-to-market factors in addition 
to the market risk premium, and Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model that utilizes momentum 
effect in addition to the Fama-French three factors are used to adjust the returns for risk. Each 
year the factor loadings are generated and used to adjust the returns of the coming year in the 
data. For example, the factor loadings of 1997 are used to adjust the returns during 1998; the 
factor loadings of 1998 are used to adjust the returns during 1999, etc. Because the results are 
similar, only Fama-French three-factor adjusted returns are reported in the tables. The 
comparison of average adjusted returns for various portfolios of family firms and non-family 
firms is in Panels A and B of Table 5.3. 
Panel A of Table 5.3 compares the adjusted average daily returns for various portfolios (all 
firms, survivors, delistings via acquisitions, delistings via other reasons) of family firms and non-
family firms while Panel B of Table 5.3 compares the adjusted average daily returns for various 
portfolios of family firms where the family’s voting power is at least 25% and non-family firms 
over periods 0.5 years through 4.5 years at one-year intervals before and after the Act. Average 
adjusted returns in Panels A and B of Table 5.3 suggest that family firms significantly 
outperform the non-family firms at least during the 0.5 years before the Act. Family firms 
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generate an average daily adjusted return of 0.09% during this period while non-family firms 
generate 0.01% and this difference is significant at 1%. Family firms where the family’s voting 
power is at least 25% also generate an average daily adjusted return of 0.09% and the difference 
between this and the average daily adjusted return of non-family firms is significant at 5%. Using 
only the survivors produces a similar result. This outperformance of family firms disappears for 
any period after the Act. There are some other significant differences in Table 5.3; however, 
these are not consistent for all portfolios of family firms and non-family firms. 
To better address the question whether family firms outperformed non-family firms before the 
Act and if that is the case, whether this differential diminished after the Act, a multivariate 
analysis is in order. Panels A1 through B5 of Table 5.4 present the results of multivariate settings 
where the daily returns of various portfolios of family firms and non-family firms are regressed 
on Fama-French three-factors plus dummy variables that take the value 1 if the observation is a 
family-firm portfolio and if the observation is in post-Act period and an interaction term of these 
dummy variables. Family firm dummy measures the excess performance of family firms over 
non-family firms during the pre-Act period while family firm dummy and the interaction term 
measures the excess performance of family firms over non-family firms during the post-Act 
period.15 Panels A1 through A5 use portfolios of family firms and non-family firms during 2002, 
2001-2003, 2000-2004, 1999-2005, and 1998-2006 periods, respectively while Panels B1 
through B5 use portfolios of family firms where the family’s voting power is at least 25% and 
non-family firms during the same periods. 
Panel A1 of Table 5.4 presents a strong reversal during the one year around the Act. If only the 
family firm dummy is used in addition to the three factors, the coefficient turns out to be 0.0005, 
which is significant at 10%. However, if the full model is utilized, then the coefficient on the 
                                                            
15 See footnote 14 for clarification. 
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family firm dummy becomes 0.0012 and the coefficient on the interaction term becomes -0.0014, 
both of which are significant at 1%. The sum of the two coefficients is -0.0002 and not 
significantly different from zero. The results suggest that family firms outperformed non-family 
firms during the pre-Act period and this differential disappeared after the Act. The results are 
consistent for all portfolios of family firms and non-family firms even though the significance 
disappears for the portfolios of delistings via acquisition. The results in Panel B1 of Table 5.4 
that compare family firms where the family’s voting power is at least 25% and non-family firms 
during the one year around the Act are similar. The coefficient on the family firm dummy is 
0.0006 and significant at 10% if only the family firm dummy is used in addition to the three 
factors. However, once the full model is utilized, the coefficient on the family firm dummy 
becomes 0.0012 and the coefficient on the interaction term becomes -0.0012, both of which are 
significant at 1%. The sum of the two coefficients is 0 and not significantly different from zero. 
If we extend the interval to three years around the Act, the results persist but the coefficients and 
their significance decrease. In Panel A2 of Table 5.4, the coefficient on the family firm dummy 
is 0.0002 if only the family firm dummy is used in addition to the three factors and this 
coefficient is not significantly different from zero. However, with the full model the coefficient 
on the family firm dummy turns out to be 0.0005 and the coefficient on the interaction term 
becomes -0.0007, both of which are significant at 5%. The sum of the two coefficients is -0.0002 
and not significantly different from zero. These results are consistent across all portfolios of 
family firms and non-family firms except for that the significance is unclear in portfolios of 
delistings via acquisition. The results in Panel B2 of Table 5.4 that compare family firms where 
the family’s voting power is at least 25% and non-family firms during the three years around the 
Act are similar. If only the family firm dummy is used in addition to the three factors, the 
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coefficient is 0.0003, which is not significantly different from zero. However, if the full model is 
utilized, then the coefficient on the family firm dummy becomes 0.0006, which is significant at 
5%, and the coefficient on the interaction term turns out to be -0.0006, which is significant at 
10%. The sum of the two coefficients is 0 and not significantly from zero. 
Further extension of the interval to five years, seven years, or nine years around the Act (Panels 
A3 through A5 and B3 through B5 of Table 5.4) does not produce any significant results even 
though the signs on the coefficients mostly persist. This suggests that family firms outperformed 
non-family firms in a relatively shorter long-run (up to 2.5 years before the Act) and this 
differential disappeared once the Act was enacted. It could be that investors preferred better 
monitored portfolio of companies during an era of corporate scandals and once the Act was 
enacted and started to act as an additional monitoring agent, investors felt safer again to invest in 
other companies. However, this argument is based on a joint hypothesis of family firms being 
better monitored and the Act being successful and this study does not disaggregate them. 
 
5.3 Survival 
5.3.1 Theory and Predictions 
Firms benefit from listing in exchanges and thus, being subject to strict disclosure requirements. 
Some of these benefits are lower cost of capital (Hail and Leuz (2006)), higher firm valuation 
(Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004)), higher liquidity (Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002)), and 
easier access to capital markets (Healy and Palepu (2001)). Therefore, a significant increase in 
disclosure costs is necessary for companies to choose delisting from exchanges. 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 can be said to have increased both material and immaterial costs of 
disclosure significantly. Some of the material costs of the Act are (1) financing of the Public 
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Company Accounting Oversight Board; (2) not being able to receive audit and non-audit services 
from the same audit firm, which prevents the company from achieving economies of scale; (3) 
holding management and accounting committee members financially responsible for company’s 
financial statements, which increases their insurance premiums. Some of the immaterial costs of 
the Act are (1) requiring accounting committee members to be composed of independent 
directors; (2) not being able to extend credit lines to company managers and directors; (3) 
requiring board of directors to be composed of majority independent directors. 
The material costs of the Act are estimated at around half a million dollars at least during the 
initial couple of years. This level of cost may be prohibitive especially for smaller public 
companies. The immaterial costs of the Act, on the other hand, are likely to affect companies that 
rely more on insider talent in managerial and directorial positions and family firms are good 
examples of such companies as numerous members of the family are employed at various 
positions in the company. Companies that do not wish to be subject to stricter disclosure of the 
Act can choose to delist from exchanges either by being acquired or by ordinary delisting. 
Families see their companies as an asset to pass on to their descendants, however. Therefore, 
they may not prefer being acquired as this ceases the company. Moreover, families’ wealth is 
tied to the fortunes of their companies and ordinary delisting is likely to lead to a negative 
market reaction, which will reduce the value of the company. The tradeoff between losing the 
firm or significant amount of family wealth and the material and immaterial costs of the Act is 
expected to determine the family firm’s decision to stay public and listed on an exchange. 
5.3.2 Experimental Design 
Logistic regression can be utilized to compare propensity to delist of family firms to that of non-
family firms. There are numerous variables that may affect the decision of a company to delist 
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and these variables can act as controls. Larger firms are less likely to delist as size may increase 
the company’s ability to generate and allocate internal cash flows and to access to public and 
private capital markets. Proxy for firm size can be natural logarithm of book value of assets 
(Log(BVA)). Firms that sell at low valuation multiples are more likely to delist as such low 
valuation multiples may imply financial distress. Market-to-book assets ratio (MVA/BVA) can be 
a proxy for the company’s growth opportunities (high multiple) and level of company’s financial 
distress (low multiple). Firms with high leverage are more likely to delist as high leverage may 
imply financial distress. Market leverage (Debt/MVA) can be a proxy for company’s leverage. 
Profitable firms are less likely to delist as they can generate sufficient internal cash flows to 
evade from financial distress. Return on assets (ROA) can be a proxy for company’s profitability. 
Leuz, Triantis and Wang (2006WP) offer several more variables that may explain the decision to 
delist in addition to the proxies for size, growth opportunities, leverage and profitability 
mentioned above. They argue that larger changes in the short-term portion of debt may imply 
financial distress and thus, increase the likelihood to delist. They use one-year change in short-
term debt-to-book value of assets (ChgSTD/BVA) as a proxy. Also, they argue that firms with 
lower asset growth are more likely to delist, for which one-year percentage change in book value 
of assets (ChgBVA/BVA) can be a proxy. They expect firms with extreme accruals, which may 
imply higher levels of earnings management, to be more likely to delist. They use absolute value 
of accruals-to-absolute value of operating cash flow (Accruals/OCF) as a proxy. They argue that 
firms that lose market activity are more like to delist and use change in logarithm of annual 
trading volume (ChgLog(Vol)) as a proxy. Also, they expect that firms with weaker recent stock 
performance are more likely to delist. They use one-year run-up return prior to last trade (Run-
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up1) as a proxy. This study also uses one-year run-up return three months prior to last trade 
(Run-up2) to exclude likely announcement effects of acquisitions and other reasons on delistings. 
This study investigates whether family firms act differently than non-family firms in the decision 
to delist due to the material and immaterial costs of the Act. In order to see this, a dummy 
variable (FFDum) that takes the value 1 if the observation is a family firm and 0 otherwise will 
also be added to the logistic regression analysis. 
5.3.3 Results and Discussion 
Table 5.5 presents the statistical distribution of the variables used in the univariate and 
multivariate analyses of survival. There is high variation in almost all the variables. For example, 
the minimum return on assets (ROA) in the sample is -6,120%. Even at the 5th percentile this 
ratio becomes only -78%. Similarly, one year percentage change in book value of assets 
(ChgBVA/BVA) is 177,800% at the maximum and this change becomes 77% at the 95th 
percentile. Due to this high volatility in the variables, (1) winsorization at 5th and 95th percentiles 
should be used in univariate and multivariate analyses, and (2) medians should be preferred over 
means in univariate analysis. 
Panels A and B of Table 5.6 present the univariate analysis of the variables used in the analysis 
of survival. In Panel A, the comparison is between family firms and non-family firms while in 
Panel B, the comparison is between family firms where the family’s voting power is at least 25% 
and non-family firms. The median family firm is smaller than the median non-family firm 
($343.03 million versus $378.25 million as measured by book value of assets) even though this 
difference is not significant. This difference is significant between family firms where the 
family’s voting power is at least 25% and non-family firms. The median family firm is 
characterized by fewer growth opportunities than the median non-family firm (1.31 versus 1.47 
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as measured by the market-to-book value of assets) and this difference is significant at 1%. 
Univariate statistics also suggest that the median family firm is more leveraged than the median 
non-family firm (11.29% versus 9.96% as measured by market leverage) and this difference is 
significant at 5%. The median family firm is more profitable than the median non-family firm 
(2.25% versus 1.37% as measured by return on assets) and this difference is significant at 1%. 
The one-year change in short-term debt as percentage of book value of assets, the one-year 
percentage change in book value of assets, and accruals-to-operating cash flow ratio are not 
significantly different between family and non-family firms. The median family firm’s trading 
volume increased more than the median non-family firm’s trading volume in the final year of 
trading (0.1435 versus 0.0894 as measured by the one-year difference in natural logarithm of 
annual volume) and this difference is significant at 1%. Finally, run-up returns (as measured by 
one-year stock return prior to last trading or one-year stock return three months prior to last 
trading) are greater for the median family firm than the median non-family firm (13.55% versus 
10.43% or 8.05% versus 3.59%) and both these differences are significant at 1%. This univariate 
comparison is similar when family firms where family’s voting power is at least 25% and non-
family firms are used. 
Panel A of Table 5.6 show some evidence that family firms are less likely to delist from 
exchanges either via acquisition or via other reasons during the post-Act era. Between January 
2002 and December 2006 75.21% of family firms survived in contrast to 71.06% of non-family 
firms. This difference is significant at 1%. On the other hand, 13.77% of family firms delisted 
via acquisition and 11.02% of family firms delisted via a reason other than acquisition in contrast 
to 16.04% and 12.90% of non-family firms, respectively. Both these differences are significant at 
10%. Panel B of Table 5.6 compare family firms where family’s voting power is at least 25% 
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and non-family firms. The results are similar to ones in Panel A; however, only the difference 
between delistings via acquisition is significant, which is at 1%. Multivariate settings of logistic 
regressions that control for variables that are evidenced to be different between family firms and 
non-family firms and for industries that are likely distributed differently between family firms 
and non-family firms can answer this question better. 
Panels A1 through B3 of Table 5.7 report the results of logistic regressions. The results are in the 
form of odd ratio estimates; therefore, they show the relative likelihood with respect to the event, 
which is delisting. Panels A1 through A3 compare family firms to non-family firms while Panels 
B1 through B3 compare family firms where the family’s voting power is at least 25% and non-
family firms. In Panels A1 and B1, the comparison is between survival and delisting (irrespective 
of the type of delisting); in Panels A2 and B2, the comparison is between survival and delisting 
via acquisition; and in Panels A3 and B3, the comparison is between survival and delisting via a 
reason other than acquisition. The basic model in all panels includes controls for size, growth 
opportunities, leverage and profitability and industry controls at the 2-digit SIC codes. Rest of 
the controls is added as appropriate.  
The dependent variable in Panel A1 of Table 5.7 is 0 for survivors and 1 for delisted companies 
(irrespective of the type of delisting). The results suggest that size, growth opportunities (as 
opposed to financial distress) and profitability are correlated with lower likelihood to delist while 
leverage is correlated with higher likelihood to delist. Of the other controls, one-year percentage 
change in book value of assets is correlated with lower likelihood to delist while the ratio of 
accruals-to-operating cash flow, one-year change in annual trading volume and one-year run-up 
return three months prior to last trade are all correlated with higher likelihood to delist. 
Regardless of the combination of controls, the odd ratio estimate on the family firm dummy sits 
52 
 
between 0.655 and 0.734 and is always significant at 1% suggesting that family firms are about a 
quarter to one-third less likely to delist than non-family firms in the post-Act period. The odd 
ratio estimate on the family firm dummy in Panel B1 of Table 5.7 where the family firms with at 
least 25% family voting power are used is between 0.650 and 0.698 and always significant at 1% 
suggesting again about one-third less likelihood on behalf of family firms to delist. These 
findings are consistent with the argument that the likely loss of their companies or significant 
amount of their wealth is a more important issue for families than the material and immaterial 
costs of the Act. 
The dependent variable in Panel A2 of Table 5.7 is 0 for survivors and 1 for delisted companies 
via acquisition. The results suggest that size, growth opportunities (as opposed to financial 
distress) and to some extent profitability are correlated with lower likelihood to delist via 
acquisition while leverage is correlated with higher likelihood to delist via acquisition. Of the 
other controls, one-year percentage change in book value of assets is correlated with lower 
likelihood to delist via acquisition and one-year run-up return prior to last trade and one-year 
run-up return three months prior to last trade are both correlated with higher likelihood to delist 
via acquisition. However, run-up returns may be including the announcement premium of the 
acquisition; therefore, results must be taken with caution. Regardless of the combination of 
controls, the odd ratio estimate on the family firm dummy is between 0.633 and 0.704 and 
always significant at 1%. In Panel B2 of Table 5.7 where the family firms with at least 25% 
family voting power are used the odd ratio estimate on the family firm dummy is between 0.582 
and 0.616 and always significant at 1%. These results suggest that family firms about one-third 
to two-fifths less likely than non-family firms to delist via acquisition in the post-Act period. 
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This is consistent with the argument that survivability of their companies is a more important 
issue for families than the material and immaterial costs of the Act. 
The dependent variable in Panel A3 of Table 5.7 is 0 for survivors and 1 for delisted companies 
via a reason other than acquisition. The results suggest that size, growth opportunities (as 
opposed to financial stress) and profitability are correlated with lower likelihood to delist via 
other reasons while leverage is correlated with extremely higher likelihood to delist via other 
reasons. Of the other controls, one-year percentage change in book value of assets, one-year run-
up return prior to last trade and one-year run-up return three months prior to last trade are 
correlated with lower likelihood to delist via other reasons while the ratio of accruals-to-
operating cash flow and one-year change in annual trading volume are correlated with higher 
likelihood to delist via other reasons. The odd ratio estimate on the family firm dummy is 
between 0.698 and 0.858 and five coefficients are significant at 10% while three coefficients are 
not significant. In Panel B3 of Table 5.7 where the family firms with at least 25% of family 
voting power are used the odd ratio estimate on the family firm dummy is between 0.766 and 
0.987 and is not significant. These results suggest that there is weak evidence that family firms 
are less likely to delist via a reason other than acquisition in the post-Act period. Combined with 
the previous results, it can be argued that survivability of their companies is the most important 
issue for families. Then, loss of significant wealth is somewhat more important than the material 
and immaterial costs of the Act. 
 
5.4 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter concentrates on an important segment of U.S. economy around the enactment of a 
significant government regulation. Public companies, in which families hold ownership stake 
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and managerial and directorial positions, are studied with respect to their performance before and 
after and their survival after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The empirical results are 
summarized below. 
First, evidence suggests that family firms outperformed non-family firms before the Act. 
However, this better performance is for a relatively shorter long-run (up to 2.5 years before the 
Act) and disappears beyond 2.5 years up to 4.5 years before the Act. Second, this better 
performance of family firms disappears after the Act. One explanation can be that investors 
sought for companies that were monitored better during the era of corporate scandals and these 
better monitored companies were family firms at the time. Once the Act was enacted, monitoring 
advantage of family firms diminished and thus their better performance disappeared. This is a 
joint test, however, of the Act’s success and families’ better monitoring ability and this study is 
not able to disaggregate them. 
Third, evidence suggests that family firms are less likely to delist (irrespective of the type of 
delisting) than non-family firms after the Act. This finding is consistent with the argument that 
survival of their companies (as opposed to delisting via acquisition) and protection of their 
wealth (as opposed to delisting via a reason other than acquisition) is more important for families 
than material and immaterial costs of the Act. Fourth, there is stronger evidence for that family 
firms are less likely to delist via acquisition than for that family firms are less likely to delist via 
a reason other than acquisition. This finding puts the survival of their companies as the most 
important issue for families and the likely loss in family wealth as somewhat more important 
than material and immaterial costs of the Act. 
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Overall, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 turns out to be a significant government regulation that led 
two important segments of the economy – family firms and non-family firms – to perform and 
react differently to its associated material and immaterial costs. 
 
 
6 Summary and Conclusions 
Using a comprehensive sample of 1,123 publicly traded family firms in the United States this 
dissertation looks into various aspects of their corporate structure. Specifically, this dissertation 
studies their industry distribution, capital structure choices, and performance and survival after 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Empirical results are summarized below. 
Chapter 3 presents the study on the industry distribution of family firms. The chapter presents 
evidence that family firms are less likely to exist in industries where optimal firm size is larger 
and more likely to exist in industries with greater amenity potential. Moreover, they are more 
likely to exist in more mature industries, less likely to exist in industries with more growth 
opportunities, and less likely to exist in industries with more volatile earnings. The evidence 
suggests that families choose to set up their companies in industries that require less wealth for 
control and in industries with less risk, which is consistent with families’ higher risk aversion 
compared to atomistic shareholders. 
Chapter 4 presents the study on the capital structure choices of family firms. The chapter 
presents evidence that family firms carry more debt on average than non-family firms. This 
result is consistent with the agency argument that large shareholders are able to better monitor 
the company and reduce the agency costs of free cash flow; and therefore, increase the capacity 
for debt financing. There is also evidence that family firms borrow significantly less of highest 
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and lowest priority debt and significantly more of debt with intermediate priorities than non-
family firms. This result is consistent with higher risk aversion of families compared to atomistic 
shareholders. Furthermore, family firms carry significantly less short-term debt and significantly 
more long-term debt. Moreover, they hold significantly less cash and short-term securities while 
they pay out significantly more of their earnings as dividends. 
Chapter 5 presents the study on the performance and survival of family firms after Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002. The chapter presents evidence that family firms significantly outperformed 
non-family firms during the 2.5 years before Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and this 
outperformance disappeared during the 1.5 years after the Act. This result can be an indication 
that family ownership in companies offers better monitoring. There is also evidence that family 
firms were less likely to delist from exchanges after the Act irrespective of whether the delisting 
was via acquisition or via other reasons. These results are consistent with the arguments that 
survival of their companies is important for families and family fortunes are tied to the wealth of 
their companies. 
Overall, this dissertation presents evidence that the differences between family firms and non-
family firms as well as between families and typical insiders and large stakeholders discussed in 
Chapter 1 are related to various corporate characteristics of such firms. 
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Table 2.1 Sample Setup 
Panel A summarizes the procedure used to identify publicly traded family firms in the United States. The 
keywords are entered into Thomson Research Database to search through the full filing of all proxy 
statements submitted to the SEC between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2003. Panel B summarizes 
the procedure used to identify publicly traded companies in the United States for the year 2002. 
 
Panel A 
Step Hits
Keyword search of familial relationships 
(keywords: father, mother, son, daughter, sibling, brother, sister, husband, wife, 
uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, cousin, grandparent, grandchild, grandfather, 
grandmother, grandson, granddaughter, father-in-law, mother-in-law, son-in-law, 
daughter-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-in-law and their plural forms) 
6,330
Elimination of irrelevant matches –4,929
Removal of trusts and funds –19
Matching with Compustat –222
Removal of companies incorporated outside the United States –21
Removal of companies with zero assets reported on Compustat for 2002 –16
Final sample 1,123
  
Panel B 
Step Hits
Compustat universe for the year 2002 9,258
Removal of companies incorporated outside the United States –1,261
Removal of duplicate entries –19
Removal of companies with zero assets reported on Compustat for 2002 –78
Final sample 7,900
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Table 3.1 Industry Distribution 
Panel A1 presents the 50 industries as defined at the 4-digit SIC-code level with family firms holding the 
largest portion of industry assets as measured by the sum of book value of assets of all companies in that 
industry. Panel A2 presents the 50 industries as defined at the 4-digit SIC-code level with family firms 
holding the smallest portion of industry assets as measured by the sum of book value of assets of all 
companies in that industry. Panel B1 presents the 50 industries as defined at the 4-digit SIC-code level 
with family firms, where the family’s voting power is at least 25%, holding the largest portion of industry 
assets as measured by the sum of book value of assets of all companies in that industry. Panel B2 presents 
the 50 industries as defined at the 4-digit SIC-code level with family firms where the family’s voting 
power is at least 25% holding the smallest portion of industry assets as measured by the sum of book 
value of assets of all companies in that industry. 
 
Panel A1 (Overall) 
SIC Industry Name #All #Family IBVA FFBVA Ratio
2085 DISTILLED AND BLENDED LIQUOR 1 1 2,264.00  2,264.00 100.00%
2611 PULP MILLS 2 2 1,639.76  1,639.76 100.00%
4013 RR SWITCHING, TERMINAL ESTAB 1 1 1,106.55  1,106.55 100.00%
3873 WATCHES, CLOCKS AND PARTS 2 2 827.68  827.68 100.00%
2052 COOKIES AND CRACKERS 1 1 305.87  305.87 100.00%
3950 PENS,PENCILS,OTH OFFICE MATL 2 2 187.25  187.25 100.00%
2790 SERVICE INDS FOR PRINT TRADE 1 1 160.47  160.47 100.00%
2013 SAUSAGE,OTH PREPARED MEAT PD 2 2 99.34  99.34 100.00%
900 FISHING,HUNTING & TRAPPING 1 1 98.98  98.98 100.00%
3567 INDL PROCESS FURNACES, OVENS 2 2 66.31  66.31 100.00%
3272 CONCRETE PDS, EX BLOCK,BRICK 1 1 13.50  13.50 100.00%
3678 ELECTRONIC CONNECTORS 6 3 3,676.16  3,648.30 99.24%
2070 FATS AND OILS 4 3 16,045.29  15,882.38 98.98%
2084 WINE,BRANDY & BRANDY SPIRITS 7 4 4,554.10  4,384.90 96.28%
200 AGRIC PROD-LVSTK,ANIMAL SPEC 5 1 257.88  235.39 91.28%
3730 SHIP & BOAT BLDG & REPAIRING 7 3 13,583.95  11,855.90 87.28%
2590 MISC FURNITURE AND FIXTURES 3 1 6,333.64  5,442.00 85.92%
5072 HARDWARE-WHOLESALE 3 1 635.07  540.22 85.06%
1520 GEN BLDG CONTRACTOR-RESIDNTL 5 2 1,304.87  1,060.30 81.26%
2540 PARTITIONS,SHELVING,LOCKERS 2 1 112.93  87.89 77.83%
2082 MALT BEVERAGES 5 2 18,632.99  14,226.31 76.35%
3562 BALL AND ROLLER BEARINGS 5 2 3,723.41  2,823.77 75.84%
5200 BLDG MATL,HARDWR,GARDEN-RETL 5 1 4,581.85  3,432.31 74.91%
4832 RADIO BROADCASTING STATIONS 21 8 46,871.97  34,545.02 73.70%
2731 BOOKS: PUBG, PUBG & PRINTING 10 4 11,083.52  7,952.21 71.75%
8351 CHILD DAY CARE SERVICES 5 2 1,290.88  914.07 70.81%
5130 APPAREL,PIECE GDS,NOTNS-WHSL 3 2 288.88  200.54 69.42%
2015 POULTRY SLAUGHTER & PROCESS 5 4 2,560.52  1,770.99 69.17%
2221 BRDWOVN FABRIC MAN MADE,SILK 4 1 1,464.12  1,011.52 69.09%
5331 VARIETY STORES 16 4 145,411.01  97,945.00 67.36%
5621 WOMEN'S CLOTHING STORES 21 8 13,813.30  9,191.25 66.54%
3081 UNSUPP PLASTICS FILM & SHEET 5 2 1,964.89  1,306.99 66.52%
6321 ACCIDENT & HEALTH INSURANCE 11 2 323,112.42  214,602.00 66.42%
7331 DIRECT MAIL ADVERTISING SVCS 4 1 1,115.03  736.73 66.07%
3823 INDUSTRIAL MEASUREMENT INSTR 20 2 9,217.63  6,035.42 65.48%
5651 FAMILY CLOTHING STORES 20 6 25,902.15  16,668.45 64.35%
63 
 
Table 3.1 (continued) 
   
Panel A1 (continued) 
SIC Industry Name #All #Family IBVA FFBVA Ratio
3448 PREFAB METAL BLDGS & COMP 4 1 1,181.90  721.27 61.03%
3452 BOLT,NUT,SCREW,RIVETS,WASHRS 6 4 2,191.76  1,328.39 60.61%
2033 CAN FRUIT,VEG,PRESRV,JAM,JEL 7 3 3,629.61  2,179.14 60.04%
2522 OFFICE FURNITURE, EX WOOD 5 2 3,983.24  2,367.60 59.44%
3537 INDL TRUCKS,TRACTORS,TRAILRS 6 1 3,678.06  2,123.90 57.75%
4833 TELEVISION BROADCAST STATION 25 8 225,943.57  127,461.94 56.41%
4841 CABLE AND OTHER PAY TV SVCS 25 6 286,372.77  161,160.30 56.28%
2011 MEAT PACKING PLANTS 6 2 21,044.64  11,653.14 55.37%
3442 METAL DOORS,FRAMES,MOLD,TRIM 4 2 1,354.13  733.09 54.14%
3433 HEATING EQ,EX ELEC,AIR FURNC 2 1 18.60  10.04 53.98%
3670 ELECTRONIC COMP, ACCESSORIES 10 2 8,130.69  4,372.49 53.78%
5093 SCRAP & WASTE MATERIALS-WHSL 5 2 1,217.88  653.66 53.67%
7500 AUTO REPAIR,SERVICES,PARKING 9 2 2,069.99  1,095.17 52.91%
1389 OIL, GAS FIELD SERVICES, NEC 13 3 38,454.47  19,733.05 51.32%
 
Panel A2 (Overall) 
SIC Industry Name #All #Family IBVA FFBVA Ratio
8090 MISC HEALTH & ALLIED SVC,NEC 17 0 4,673.94  0.00 0.00%
3790 MISC TRANSPORTATION EQUIP 10 0 4,752.60  0.00 0.00%
4100 TRANSIT & PASSENGER TRANS 3 0 4,889.86  0.00 0.00%
5171 PETROLEUM BULK STATIONS-WHSL 5 0 4,895.61  0.00 0.00%
4220 PUBLIC WAREHOUSING 3 0 5,023.62  0.00 0.00%
7996 AMUSEMENT PARKS 3 0 5,068.08  0.00 0.00%
1221 BITMNS COAL,LIGNITE SURF MNG 1 0 5,140.18  0.00 0.00%
2800 CHEMICALS & ALLIED PRODS 3 0 5,640.90  0.00 0.00%
2100 TOBACCO PRODUCTS 2 0 5,692.68  0.00 0.00%
3942 DOLLS AND STUFFED TOYS 7 0 6,207.97  0.00 0.00%
5700 HOME FURNITURE & EQUIP STORE 7 0 6,418.56  0.00 0.00%
5141 GROCERIES, GENERAL LINE-WHSL 9 0 6,605.02  0.00 0.00%
5140 GROCERIES & RELATED PDS-WHSL 14 0 7,089.66  0.00 0.00%
6200 SECURITY & COMMODITY BROKERS 12 0 7,276.12  0.00 0.00%
3612 PWR,DISTR,SPECL TRANSFORMERS 5 0 7,488.12  0.00 0.00%
4610 PIPE LINES, EX NATURAL GAS 11 0 7,501.56  0.00 0.00%
7841 VIDEO TAPE RENTAL 5 0 7,887.47  0.00 0.00%
3330 PRIM SMELT,REFIN NONFER METL 5 0 8,204.05  0.00 0.00%
5040 PROF & COML EQ & SUPPLY-WHSL 6 0 9,804.27  0.00 0.00%
1220 BITUMINOUS COAL, LIGNITE MNG 7 0 9,831.89  0.00 0.00%
3510 ENGINES AND TURBINES 9 0 9,860.34  0.00 0.00%
3221 GLASS CONTAINERS 2 0 10,425.70  0.00 0.00%
1040 GOLD AND SILVER ORES 21 0 11,895.52  0.00 0.00%
5399 MISC GENERAL MDSE STORES 2 0 13,101.22  0.00 0.00%
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Panel A2 (continued) 
SIC Industry Name #All #Family IBVA FFBVA Ratio
3411 METAL CANS 4 0 13,590.65  0.00 0.00%
6099 FUNCTIONS REL TO DEP BKE,NEC 14 0 13,966.65  0.00 0.00%
3600 ELECTR, OTH ELEC EQ, EX CMP 1 0 14,545.00  0.00 0.00%
3357 DRAWNG,INSULATNG NONFER WIRE 12 0 15,474.19  0.00 0.00%
4932 GAS & OTHER SERV COMBINED 4 0 24,106.77  0.00 0.00%
3523 FARM MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 8 0 27,425.02  0.00 0.00%
7311 ADVERTISING AGENCIES 6 0 27,495.24  0.00 0.00%
3760 GUIDED MISSILES & SPACE VEHC 4 0 28,472.23  0.00 0.00%
4513 AIR COURIER SERVICES 6 0 29,570.13  0.00 0.00%
2400 LUMBER AND WOOD PDS, EX FURN 7 0 35,914.65  0.00 0.00%
3728 AIRCRAFT PARTS, AUX EQ, NEC 11 0 38,091.25  0.00 0.00%
3350 ROLLING & DRAW NONFER METAL 12 0 41,504.49  0.00 0.00%
2820 PLASTIC MATL,SYNTHETIC RESIN 6 0 41,781.34  0.00 0.00%
5211 LUMBER & OTH BLDG MATL-RETL 5 0 46,878.93  0.00 0.00%
3576 COMPUTER COMMUNICATION EQUIP 50 0 52,071.85  0.00 0.00%
3721 AIRCRAFT 6 0 52,467.75  0.00 0.00%
2600 PAPER AND ALLIED PRODUCTS 3 0 59,049.84  0.00 0.00%
7374 CMP PROCESSING,DATA PREP SVC 30 0 64,184.57  0.00 0.00%
4923 NATURAL GAS TRANSMIS & DISTR 22 0 68,229.65  0.00 0.00%
2000 FOOD AND KINDRED PRODUCTS 6 0 91,199.97  0.00 0.00%
2111 CIGARETTES 5 0 103,202.39  0.00 0.00%
4922 NATURAL GAS TRANSMISSION 22 0 185,046.10  0.00 0.00%
6172 FINANCE LESSORS 9 0 287,230.70  0.00 0.00%
4931 ELECTRIC & OTHER SERV COMB 60 0 447,528.58  0.00 0.00%
6199 FINANCE-SERVICES 5 0 1,258,709.80  0.00 0.00%
6111 FEDERAL CREDIT AGENCIES 6 0 1,720,020.39  0.00 0.00%
 
Panel B1 (Family Voting Power ≥ 25%) 
SIC Industry Name #All #Family IBVA FFBVA Ratio
2085 DISTILLED AND BLENDED LIQUOR 1 1 2,264.00  2,264.00 100.00%
3873 WATCHES, CLOCKS AND PARTS 2 2 827.68  827.68 100.00%
2790 SERVICE INDS FOR PRINT TRADE 1 1 160.47  160.47 100.00%
900 FISHING,HUNTING & TRAPPING 1 1 98.98  98.98 100.00%
3567 INDL PROCESS FURNACES, OVENS 2 1 66.31  62.18 93.77%
2084 WINE,BRANDY & BRANDY SPIRITS 7 3 4,554.10  4,184.71 91.89%
200 AGRIC PROD-LVSTK,ANIMAL SPEC 5 1 257.88  235.39 91.28%
5072 HARDWARE-WHOLESALE 3 1 635.07  540.22 85.06%
1520 GEN BLDG CONTRACTOR-RESIDNTL 5 1 1,304.87  1,034.89 79.31%
2540 PARTITIONS,SHELVING,LOCKERS 2 1 112.93  87.89 77.83%
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Panel B1 (continued) 
SIC Industry Name #All #Family IBVA FFBVA Ratio
2013 SAUSAGE,OTH PREPARED MEAT PD 2 1 99.34  77.18 77.69%
5130 APPAREL,PIECE GDS,NOTNS-WHSL 3 2 288.88  200.54 69.42%
2015 POULTRY SLAUGHTER & PROCESS 5 4 2,560.52  1,770.99 69.17%
2221 BRDWOVN FABRIC MAN MADE,SILK 4 1 1,464.12  1,011.52 69.09%
5331 VARIETY STORES 16 2 145,411.01  95,074.00 65.38%
5651 FAMILY CLOTHING STORES 20 6 25,902.15  16,668.45 64.35%
3537 INDL TRUCKS,TRACTORS,TRAILRS 6 1 3,678.06  2,123.90 57.75%
4841 CABLE AND OTHER PAY TV SVCS 25 6 286,372.77  161,160.30 56.28%
2011 MEAT PACKING PLANTS 6 2 21,044.64  11,653.14 55.37%
3433 HEATING EQ,EX ELEC,AIR FURNC 2 1 18.60  10.04 53.98%
3670 ELECTRONIC COMP, ACCESSORIES 10 2 8,130.69  4,372.49 53.78%
6321 ACCIDENT & HEALTH INSURANCE 11 1 323,112.42  169,544.00 52.47%
3452 BOLT,NUT,SCREW,RIVETS,WASHRS 6 2 2,191.76  1,073.33 48.97%
7500 AUTO REPAIR,SERVICES,PARKING 9 1 2,069.99  998.88 48.26%
2520 OFFICE FURNITURE 2 1 1,441.61  674.11 46.76%
5712 FURNITURE STORES 5 2 965.56  448.46 46.45%
4833 TELEVISION BROADCAST STATION 25 6 225,943.57  101,183.54 44.78%
3950 PENS,PENCILS,OTH OFFICE MATL 2 1 187.25  82.11 43.85%
5094 JEWELRY & WATCHES-WHSL 3 1 378.54  160.41 42.38%
5045 COMPUTERS & SOFTWARE-WHSL 27 3 12,839.57  5,232.28 40.75%
4400 WATER TRANSPORTATION 14 2 31,496.19  12,741.60 40.45%
3678 ELECTRONIC CONNECTORS 6 2 3,676.16  1,394.38 37.93%
5600 APPAREL AND ACCESSORY STORES 9 3 3,206.63  1,213.62 37.85%
6799 INVESTORS, NEC 32 3 7,964.54  2,953.32 37.08%
2030 CAN,FROZNPRESRV FRUIT & VEG 13 2 16,569.17  5,739.20 34.64%
7371 COMPUTER PROGRAMMING SERVICE 22 2 2,117.13  713.53 33.70%
5093 SCRAP & WASTE MATERIALS-WHSL 5 1 1,217.88  405.01 33.26%
2761 MANIFOLD BUSINESS FORMS 5 1 2,273.29  754.86 33.21%
1540 GEN BLDG CONTRACTORS-NONRES 3 2 598.15  195.76 32.73%
6282 INVESTMENT ADVICE 27 2 21,253.66  6,669.55 31.38%
1623 WATER,SEWER,PIPE LINE CONSTR 5 1 2,054.25  623.79 30.37%
6513 OPERATORS-APARTMENT BLDGS 8 1 1,806.42  540.22 29.91%
3140 FOOTWEAR, EXCEPT RUBBER 15 4 3,653.72  1,076.69 29.47%
2731 BOOKS: PUBG, PUBG & PRINTING 10 3 11,083.52  2,920.03 26.35%
3634 ELECTRIC HOUSEWARES AND FANS 6 2 2,644.58  695.62 26.30%
3713 TRUCK AND BUS BODIES 5 2 487.39  122.53 25.14%
3580 REFRIG & SERVICE IND MACHINE 19 2 875.52  210.66 24.06%
2721 PERIODICAL:PUBG,PUBG & PRINT 13 2 8,734.21  2,096.03 24.00%
7340 SVCS TO DWELLINGS, OTH BLDGS 6 1 1,324.73  317.41 23.96%
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Panel B1 (continued) 
SIC Industry Name #All #Family IBVA FFBVA Ratio
7011 HOTELS,MOTELS,TOURIST COURTS 31 5 51,125.65  11,718.81 22.92%
 
Panel B2 (Family Voting Power ≥ 25%) 
SIC Industry Name #All #Family IBVA FFBVA Ratio
1600 HEAVY CONSTR-NOT BLDG CONSTR 8 0 11,000.57  0.00 0.00%
5531 AUTO AND HOME SUPPLY STORES 7 0 11,308.53  0.00 0.00%
8721 ACCOUNT,AUDIT,BOOKKEEP SVCS 10 0 11,334.13  0.00 0.00%
8051 SKILLED NURSING CARE FAC 12 0 11,374.49  0.00 0.00%
6361 TITLE INSURANCE 5 0 11,481.53  0.00 0.00%
1040 GOLD AND SILVER ORES 21 0 11,895.52  0.00 0.00%
5399 MISC GENERAL MDSE STORES 2 0 13,101.22  0.00 0.00%
3411 METAL CANS 4 0 13,590.65  0.00 0.00%
6099 FUNCTIONS REL TO DEP BKE,NEC 14 0 13,966.65  0.00 0.00%
3600 ELECTR, OTH ELEC EQ, EX CMP 1 0 14,545.00  0.00 0.00%
3357 DRAWNG,INSULATNG NONFER WIRE 12 0 15,474.19  0.00 0.00%
3825 ELEC MEAS & TEST INSTRUMENTS 41 0 15,575.17  0.00 0.00%
5731 RADIO,TV,CONS ELECTR STORES 10 0 18,794.65  0.00 0.00%
2531 PUBLIC BLDG & REL FURNITURE 5 0 19,925.08  0.00 0.00%
3533 OIL & GAS FIELD MACHY, EQUIP 17 0 21,136.55  0.00 0.00%
3672 PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARDS 21 0 24,094.54  0.00 0.00%
4932 GAS & OTHER SERV COMBINED 4 0 24,106.77  0.00 0.00%
3523 FARM MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 8 0 27,425.02  0.00 0.00%
7311 ADVERTISING AGENCIES 6 0 27,495.24  0.00 0.00%
3760 GUIDED MISSILES & SPACE VEHC 4 0 28,472.23  0.00 0.00%
4513 AIR COURIER SERVICES 6 0 29,570.13  0.00 0.00%
2400 LUMBER AND WOOD PDS, EX FURN 7 0 35,914.65  0.00 0.00%
3531 CONSTRUCTION MACHINERY & EQ 7 0 37,982.56  0.00 0.00%
3728 AIRCRAFT PARTS, AUX EQ, NEC 11 0 38,091.25  0.00 0.00%
6794 PATENT OWNERS AND LESSORS 30 0 39,894.48  0.00 0.00%
3312 STEEL WORKS & BLAST FURNACES 23 0 40,196.90  0.00 0.00%
3350 ROLLING & DRAW NONFER METAL 12 0 41,504.49  0.00 0.00%
2820 PLASTIC MATL,SYNTHETIC RESIN 6 0 41,781.34  0.00 0.00%
5211 LUMBER & OTH BLDG MATL-RETL 5 0 46,878.93  0.00 0.00%
8062 GEN MED & SURGICAL HOSPITALS 12 0 48,473.68  0.00 0.00%
3576 COMPUTER COMMUNICATION EQUIP 50 0 52,071.85  0.00 0.00%
3721 AIRCRAFT 6 0 52,467.75  0.00 0.00%
4924 NATURAL GAS DISTRIBUTION 32 0 55,389.95  0.00 0.00%
2600 PAPER AND ALLIED PRODUCTS 3 0 59,049.84  0.00 0.00%
3663 RADIO,TV BROADCAST, COMM EQ 81 0 62,411.22  0.00 0.00%
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Panel B2 (continued) 
SIC Industry Name #All #Family IBVA FFBVA Ratio
7374 CMP PROCESSING,DATA PREP SVC 30 0 64,184.57  0.00 0.00%
4923 NATURAL GAS TRANSMIS & DISTR 22 0 68,229.65  0.00 0.00%
3570 COMPUTER & OFFICE EQUIPMENT 3 0 71,388.61  0.00 0.00%
4210 TRUCKING,COURIER SVC,EX AIR 11 0 88,469.86  0.00 0.00%
2000 FOOD AND KINDRED PRODUCTS 6 0 91,199.97  0.00 0.00%
2111 CIGARETTES 5 0 103,202.39  0.00 0.00%
4512 AIR TRANSPORT, SCHEDULED 27 0 183,220.48  0.00 0.00%
4922 NATURAL GAS TRANSMISSION 22 0 185,046.10  0.00 0.00%
6172 FINANCE LESSORS 9 0 287,230.70  0.00 0.00%
2911 PETROLEUM REFINING 23 0 394,488.09  0.00 0.00%
4931 ELECTRIC & OTHER SERV COMB 60 0 447,528.58  0.00 0.00%
3711 MOTOR VEHICLES & CAR BODIES 8 0 678,612.97  0.00 0.00%
4911 ELECTRIC SERVICES 135 0 1,024,823.77  0.00 0.00%
6199 FINANCE-SERVICES 5 0 1,258,709.80  0.00 0.00%
6111 FEDERAL CREDIT AGENCIES 6 0 1,720,020.39  0.00 0.00%
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Table 3.2 Industry Distribution – Univariate Results and Definition of Variables 
Panel A presents the univariate statistics of the variables that are used in multivariate settings of 
analysis of industry distribution of family firms. Panel B presents the univariate statistics of the 
variables that are used in multivariate settings of analysis of industry distribution of family firms, 
where the family’s voting power is at least 25%. T-test is utilized to test the differences in means and 
Wilcoxon test is utilized to test the differences in medians. The tests are between industries, in which 
family firms hold a nonzero portion of industry assets (groups 0-25%, 25-50%, 50-75%, and 75-
100%), and industries, in which there are no family firms (group None). Variable definitions are on 
page 70. ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A Family Firm Assets / Industry Assets (Overall) 
 None 0-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-100% 
          
Log(mnYear)          
N 94 235  56  26  19  
Mean 2.4496 2.4940  2.5780  2.6484  2.9255 ** 
Median 2.5103 2.4250  2.5955  2.7041  3.1096 ** 
       
Log(nFirm)       
N 105 235  56  26  19  
Mean 0.9890 2.3261 *** 1.8140 *** 1.7570 *** 0.8125  
Median 0.8651 2.2191 *** 1.7286 *** 1.6246 *** 0.7010  
       
Log(mBVA)       
N 105 235  56  26  19  
Mean 19.0017 18.7792  19.0690  19.1628  18.6575  
Median 19.0231 18.6124  18.9505  19.1727  18.8446  
       
mMBA/BVA       
N 103 235  56  26  19  
Mean 3.5129 1.7181 * 1.6148 ** 1.7017 * 1.5019 ** 
Median 1.6596 1.5346 ** 1.4564 ** 1.5843  1.3624 ** 
       
mOIbD/BVA       
N 104 235  56  26  19  
Mean -0.0474 0.0896 * 0.1141 ** 0.1141 ** 0.1407 ** 
Median 0.0898 0.1079  0.1215 ** 0.1197 ** 0.1347 ***
       
mEarnVol       
N 94 235  56  26  19  
Mean 0.1909 0.0591 ** 0.0463 ** 0.0418 ** 0.0467 ** 
Median 0.0501 0.0444  0.0386 ** 0.0388  0.0393  
       
AmeDum       
N 105 235  56  26  19  
Mean 0.0000 0.0000  0.0179  0.1154 * 0.0000  
Median 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 *** 0.0000  
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Panel B Family Firm Assets / Industry Assets (Family Voting Power ≥ 25%) 
 None 0-25% 25-50% 50-75% 75-100% 
          
Log(mnYear)          
N 147 227  32  14  9  
Mean 2.5088 2.4885  2.5502  2.8468 * 3.0115 ** 
Median 2.5041 2.4291  2.5847  2.9177 ** 3.1348 ** 
       
Log(nFirm)       
N 159 227  32  14  9  
Mean 1.2069 2.3848 *** 1.5884 ** 1.5238  0.8651  
Median 1.1764 2.3243 *** 1.5918 ** 1.3306  0.7010  
       
Log(mBVA)       
N 159 227  32  14  9  
Mean 19.0491 18.7752  18.8878  18.7857  18.9641  
Median 19.1447 18.7737 ** 18.8229  18.9613  18.7602  
       
mMBA/BVA       
N 157 227  32  14  9  
Mean 2.8855 1.5276 * 1.6804 * 1.5884 ** 1.6342 * 
Median 1.5860 1.6963 ** 1.5191  1.4652  1.4117  
       
mOIbD/BVA       
N 158 227  32  14  9  
Mean 0.0072 0.0908  0.1138 ** 0.0959  0.1576 ***
Median 0.1094 0.1076  0.1165  0.1091  0.1723 ***
       
mEarnVol       
N 147 227  32  14  9  
Mean 0.1399 0.0585 ** 0.0470 ** 0.0477 ** 0.0403 ** 
Median 0.0432 0.0441  0.0406  0.0379  0.0396  
       
AmeDum       
N 159 227  32  14  9  
Mean 0.0000 0.0088  0.0625  0.0000  0.0000  
Median 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 *** 0.0000  0.0000  
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Table 3.2 (continued) 
 
Variable  Definition 
 
mnYear median number of years a company existed in an industry as defined at 4-digit 
SIC-code level on Compustat 
nFirm number of companies in an industry as defined at 4-digit SIC-code level on 
Compustat 
mBVA median book value of assets in an industry as defined at 4-digit SIC-code level on 
Compustat 
mMVA/BVA median market-to-book assets in an industry as defined at 4-digit SIC-code level 
on Compustat 
mOIbD/BVA median operating income before depreciation-to-book value of assets in an 
industry as defined at 4-digit SIC-code level on Compustat 
mEarnVol median 5-year standard deviation of operating income before depreciation-to-
book value of assets in an industry as defined at 4-digit SIC-code level on 
Compustat 
AmeDum dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is newspaper publishing 
(SIC code 2711), periodical publishing (SIC code 2721), radio broadcasting (SIC 
code 4832), or television broadcasting industries (SIC code 4833) on Compustat; 
and 0 otherwise 
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Table 3.3 Industry Distribution – Multivariate Results 
Panel A presents the results of censored Tobit regressions run annually between 1992 and 2006, where the dependent variable is the portion of an 
industry’s book value of assets accounted for by family firms while Panel B presents the results of censored Tobit regressions run annually 
between 1992 and 2006, where the dependent variable is the portion of an industry’s book value of assets accounted for by family firms, where the 
family’s voting power is at least 25%. An industry is defined at 4-digit SIC-code level. Log(mnYear) is the natural logarithm of median number of 
years a company existed in an industry on Compustat. Log(nFirm) is the natural logarithm of number of companies in an industry on Compustat. 
Log(mBVA) is the median book value of assets in an industry on Compustat. mMVA/BVA is the median market value of assets-to-book-value of 
assets in an industry on Compustat. mOIbD/BVA is the median operating income before depreciation-to-book value of assets in an industry on 
Compustat. mEarnVol is the median standard deviation of 5-year operating income before depreciation-to-book value of assets in an industry on 
Compustat. AmeDum is a dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the observation is newspaper publishing (SIC code 2711), periodical 
publishing (SIC code 2721), radio broadcasting (SIC code 4832), or television broadcasting (SIC code 4833) industries on Compustat; and 0 
otherwise. P-values adjusted for heteroskedasticity are in square brackets. #Sign. is the number of sample years, in which the coefficient is 
significant at least at 10% level. Average is the average of the coefficient over sample years. T-stat and p-value are the results of the test whether 
Average is significantly different from zero. 
 
Panel A Family Firm Assets / Industry Assets (Overall) 
Year Intercept Log(mnYear) Log(nFirm) Log(mBVA) mMVA/BVA mOIbD/BVA mEarnVol AmeDum N LL 
1992 0.5562 0.0464 0.0310 -0.0300 -0.0443 0.0620 -0.6703 0.5592 386 -202.49 
 [0.0243] [0.1257] [0.1535] [0.0194] [0.0363] [0.7107] [0.0950] [0.0019]   
1993 0.7244 0.0403 0.0322 -0.0353 -0.0695 0.0691 -0.8223 0.5742 390 -191.83 
 [0.0048] [0.1411] [0.1250] [0.0069] [0.0078] [0.7203] [0.1041] [0.0010]   
1994 1.2010 0.0653 0.0262 -0.0572 -0.1490 0.1386 -0.6751 0.5845 393 -193.31 
 [0.0001] [0.0243] [0.2094] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.5192] [0.1576] [0.0011]   
1995 0.9740 0.0369 0.0002 -0.0455 -0.0481 0.0202 -0.5721 0.4913 402 -204.17 
 [0.0002] [0.1735] [0.9932] [0.0007] [0.0939] [0.9295] [0.2283] [0.0055]   
1996 0.8804 0.0473 0.0191 -0.0452 -0.0341 0.3033 -1.2968 0.4395 405 -189.11 
 [0.0009] [0.0739] [0.3093] [0.0009] [0.1905] [0.2147] [0.0266] [0.0266]   
1997 0.8704 0.0600 0.0087 -0.0465 -0.0063 0.1448 -1.1833 0.5558 408 -191.58 
 [0.0013] [0.0328] [0.6391] [0.0005] [0.5555] [0.4453] [0.0364] [0.0009]   
1998 0.6864 0.0456 0.0288 -0.0402 -0.0220 0.5326 -0.3827 0.4058 410 -192.79 
 [0.0079] [0.1274] [0.1160] [0.0016] [0.4041] [0.0051] [0.3322] [0.0163]   
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Panel A (continued)          
Year Intercept Log(mnYear) Log(nFirm) Log(mBVA) mMVA/BVA mOIbD/BVA mEarnVol AmeDum N LL 
1999 0.9480 0.0382 0.0175 -0.0500 -0.0144 0.5367 -1.0215 0.4259 414 -172.91 
 [0.0001] [0.1713] [0.3025] [0.0001] [0.3543] [0.0107] [0.0364] [0.0076]   
2000 0.7719 0.0586 0.0148 -0.0421 -0.0471 0.6587 -0.5306 0.5930 420 -180.19 
 [0.0018] [0.0494] [0.3798] [0.0006] [0.0475] [0.0014] [0.1421] [0.0002]   
2001 0.5974 0.0724 0.0117 -0.0324 -0.0357 0.2010 -0.7847 0.5618 422 -175.74 
 [0.0182] [0.0169] [0.4665] [0.0080] [0.1217] [0.1980] [0.0117] [0.0004]   
2002 0.6051 0.1202 0.0158 -0.0385 -0.0567 0.1471 -0.7535 0.4756 424 -183.88 
 [0.0194] [0.0002] [0.3313] [0.0022] [0.0608] [0.4170] [0.0253] [0.0033]   
2003 0.4893 0.1610 0.0104 -0.0389 -0.0413 0.1228 -0.5161 0.4750 420 -197.07 
 [0.0699] [0.0001] [0.5358] [0.0031] [0.0463] [0.4014] [0.0693] [0.0053]   
2004 0.3931 0.1756 0.0189 -0.0408 -0.0176 0.3475 -0.4629 0.4534 419 -215.26 
 [0.1844] [0.0001] [0.2832] [0.0037] [0.4018] [0.0756] [0.1160] [0.0112]   
2005 0.8394 0.1948 0.0214 -0.0650 -0.0535 0.4102 -0.2413 0.4238 416 -234.17 
 [0.0079] [0.0001] [0.2533] [0.0001] [0.0133] [0.0315] [0.3150] [0.0254]   
2006 0.8290 0.1533 0.0173 -0.0556 -0.0758 0.2046 -0.2042 0.4153 401 -235.13 
 [0.0092] [0.0012] [0.3971] [0.0002] [0.0027] [0.2326] [0.2525] [0.0343]   
           
#Sign. 14/15 10/15 0/15 15/15 9/15 5/15 7/15 15/15   
Average 0.7577 0.0877 0.0183 -0.0442 -0.0477 0.2599 -0.6745 0.4956   
t-stat 13.95 6.02 8.04 -17.87 -5.39 5.12 -8.26 27.97   
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000   
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Table 3.3 (continued) 
           
Panel B Family Firm Assets / Industry Assets (Family Voting Power ≥ 25%) 
Year Intercept Log(mnYear) Log(nFirm) Log(mBVA) mMVA/BVA mOIbD/BVA mEarnVol AmeDum N LL 
1992 0.5171 0.0629 0.0534 -0.0375 -0.0801 -0.0096 -0.5486 0.3454 386 -189.14 
 [0.0590] [0.0565] [0.0244] [0.0081] [0.0028] [0.9609] [0.2413] [0.0625]   
1993 0.7267 0.0440 0.0460 -0.0452 -0.0732 0.1014 -0.8263 0.3335 390 -188.54 
 [0.0114] [0.1383] [0.0464] [0.0021] [0.0169] [0.6526] [0.1586] [0.0706]   
1994 1.3781 0.0707 0.0337 -0.0743 -0.1724 0.2132 -0.7871 0.4342 393 -192.91 
 [0.0001] [0.0235] [0.1396] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.3877] [0.1592] [0.0224]   
1995 0.7571 0.0497 0.0154 -0.0435 -0.0566 -0.0292 -0.4182 0.3945 402 -203.30 
 [0.0062] [0.0787] [0.4581] [0.0021] [0.0637] [0.9049] [0.3984] [0.0247]   
1996 0.9039 0.0593 0.0379 -0.0552 -0.0518 0.1890 -1.0138 0.2994 405 -186.04 
 [0.0012] [0.0306] [0.0526] [0.0001] [0.0617] [0.4684] [0.0926] [0.0669]   
1997 0.8011 0.0502 0.0289 -0.0502 -0.0260 0.2001 -0.7336 0.4157 408 -184.90 
 [0.0046] [0.0792] [0.1296] [0.0003] [0.1981] [0.3089] [0.2121] [0.0102]   
1998 0.6669 0.0518 0.0369 -0.0474 -0.0117 0.4690 -0.5103 0.3544 410 -189.26 
 [0.0210] [0.0919] [0.0515] [0.0007] [0.6765] [0.0198] [0.4018] [0.0315]   
1999 0.6536 0.0500 0.0367 -0.0462 -0.0050 0.5584 -0.7044 0.3158 414 -164.54 
 [0.0088] [0.0750] [0.0311] [0.0002] [0.7478] [0.0085] [0.1475] [0.0355]   
2000 0.6802 0.0764 0.0384 -0.0479 -0.0491 0.4784 -0.3781 0.5548 420 -176.40 
 [0.0070] [0.0124] [0.0276] [0.0001] [0.0525] [0.0197] [0.2635] [0.0004]   
2001 0.5928 0.0786 0.0351 -0.0426 -0.0324 0.1614 -0.5870 0.5153 422 -169.69 
 [0.0204] [0.0105] [0.0319] [0.0006] [0.1636] [0.2905] [0.0540] [0.0007]   
2002 0.7032 0.1127 0.0413 -0.0502 -0.0782 0.1575 -0.8054 0.4162 424 -165.45 
 [0.0075] [0.0005] [0.0117] [0.0001] [0.0163] [0.4124] [0.0365] [0.0058]   
2003 0.4637 0.1554 0.0443 -0.0478 -0.0433 0.1525 -0.4003 0.4194 420 -182.76 
 [0.0945] [0.0001] [0.0109] [0.0004] [0.0608] [0.3746] [0.1782] [0.0098]   
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Table 3.3 (continued) 
           
Panel B (continued)          
Year Intercept Log(mnYear) Log(nFirm) Log(mBVA) mMVA/BVA mOIbD/BVA mEarnVol AmeDum N LL 
2004 0.4751 0.1677 0.0573 -0.0544 -0.0196 0.1748 -0.5012 0.4197 419 -202.83 
 [0.1327] [0.0001] [0.0025] [0.0003] [0.3799] [0.3875] [0.1353] [0.0171]   
2005 0.5770 0.1454 0.0619 -0.0572 -0.0425 0.2982 -0.2394 0.3565 416 -212.26 
 [0.0844] [0.0014] [0.0020] [0.0003] [0.0583] [0.1217] [0.3720] [0.0538]   
2006 0.4961 0.1069 0.0719 -0.0483 -0.0601 0.2923 -0.0813 0.3111 401 -204.42 
 [0.1446] [0.0344] [0.0013] [0.0023] [0.0236] [0.1834] [0.5558] [0.1140]   
           
#Sign. 13/15 14/15 12/15 15/15 10/15 3/15 3/15 14/15   
Average 0.6928 0.0854 0.0426 -0.0499 -0.0535 0.2272 -0.5690 0.3924   
t-stat 11.78 7.89 11.77 -22.87 -5.15 5.22 -8.91 20.72   
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000   
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Table 4.1 Capital Structure Choices – Statistical Distribution and Definition of Variables 
Below are the number of observations (N), mean, standard deviation (Std. Dev.), and various percentiles of the accounting variables that are used 
in univariate and multivariate settings throughout this chapter. Panel A1 through A4 presents statistics for the years 1993 through 2002 while 
Panel B1 through B4 presents statistics for the years 1996 through 2005. Definition of the variables is on page 79. 
 
Panel A1 Level of debt Percentiles 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min 1% 5% Median 95% 99% Max
FFDum 7,899 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Debt/BVA 7,882 0.59 6.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.92 4.34 305.51
Debt/MVA 6,984 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.49 0.70 0.93
BVA ($ mil) 7,882 2,484.42 18,115.01 0.01 0.20 1.90 151.55 6,963.75 34,660.07 530,518.20
Log(BVA) 7,882 18.47 2.60 8.53 11.65 14.03 18.62 22.55 24.16 26.83
MVA/BVA 6,984 8.06 81.79 0.10 0.71 0.94 1.61 13.52 100.47 4,056.93
ROA 7,876 -0.71 7.28 -341.19 -12.03 -1.86 0.01 0.12 0.22 74.44
FCF/BVE 7,355 -0.18 28.66 -428.29 -10.46 -2.25 0.12 0.62 2.39 2,356.11
 
Panel A2 Maturity structure of debt Percentiles 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min 1% 5% Median 95% 99% Max
FFDum 4,632 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Debtin1yr 4,386 0.36 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.28 0.99 1.00 1.00
Debtin2yrs 4,080 0.52 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.49 1.00 1.00 1.00
Debtin3yrs 4,077 0.62 0.31 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.65 1.00 1.00 1.00
Debtin1+yrs 4,066 0.61 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.99 1.00 1.00
Debtin2+yrs 4,066 0.48 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.95 1.00 1.00
Debtin3+yrs 4,066 0.38 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.89 0.99 1.00
MVA/BVA 3,975 10.08 169.79 0.18 0.71 0.92 1.76 12.96 91.49 9,467.15
Log(MVA) 3,976 19.02 2.24 11.61 14.53 15.64 18.88 22.91 24.42 26.69
AbnEarn 3,842 7.20 208.83 -640.48 -4.02 -0.28 0.01 1.52 19.74 9,835.27
TermStr 4,610 1.26 0.38 -0.68 0.52 0.96 1.16 1.78 3.02 3.27
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Table 4.1 (continued) 
 
Panel A3 Priority structure of debt Percentiles 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min 1% 5% Median 95% 99% Max 
FFDum 4,632 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
CLeases/FixClm 4,342 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.34 0.50 
Secured/FixClm 4,036 0.27 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.81 0.96 1.60 
Ordinary/FixClm 4,065 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.98 1.00 1.70 
Subord/FixClm 4,086 0.05 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.67 1.01 
PrefEq/FixClm 4,342 0.10 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.65 1.00 1.00 
MVA/BVA 3,975 10.08 169.79 0.18 0.71 0.92 1.76 12.96 91.49 9,467.15 
AbnEarn 3,842 7.20 208.83 -640.48 -4.02 -0.28 0.01 1.52 19.74 9,835.27 
Tax-LossDum 4,632 0.23 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Log(MVA) 3,976 19.02 2.24 11.61 14.53 15.64 18.88 22.91 24.42 26.69 
 
Panel A4 Cash holdings and dividend policy Percentiles 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min 1% 5% Median 95% 99% Max
FFDum 7,899 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Cash/BVA 7,882 0.18 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.66 0.86 1.00
DivYld 6,984 1.20 64.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.13 4,896.89
DivPay 6,371 0.74 25.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.21 4.80 1,988.50
Div/OIbD 6,464 0.15 1.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 1.40 99.69
BVA ($ mil) 7,882 2,484.42 18,115.01 0.01 0.20 1.90 151.55 6,963.75 34,660.07 530,518.20
Log(BVA) 7,882 18.47 2.60 8.53 11.65 14.03 18.62 22.55 24.16 26.83
MVA/BVA 6,984 8.06 81.79 0.10 0.71 0.94 1.61 13.52 100.47 4,056.93
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Table 4.1 (continued) 
 
Panel B1 Level of debt Percentiles 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min 1% 5% Median 95% 99% Max
FFDum 7,899 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Debt/BVA 7,899 0.74 8.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 1.03 6.50 456.74
Debt/MVA 7,343 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.50 0.70 0.96
BVA ($ mil) 7,899 3,318.95 26,316.88 0.01 0.32 2.22 188.52 8,876.99 47,178.82 921,622.00
Log(BVA) 7,899 18.71 2.64 8.35 11.84 14.11 18.89 22.80 24.43 27.38
MVA/BVA 7,342 9.75 115.86 0.31 0.76 0.96 1.64 15.35 117.96 7,530.07
ROA 7,895 -1.43 36.14 -2,954.37 -15.87 -2.05 0.01 0.11 0.23 87.32
FCF/BVE 7,515 -0.33 23.75 -428.29 -12.36 -2.45 0.12 0.60 2.46 1,889.77
 
Panel B2 Maturity structure of debt Percentiles 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min 1% 5% Median 95% 99% Max
FFDum 4,586 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Debtin1yr 4,416 0.35 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.27 0.99 1.00 1.00
Debtin2yrs 4,217 0.51 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.48 1.00 1.00 1.00
Debtin3yrs 4,216 0.61 0.32 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.64 1.00 1.00 1.00
Debtin1+yrs 4,203 0.62 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.99 1.00 1.00
Debtin2+yrs 4,203 0.48 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.95 1.00 1.00
Debtin3+yrs 4,203 0.38 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.90 0.99 1.00
MVA/BVA 4,154 9.11 98.93 0.30 0.76 0.93 1.80 15.32 96.56 4,739.18
Log(MVA) 4,156 19.18 2.28 11.61 14.43 15.72 19.08 23.15 24.63 26.96
AbnEarn 4,058 8.18 340.37 -5,184.57 -7.09 -0.30 0.01 1.32 19.69 19,444.33
TermStr 4,586 1.35 0.30 -0.68 0.35 1.06 1.28 1.78 2.34 3.27
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Table 4.1 (continued) 
 
Panel B3 Priority structure of debt Percentiles 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min 1% 5% Median 95% 99% Max 
FFDum 4,586 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
CLeases/FixClm 4,355 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.33 0.50 
Secured/FixClm 4,076 0.26 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.80 0.96 1.69 
Ordinary/FixClm 4,087 0.53 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.98 1.00 31.37 
Subord/FixClm 4,102 0.05 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.66 27.64 
PrefEq/FixClm 4,355 0.09 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.57 1.00 1.00 
MVA/BVA 4,154 9.11 98.93 0.30 0.76 0.93 1.80 15.32 96.56 4,739.18 
AbnEarn 4,058 8.18 340.37 -5,184.57 -7.09 -0.30 0.01 1.32 19.69 19,444.33 
Tax-LossDum 4,586 0.29 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Log(MVA) 4,156 19.18 2.28 11.61 14.43 15.72 19.08 23.15 24.63 26.96 
 
Panel B4 Cash holdings and dividend policy Percentiles 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min 1% 5% Median 95% 99% Max
FFDum 7,899 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Cash/BVA 7,899 0.19 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.66 0.87 1.00
DivYld 7,342 1.46 67.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.13 3,484.26
DivPay 6,707 0.50 9.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.17 4.15 764.40
Div/OIbD 6,661 0.16 2.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 1.37 132.67
BVA ($ mil) 7,899 3,318.95 26,316.88 0.01 0.32 2.22 188.52 8,876.99 47,178.82 921,622.00
Log(BVA) 7,899 18.71 2.64 8.35 11.84 14.11 18.89 22.80 24.43 27.38
MVA/BVA 7,342 9.75 115.86 0.31 0.76 0.96 1.64 15.35 117.96 7,530.07
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Table 4.1 (continued) 
 
Variable  Definition 
 
FFDum dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is a family firm; 0 
otherwise 
 
Level of debt 
Debt/BVA  total debt-to-book value of assets [total debt = long-term debt + short-term debt] 
Debt/MVA  total debt-to-market value of assets 
BVA   book value of assets 
MVA/BVA  market-to-book assets 
ROA   return on assets, i.e. net income-to-book value of assets 
FCF/BVE free cash flow-to-book value of equity [free cash flow = operating income before 
depreciation – (income taxes – change in deferred taxes) – interest expense – 
preferred dividends – common dividends] 
 
Maturity structure of debt 
Debtin1yr  portion of debt that is due in the next year 
Debtin2yrs  portion of debt that is due in the next 2 years 
Debtin3yrs  portion of debt that is due in the next 3 years 
Debtin1+yr  portion of debt that is due after next year 
Debtin2+yrs  portion of debt that is due after next 2 years 
Debtin3+yrs  portion of debt that is due after next 3 years 
MVA/BVA  market-to-book assets 
MVA   market value of assets 
AbnEarn abnormal earnings [abnormal earnings t = (earnings per share excluding 
extraordinary items t – earnings per share excluding extraordinary items t -1) / 
fiscal-year-end share price t-1] 
TermStr term structure [term structure m = yield on a 10-year Treasury bond m – yield on 
a 6-month Treasury bill m] 
 
Priority structure of debt 
CLeases/FixClm portion of fixed claims that is capitalized leases 
Secured/FixClm portion of fixed claims that is secured debt 
Ordinary/FixClm portion of fixed claims that is ordinary debt 
Subord/FixClm portion of fixed claims that is subordinated debt 
PrefEq/FixClm portion of fixed claims that is preferred equity 
MVA/BVA  market-to-book assets 
AbnEarn abnormal earnings [abnormal earnings t = (earnings per share excluding 
extraordinary items t – earnings per share excluding extraordinary items t -1) / 
fiscal-year-end share price t-1] 
Tax-lossDum dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation has a tax-loss 
carryforward; 0 otherwise 
MVA   market value of assets 
 
Cash holdings and dividend policy 
Cash/BVA  cash and short-term securities-to-book value of assets 
DivYld   dividend yield 
DivPay   dividend payout 
Div/OIbD  common dividends-to-operating income before depreciation 
BVA   book value of assets 
MVA/BVA  market-to-book assets 
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Table 4.2 Level of Debt – Univariate Results 
Panels A1 through A3 present the univariate statistics between family firms and non-family firms of the 
variables that are used in multivariate analysis of level of debt for the years 1993 through 2002 while 
Panels B1 through B3 present the same univariate statistics for the years 1996 through 2005. T-test is 
utilized to test the differences in means and Wilcoxon test is utilized to test the differences in medians. 
Variable definitions are on the previous page. ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, 10%, 
respectively. Variable Debt/BVA is winsorized between 0 and 1, and variables MVA/BVA, ROA and 
FCF/BVE are winsorized at 5th and 95th percentiles. 
 
 
Panel A1     (Overall) 
 Family Non-family Significance 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
Debt/BVA 1,123 0.2483 0.1988 6,759 0.2928 0.2199 *** *** 
Debt/MVA 1,118 0.1833 0.1364 5,866 0.1608 0.1092 *** *** 
BVA ($mil) 1,123 1,502.2118 163.0904 6,759 2,647.6145 149.5442 *** *** 
Log(BVA) 1,123 18.7638 18.7928 6,759 18.4220 18.5966 *** *** 
MVA/BVA 1,118 1.9668 1.3146 5,866 3.0747 1.6970 *** *** 
ROA 1,123 -0.0525 0.0157 6,753 -0.2333 0.0043 *** *** 
FCF/BVE 1,099 0.0482 0.1567 6,256 -0.1425 0.1172 *** *** 
         
 
Panel A2     (Excluding Utilities and Financials) 
 Family Non-family Significance 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
Debt/BVA 851 0.2606 0.2194 5,168 0.3003 0.2234 ***  
Debt/MVA 846 0.1829 0.1455 4,568 0.1485 0.0993 *** *** 
BVA ($mil) 851 1,021.2723 101.6814 5,171 1,123.0180 80.7932  *** 
Log(BVA) 851 18.3454 18.3163 5,168 17.8896 17.9386 *** *** 
MVA/BVA 846 2.2245 1.5012 4,565 3.4933 2.0680 *** *** 
ROA 851 -0.0729 0.0236 5,159 -0.3018 -0.0300 *** *** 
FCF/BVE 842 0.0258 0.1550 4,767 -0.2177 0.0890 *** *** 
         
 
Panel A3     (Family Voting Power ≥  25% & Excluding Utilities and Financials) 
 Family Non-family Significance 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
Debt/BVA 497 0.2634 0.2239 5,168 0.3003 0.2234 ***  
Debt/MVA 496 0.1896 0.1554 4,568 0.1485 0.0993 *** *** 
BVA ($mil) 497 686.1201 91.3645 5,171 1,123.0180 80.7932 **  
Log(BVA) 497 18.2179 18.2410 5,168 17.8896 17.9386 *** ** 
MVA/BVA 496 2.0843 1.4280 4,565 3.4933 2.0680 *** *** 
ROA 497 -0.0473 0.0256 5,159 -0.3018 -0.0300 *** *** 
FCF/BVE 492 0.0465 0.1551 4,767 -0.2177 0.0890 *** *** 
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Table 4.2 (continued) 
 
Panel B1     (Overall) 
 Family Non-family Significance 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
Debt/BVA 1,123 0.2495 0.1935 6,776 0.3007 0.2232 *** *** 
Debt/MVA 1,121 0.1850 0.1448 6,222 0.1629 0.1121 *** *** 
BVA ($mil) 1,123 2,021.4071 201.4021 6,776 3,533.9893 187.2593 *** *** 
Log(BVA) 1,123 19.0194 19.0298 6,776 18.6551 18.8665 *** *** 
MVA/BVA 1,121 2.0053 1.3340 6,221 3.2357 1.7309 *** *** 
ROA 1,123 -0.0572 0.0150 6,772 -0.2423 0.0036 *** *** 
FCF/BVE 1,092 0.0315 0.1463 6,423 -0.1750 0.1111 *** *** 
         
 
Panel B2     (Excluding Utilities and Financials) 
 Family Non-family Significance 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
Debt/BVA 848 0.2565 0.2130 5,182 0.3081 0.2239 *** *** 
Debt/MVA 846 0.1815 0.1464 4,827 0.1480 0.0991 *** *** 
BVA ($mil) 848 1,311.6205 125.1601 5,185 1,414.9730 100.0227  *** 
Log(BVA) 848 18.5873 18.5028 5,182 18.1056 18.2035 *** *** 
MVA/BVA 846 2.2399 1.5199 4,823 3.6974 2.0989 *** *** 
ROA 848 -0.0766 0.0223 5,175 -0.3140 -0.0318 *** *** 
FCF/BVE 838 0.0049 0.1437 4,919 -0.2535 0.0773 *** *** 
         
 
Panel B3     (Family Voting Power ≥  25% & Excluding Utilities and Financials) 
 Family Non-family Significance 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
Debt/BVA 496 0.2578 0.2113 5,182 0.3081 0.2239 *** ** 
Debt/MVA 496 0.1865 0.1497 4,827 0.1480 0.0991 *** *** 
BVA ($mil) 496 958.5841 104.5398 5,185 1,414.9730 100.0227 *  
Log(BVA) 496 18.4119 18.3663 5,182 18.1056 18.2035 *** * 
MVA/BVA 496 2.0900 1.4360 4,823 3.6974 2.0989 *** *** 
ROA 496 -0.0560 0.0218 5,175 -0.3140 -0.0318 *** *** 
FCF/BVE 489 0.0181 0.1438 4,919 -0.2535 0.0773 *** *** 
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Table 4.3 Level of Debt – Multivariate Results 
Panels A1 and A2 of the table present results of GLS models, where the Compustat universe over 1993-2002 period is used as a sample while 
Panels B1 and B2 present results for the years 1996 through 2005. In Panels A1 and B1, the dependent variable is book value of debt-to-book 
value of assets while the dependent variable is book value of debt-to-market value of assets in Panels A2 and B2. BVA is book value of assets. 
MVA/BVA is market value of assets-to-book value of assets. ROA is net income-to-book value of assets. FCF/BVE is free cash flow-to-book value 
of equity. FFDum is a dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the observation is a family firm; and 0 otherwise. Time represents the dummy 
variables, which take the value 1 for each of the observation years; and 0 otherwise, excluding the year 2002. Industry represents either 10 SIC 
manual divisions as presented in Kahle and Walkling (1996) (MD10), 38 industries defined by Fama and French (FF38) or 2-digit SIC codes 
(SIC2). P-values adjusted for heteroskedasticity are in square brackets. Variable Debt/BVA is winsorized between 0 and 1 while variables 
MVA/BVA, ROA and FCF/BVE are winsorized at 5th and 95th percentiles. 
 
Panel A1 Debt/BVA     (over 1993-2002 period) 
 Overall Excl. Utilities &Financials Family Voting Power ≥ 25% and 
Excl. Utilities &Financials 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
          
Log(BVA) 0.0181 0.0165 0.0200 0.0200 0.0182 0.0172 0.0199 0.0182 0.0171 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
MVA/BVA -0.0174 -0.0159 -0.0153 -0.0185 -0.0170 -0.0151 -0.0181 -0.0166 -0.0148 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
ROA -0.0091 -0.0113 -0.0353 -0.0274 -0.0264 -0.0322 -0.0165 -0.0167 -0.0222 
 [0.0504] [0.0130] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0005] [0.0001] 
          
FCF/BVE -0.0239 -0.0255 -0.0190 -0.0144 -0.0176 -0.0168 -0.0205 -0.0230 -0.0221 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
FFDum 0.0056 -0.0020 -0.0017 0.0139 0.0046 0.0005 0.0196 0.0054 0.0019 
 [0.0104] [0.3624] [0.4136] [0.0001] [0.0587] [0.8221] [0.0001] [0.0850] [0.5470] 
          
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry MD10 FF38 SIC2 MD10 FF38 SIC2 MD10 FF38 SIC2 
N 46,217 46,387 46,387 33,858 36,137 35,863 31,141 33,262 33,016 
Adj. R2 0.1408 0.1623 0.2793 0.1253 0.1710 0.2226 0.1243 0.1708 0.2225 
83 
 
Table 4.3 (continued) 
 
Panel A2 Debt/MVA     (over 1993-2002 period) 
 Overall Excl. Utilities &Financials Family Voting Power ≥ 25% and 
Excl. Utilities &Financials 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
          
Log(BVA) 0.0113 0.0097 0.0127 0.0114 0.0098 0.0087 0.0114 0.0099 0.0087 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
MVA/BVA -0.0257 -0.0240 -0.0235 -0.0262 -0.0248 -0.0230 -0.0257 -0.0243 -0.0226 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
ROA -0.0229 -0.0252 -0.0470 -0.0381 -0.0384 -0.0438 -0.0290 -0.0301 -0.0354 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
FCF/BVE -0.0023 -0.0046 0.0018 0.0085 0.0048 0.0062 0.0036 0.0005 0.0020 
 [0.3429] [0.0551] [0.4267] [0.0013] [0.0541] [0.0100] [0.1828] [0.8277] [0.4047] 
          
FFDum 0.0107 0.0053 0.0052 0.0202 0.0118 0.0077 0.0279 0.0149 0.0105 
 [0.0001] [0.0061] [0.0045] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry MD10 FF38 SIC2 MD10 FF38 SIC2 MD10 FF38 SIC2 
N 46,217 46,386 46,386 33,858 36,136 35,862 31,141 33,261 33,015 
Adj. R2 0.1822 0.2063 0.3197 0.1919 0.2319 0.2851 0.1915 0.2323 0.2858 
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Table 4.3 (continued) 
 
Panel B1 Debt/BVA     (over 1996-2005 period) 
 Overall Excl. Utilities &Financials Family Voting Power ≥ 25% and 
Excl. Utilities &Financials 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
          
Log(BVA) 0.0185 0.0170 0.0202 0.0202 0.0187 0.0175 0.0201 0.0186 0.0174 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
MVA/BVA -0.0150 -0.0137 -0.0137 -0.0158 -0.0145 -0.0131 -0.0154 -0.0142 -0.0127 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
ROA -0.0003 -0.0021 -0.0241 -0.0136 -0.0143 -0.0170 -0.0048 -0.0062 -0.0086 
 [0.9411] [0.6113] [0.0001] [0.0022] [0.0007] [0.0001] [0.2820] [0.1491] [0.0388] 
          
FCF/BVE -0.0322 -0.0340 -0.0293 -0.0265 -0.0282 -0.0286 -0.0316 -0.0330 -0.0333 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
FFDum 0.0070 -0.0004 -0.0013 0.0149 0.0044 -0.0005 0.0195 0.0040 -0.0011 
 [0.0009] [0.8422] [0.4136] [0.0001] [0.0605] [0.8428] [0.0001] [0.1793] [0.7038] 
          
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry MD10 FF38 SIC2 MD10 FF38 SIC2 MD10 FF38 SIC2 
N 51,356 51,591 51,591 37,231 39,896 39,617 34,375 36,849 36,600 
Adj. R2 0.1342 0.1588 0.2748 0.1206 0.1713 0.2234 0.1194 0.1705 0.2223 
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Table 4.3 (continued) 
 
Panel B2 Debt/MVA     (over 1996-2005 period) 
 Overall Excl. Utilities &Financials Family Voting Power ≥ 25% and 
Excl. Utilities &Financials 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
          
Log(BVA) 0.0111 0.0097 0.0124 0.0110 0.0096 0.0084 0.0110 0.0097 0.0084 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
MVA/BVA -0.0222 -0.0206 -0.0206 -0.0224 -0.0212 -0.0199 -0.0220 -0.0208 -0.0195 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
ROA -0.0212 -0.0229 -0.0425 -0.0319 -0.0331 -0.0357 -0.0245 -0.0262 -0.0286 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
FCF/BVE -0.0043 -0.0069 -0.0023 0.0030 0.0004 0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0033 -0.0031 
 [0.0422] [0.0010] [0.2468] [0.1794] [0.8396] [0.7735] [0.6193] [0.1256] [0.1395] 
          
FFDum 0.0124 0.0066 0.0054 0.0210 0.0113 0.0065 0.0271 0.0130 0.0073 
 [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0016] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0009] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0034] 
          
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry MD10 FF38 SIC2 MD10 FF38 SIC2 MD10 FF38 SIC2 
N 51,356 51,590 51,590 37,231 39,895 39,616 34,375 36,848 36,599 
Adj. R2 0.1748 0.2025 0.3167 0.1826 0.2291 0.2842 0.1820 0.2293 0.2846 
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Table 4.4 Maturity Structure of Debt – Univariate Results 
Panels A1 and A2 present the univariate statistics between family firms and non-family firms of the 
variables that are used in multivariate analysis of maturity structure of debt for the years 1993 through 
2002 while Panels B1 and B2 present the same univariate statistics for the years 1996 through 2005. T-
test is utilized to test the differences in means and Wilcoxon test is utilized to test the differences in 
medians. Variable definitions are on page 79. ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, 10%, 
respectively. Variable MVA/BVA is winsorized at 5th and 95th percentiles, and variable AbnEarn is 
winsorized between -5 and 5. 
 
 
Panel A1     (Overall) 
 Family Non-family Significance 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
Debtin1yr 645 0.3381 0.2644 3,741 0.3591 0.2835 *  
Debtin2yr 622 0.5158 0.4995 3,458 0.5223 0.4933   
Debtin3yr 621 0.6280 0.6658 3,456 0.6195 0.6504   
Debtin1+yr 620 0.6383 0.7235 3,446 0.6079 0.6984 ** * 
Debtin2+yr 620 0.4826 0.5005 3,446 0.4749 0.5035   
Debtin3+yr 620 0.3705 0.3344 3,446 0.3777 0.3431   
MVA/BVA 658 2.0891 1.4441 3,317 3.1289 1.8625 *** *** 
Log(MVA) 658 19.0037 18.8342 3,318 19.0229 18.9037   
AbnEarn 647 0.1594 0.0117 3,195 0.1743 0.0137   
TermStr 660 0.0121 0.0116 3,950 0.0126 0.0116 ***  
         
 
Panel A2     (Family Voting Power ≥  25%) 
 Family Non-family Significance 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
Debtin1yr 375 0.3364 0.2472 3,741 0.3591 0.2835   
Debtin2yr 363 0.5200 0.5000 3,458 0.5223 0.4933   
Debtin3yr 363 0.6367 0.6753 3,456 0.6195 0.6504   
Debtin1pyr 363 0.6390 0.7388 3,446 0.6079 0.6984 *  
Debtin2pyr 363 0.4775 0.4944 3,446 0.4749 0.5035   
Debtin3pyr 363 0.3626 0.3249 3,446 0.3777 0.3431   
MVA/BVA 383 1.9034 1.3542 3,317 3.1289 1.8625 *** *** 
Log(MVA) 383 18.8028 18.7006 3,318 19.0229 18.9037 **  
AbnEarn 377 0.1899 0.0180 3,194 0.1793 0.0141   
TermStr 385 0.0121 0.0116 3,950 0.0126 0.0116 ***  
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Table 4.4 (continued) 
 
Panel B1     (Overall) 
 Family Non-family Significance 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
Debtin1yr 639 0.3404 0.2576 3,777 0.3558 0.2760   
Debtin2yr 624 0.5170 0.5152 3,593 0.5138 0.4710   
Debtin3yr 623 0.6262 0.6654 3,593 0.6111 0.6309   
Debtin1pyr 623 0.6356 0.7205 3,580 0.6138 0.7094 *  
Debtin2pyr 623 0.4805 0.4903 3,580 0.4838 0.5245   
Debtin3pyr 623 0.3723 0.3311 3,580 0.3863 0.3659   
MVA/BVA 655 2.1288 1.4592 3,499 3.3662 1.9223 *** *** 
Log(MVA) 655 19.1818 19.0805 3,501 19.1834 19.0832   
AbnEarn 652 0.1342 0.0117 3,406 0.1371 0.0146   
TermStr 656 0.0132 0.0128 3,930 0.0135 0.0128 ***  
         
 
Panel B2     (Family Voting Power ≥  25%) 
 Family Non-family Significance 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
Debtin1yr 370 0.3398 0.2480 3,777 0.3558 0.2760   
Debtin2yr 364 0.5264 0.5259 3,593 0.5138 0.4710   
Debtin3yr 363 0.6362 0.6831 3,593 0.6111 0.6309   
Debtin1pyr 363 0.6364 0.7275 3,580 0.6138 0.7094   
Debtin2pyr 363 0.4711 0.4738 3,580 0.4838 0.5245   
Debtin3pyr 363 0.3629 0.3202 3,580 0.3863 0.3659   
MVA/BVA 381 1.9190 1.3883 3,499 3.3662 1.9223 *** *** 
Log(MVA) 381 18.9662 18.8659 3,501 19.1834 19.0832 ** * 
AbnEarn 381 0.1283 0.0116 3,405 0.1458 0.0150   
TermStr 382 0.0132 0.0128 3,930 0.0135 0.0128 ***  
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Table 4.5 Maturity Structure of Debt – Multivariate Results 
Panels A and B of the table present results of GLS models, where the Compustat universe with SIC codes 2000 through 5999 over 1993-2002 and 
1996-2005 periods is used as a sample, respectively. The dependent variables are portion of total debt that is due in various years. MVA/BVA is 
market value of assets-to-book value of assets. MVA is market value of assets. AbnEarn is abnormal earnings measured as the difference between 
current year’s and previous year’s EPS (excluding extraordinary items) divided by previous year’s share price. TermStr is term structure measured 
as the difference between the monthly yield on a 10-year Treasury bond and 6-month Treasury bill, which is then matched to a company by fiscal 
year and its fiscal-year-end month. FFDum is a dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the observation is a family firm; and 0 otherwise. Time 
represents dummy variables, which take the values 1 for each of the observation years; and 0 otherwise, excluding the year 2002. Industry 
represents 2-digit SIC codes (SIC2).  P-values adjusted for heteroskedasticity are in square brackets. The variable MVA/BVA is winsorized at 5th 
and 95th percentiles and AbnEarn is winsorized between -5 and +5. 
 
Panel A Overall     (over 1993-2002 period) Family Voting Power ≥ 25%     (over 1993-2002 period) 
 Debt in 
1 year 
Debt in 
2 years 
Debt in 
3 years 
Debt in 
1+ years 
Debt in 
2+ years 
Debt in 
3+ years 
Debt in 
1 year 
Debt in 
2 years 
Debt in 
3 years 
Debt in 
1+ years 
Debt in 
2+ years 
Debt in 
3+ years 
             
MVA/BVA 0.0229 0.0296 0.0254 -0.0288 -0.0298 -0.0255 0.0226 0.0293 0.0249 -0.0287 -0.0296 -0.0250 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
             
Log(MVA) -0.0437 -0.0614 -0.0642 0.0476 0.0616 0.0642 -0.0438 -0.0615 -0.0641 0.0477 0.0617 0.0642 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
             
AbnEarn 0.0001 -0.0044 -0.0021 0.0021 0.0045 0.0026 0.0012 -0.0043 -0.0021 0.0010 0.0044 0.0026 
 [0.9652] [0.1143] [0.4432] [0.4336] [0.1040] [0.3440] [0.6171] [0.1297] [0.4487] [0.7197] [0.1244] [0.3611] 
             
TermStr 0.6532 0.7964 0.7119 -0.5862 -0.7880 -0.6813 0.6753 0.8359 0.7399 -0.6184 -0.8342 -0.7098 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0012] [0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0010] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
             
FFDum -0.0192 -0.0187 -0.0155 0.0260 0.0187 0.0153 -0.0168 -0.0107 -0.0080 0.0204 0.0104 0.0080 
 [0.0002] [0.0010] [0.0055] [0.0001] [0.0012] [0.0067] [0.0108] [0.1401] [0.2579] [0.0047] [0.1566] [0.2626] 
             
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 
N 23,594 19,597 19,568 19,128 19,128 19,128 21,634 17,950 17,923 17,538 17,538 17,538 
Adj. R2 0.1777 0.2724 0.2931 0.2116 0.2771 0.2979 0.1794 0.2781 0.2983 0.2158 0.2829 0.3030 
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Table 4.5 (continued) 
 
Panel B Overall     (over 1996-2005 period) Family Voting Power ≥ 25%     (over 1996-2005 period) 
 Debt in 
1 year 
Debt in 
2 years 
Debt in 
3 years 
Debt in 
1+ years 
Debt in 
2+ years 
Debt in 
3+ years 
Debt in 
1 year 
Debt in 
2 years 
Debt in 
3 years 
Debt in 
1+ years 
Debt in 
2+ years 
Debt in 
3+ years 
             
MVA/BVA 0.0201 0.0240 0.0200 -0.0255 -0.0243 -0.0201 0.0200 0.0237 0.0197 -0.0255 -0.0240 -0.0198 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
             
Log(MVA) -0.0469 -0.0633 -0.0643 0.0515 0.0635 0.0646 -0.0471 -0.0635 -0.0645 0.0518 0.0638 0.0648 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
             
AbnEarn -0.0024 -0.0047 -0.0009 0.0049 0.0046 0.0012 -0.0020 -0.0048 -0.0009 0.0048 0.0046 0.0012 
 [0.2818] [0.0674] [0.7137] [0.0555] [0.0779] [0.6343] [0.3671] [0.0714] [0.7301] [0.0674] [0.0838] [0.6563] 
             
TermStr 0.5526 0.8631 0.8134 -0.6951 -0.8821 -0.8042 0.5665 0.8582 0.8278 -0.7033 -0.8774 -0.8072 
 [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
             
FFDum -0.0131 -0.0082 -0.0059 0.0194 0.0084 0.0061 -0.0137 0.0009 0.0032 0.0169 -0.0000 -0.0022 
 [0.0105] [0.1454] [0.2849] [0.0005] [0.1414] [0.2805] [0.0360] [0.8961] [0.6516] [0.0181] [0.9949] [0.7620] 
             
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 
N 25,413 21,041 21,014 20,499 20,499 20,499 23,390 19,336 19,310 18,853 18,853 18,853 
Adj. R2 0.1938 0.2840 0.2948 0.2378 0.2894 0.2996 0.1964 0.2902 0.3004 0.2425 0.2958 0.3063 
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Table 4.6 Priority Structure of Debt – Univariate Results 
Panels A1 and A2 present the univariate statistics between family firms and non-family firms of the 
variables that are used in multivariate analysis of priority structure of debt for the years 1993 through 
2002 while Panels B1 and B2 present the same univariate statistics for the years 1996 through 2005. T-
test is utilized to test the differences in means and Wilcoxon test is utilized to test the differences in 
medians. Variable definitions are on page 79. ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, 10%, 
respectively. Variable MVA/BVA is winsorized at 5th and 95th percentiles, variables CLeases/FixClm, 
Secured/FixClm, Ordinary/FixClm, Subord/FixClm and PrefEq/FixClm are winsorized between 0 and 1, 
and variable AbnEarn is winsorized between -5 and 5. 
 
 
Panel A1     (Overall) 
 Family Non-family Significance 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
CLeases/FixClm 635 0.0353 0.0010 3,707 0.0363 0.0010   
Secured/FixClm 623 0.2982 0.2383 3,413 0.2591 0.1794 *** *** 
Ordinary/FixClm 627 0.5778 0.6463 3,438 0.4900 0.5152 *** *** 
Subord/FixClm 631 0.0394 0.0000 3,455 0.0465 0.0000   
PrefEq/FixClm 635 0.0558 0.0000 3,707 0.1134 0.0000 *** *** 
MVA/BVA 658 2.0891 1.4441 3,317 3.1289 1.8625 *** *** 
AbnEarn 647 0.1594 0.0117 3,195 0.1743 0.0137   
Tax-LossDum 660 0.2293 0.0000 3,972 0.2278 0.0000   
Log(MVA) 658 19.0037 18.8342 3,318 19.0229 18.9037   
         
 
Panel A2     (Family Voting Power ≥  25%) 
 Family Non-family Significance 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
CLeases/FixClm 369 0.0339 0.0010 3,707 0.0363 0.0010   
Secured/FixClm 365 0.3120 0.2527 3,413 0.2591 0.1794 *** *** 
Ordinary/FixClm 368 0.5772 0.6276 3,438 0.4900 0.5152 *** *** 
Subord/FixClm 369 0.0450 0.0000 3,455 0.0465 0.0000   
PrefEq/FixClm 369 0.0518 0.0000 3,707 0.1134 0.0000 *** *** 
MVA/BVA 383 1.9034 1.3542 3,317 3.1289 1.8625 *** *** 
AbnEarn 377 0.1899 0.0180 3,194 0.1793 0.0141   
Tax-LossDum 385 0.2245 0.1000 3,972 0.2278 0.0000   
Log(MVA) 383 18.8028 18.7006 3,318 19.0229 18.9037 **  
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Table 4.6 (continued) 
 
Panel B1     (Overall) 
 Family Non-family Significance 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
CLeases/FixClm 631 0.0340 0.0008 3,724 0.0341 0.0010   
Secured/FixClm 625 0.2902 0.2171 3,451 0.2597 0.1843 ** ** 
Ordinary/FixClm 625 0.5781 0.6419 3,462 0.5068 0.5323 *** *** 
Subord/FixClm 627 0.0405 0.0000 3,475 0.0470 0.0000   
PrefEq/FixClm 631 0.0530 0.0000 3,724 0.0988 0.0000 *** *** 
MVA/BVA 655 2.1288 1.4592 3,499 3.3662 1.9223 *** *** 
AbnEarn 652 0.1342 0.0117 3,406 0.1371 0.0146   
Tax-LossDum 656 0.2860 0.1000 3,930 0.2898 0.1000   
Log(MVA) 655 19.1818 19.0805 3,501 19.1834 19.0832   
         
 
Panel B2     (Family Voting Power ≥  25%) 
 Family Non-family Significance 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
CLeases/FixClm 365 0.0327 0.0008 3,724 0.0341 0.0010   
Secured/FixClm 364 0.3083 0.2259 3,451 0.2597 0.1843 *** *** 
Ordinary/FixClm 365 0.5780 0.6323 3,462 0.5068 0.5323 *** *** 
Subord/FixClm 365 0.0444 0.0000 3,475 0.0470 0.0000   
PrefEq/FixClm 365 0.0514 0.0000 3,724 0.0988 0.0000 *** *** 
MVA/BVA 381 1.9190 1.3883 3,499 3.3662 1.9223 *** *** 
AbnEarn 381 0.1283 0.0116 3,405 0.1458 0.0150   
Tax-LossDum 382 0.2776 0.1000 3,930 0.2898 0.1000   
Log(MVA) 381 18.9662 18.8659 3,501 19.1834 19.0832 ** * 
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Table 4.7 Priority Structure of Debt – Multivariate Results 
Panels A and B of the table present results of GLS models, where the Compustat universe with SIC codes 2000 through 5999 over 1993-2002 and 
1996-2005 periods is used as a sample, respectively. The dependent variables are claims in each priority class as a fraction of total fixed claims. 
MVA/BVA is market value of assets-to-book value of assets. AbnEarn is abnormal earnings measured as the difference between current year’s and 
previous year’s EPS (excluding extraordinary items) divided by previous year’s share price. Tax-lossDum is a dummy variable, which takes the 
value 1 if the firm has a tax-loss carryforward; and 0 otherwise. MVA is market value of assets. FFDum is a dummy variable, which takes the 
value 1 if the observation is a family firm; and 0 otherwise. Time represents dummy variables, which take the values 1 for each of the observation 
years; and 0 otherwise, excluding the year 2002. Industry represents 2-digit SIC codes (SIC2).  P-values adjusted for heteroskedasticity are in 
square brackets. The dependent variables are winsorized between 0 and 1 while variable MVA/BVA is winsorized at 5th and 95th percentiles and 
AbnEarn is winsorized between -5 and +5. 
 
Panel A Overall     (over 1993-2002 period) Family Voting Power ≥ 25%     (over 1993-2002 period) 
 Capitalized 
Leases 
Secured 
Debt 
Ordinary
Claims 
Subordinated
Debt 
Preferred
Stock 
Capitalized
Leases 
Secured
Debt 
Ordinary
Claims 
Subordinated
Debt 
Preferred
Stock 
           
MVA/BVA 0.0016 -0.0205 -0.0321 -0.0037 0.0190 0.0012 -0.0209 -0.0313 -0.0034 0.0185 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
           
AbnEarn -0.0018 0.0026 0.0001 0.0016 0.0014 -0.0018 0.0018 -0.0011 0.0016 0.0016 
 [0.0174] [0.3538] [0.9702] [0.1367] [0.3478] [0.0210] [0.5272] [0.7102] [0.1431] [0.3133] 
           
Tax-lossDum 0.0044 -0.0059 -0.0265 0.0079 0.0141 0.0037 -0.0053 -0.0256 0.0065 0.0145 
 [0.0014] [0.2501] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0109] [0.3206] [0.0001] [0.0015] [0.0001] 
           
Log(MVA) -0.0038 -0.0348 0.0505 0.0040 -0.0118 -0.0037 -0.0345 0.0502 0.0042 -0.0119 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
           
FFDum -0.0056 0.0193 0.0461 0.0039 -0.0181 -0.0078 0.0170 0.0462 0.0086 -0.0231 
 [0.0005] [0.0012] [0.0001] [0.0850] [0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0254] [0.0001] [0.0034] [0.0001] 
           
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 
N 22,619 20,526 21,319 21,660 22,619 20,741 18,791 19,524 19,819 20,741 
Adj. R2 0.0542 0.0885 0.1733 0.0309 0.0981 0.0559 0.0881 0.1723 0.0343 0.0941 
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Table 4.7 (continued) 
 
Panel B Overall     (over 1996-2005 period) Family Voting Power ≥ 25%     (over 1996-2005 period) 
 Capitalized 
Leases 
Secured 
Debt 
Ordinary
Claims 
Subordinated
Debt 
Preferred
Stock 
Capitalized
Leases 
Secured
Debt 
Ordinary
Claims 
Subordinated
Debt 
Preferred
Stock 
           
MVA/BVA 0.0001 -0.0206 -0.0249 -0.0031 0.0151 -0.0000 -0.0208 -0.0243 -0.0030 0.0147 
 [0.4936] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.8692] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
           
AbnEarn -0.0001 0.0043 0.0006 0.0007 0.0016 0.0000 0.0039 0.0002 0.0007 0.0016 
 [0.8370] [0.0866] [0.8331] [0.4806] [0.2519] [0.9679] [0.1205] [0.9391] [0.5072] [0.2747] 
           
Tax-lossDum 0.0016 -0.0114 -0.0249 0.0071 0.0154 0.0006 -0.0116 -0.0243 0.0051 0.0153 
 [0.1994] [0.0146] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.6408] [0.0168] [0.0001] [0.0079] [0.0001] 
           
Log(MVA) -0.0024 -0.0326 0.0530 0.0040 -0.0129 -0.0024 -0.0321 0.0528 0.0042 -0.0129 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
           
FFDum -0.0041 0.0197 0.0319 0.0051 -0.0155 -0.0073 0.0301 0.0424 0.0062 -0.0195 
 [0.0075] [0.0007] [0.0001] [0.0272] [0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0331] [0.0001] 
           
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 
N 24,456 22,748 23,231 23,598 24,456 22,522 20,922 21,380 21,697 22,522 
Adj. R2 0.0390 0.0848 0.1835 0.0319 0.1019 0.0406 0.0853 0.1837 0.0341 0.0977 
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Table 4.8 Cash Holdings and Dividend Policy – Univariate Results 
Panels A1 through A3 present the univariate statistics between family firms and non-family firms of the 
variables that are used in multivariate analysis of cash holdings and dividend policy for the years 1993 
through 2002 while Panels B1 through B3 present the same univariate statistics for the years 1996 
through 2005. T-test is utilized to test the differences in means and Wilcoxon test is utilized to test the 
differences in medians. Variable definitions are on page 79. ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1%, 
5%, 10%, respectively. Variable MVA/BVA is winsorized at 5th and 95th percentiles, and variables DivYld, 
DivPay, and Div/OIbD are winsorized at 95th percentile. 
 
 
Panel A1     (Overall) 
 Family Non-family Significance 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
Cash/BVA 1,123 0.1420 0.0818 6,759 0.1896 0.0933 *** *** 
DivYld 1,118 0.0105 0.0002 5,866 0.0084 0.0000 *** *** 
DivPay 1,045 0.2233 0.0568 5,326 0.2255 0.0000  *** 
Div/OIbD 1,040 0.0771 0.0176 5,424 0.0690 0.0000 ** *** 
BVA ($mil) 1,123 1,502.2118 163.0904 6,759 2,647.6145 149.5442 *** *** 
Log(BVA) 1,123 18.7638 18.7928 6,759 18.4220 18.5966 *** *** 
MVA/BVA 1,118 1.9668 1.3146 5,866 3.0747 1.6970 *** *** 
         
 
Panel A2     (Excluding Utilities and Financials) 
 Family Non-family Significance 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
Cash/BVA 851 0.1569 0.0971 5,168 0.2216 0.1283 *** *** 
DivYld 846 0.0071 0.0000 4,586 0.0042 0.0000 *** *** 
DivPay 771 0.1744 0.0000 3,776 0.1392 0.0000 *** *** 
Div/OIbD 783 0.0624 0.0000 3,943 0.0441 0.0000 *** *** 
BVA ($mil) 851 1,021.2723 101.6814 5,171 1,123.0180 80.7932  *** 
Log(BVA) 851 18.3454 18.3163 5,168 17.8896 17.9386 *** *** 
MVA/BVA 846 2.2245 1.5012 4,565 3.4933 2.0680 *** *** 
         
 
Panel A3     (Family Voting Power ≥  25% & Excluding Utilities and Financials) 
 Family Non-family Significance 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median 
Cash/BVA 497 0.1500 0.0908 5,168 0.2216 0.1283 *** *** 
DivYld 496 0.0070 0.0000 4,586 0.0042 0.0000 *** *** 
DivPay 460 0.1623 0.0000 3,776 0.1392 0.0000  *** 
Div/OIbD 466 0.0634 0.0000 3,943 0.0441 0.0000 *** *** 
BVA ($mil) 497 686.1201 91.3645 5,171 1,123.0180 80.7932 **  
Log(BVA) 497 18.2179 18.2410 5,168 17.8896 17.9386 *** ** 
MVA/BVA 496 2.0843 1.4280 4,565 3.4933 2.0680 *** *** 
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Table 4.8 (continued) 
 
Panel B1     (Overall) 
 Family Non-family Significance 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
Cash/BVA 1,123 0.1465 0.0792 6,776 0.1943 0.0992 *** *** 
DivYld 1,121 0.0103 0.0013 6,221 0.0081 0.0000 *** *** 
DivPay 1,063 0.2185 0.0520 5,644 0.2159 0.0000  *** 
Div/OIbD 1,052 0.0751 0.0151 5,609 0.0679 0.0000 ** *** 
BVA ($mil) 1,123 2,021.4071 201.4021 6,776 3,533.9893 187.2593 *** *** 
Log(BVA) 1,123 19.0194 19.0298 6,776 18.6551 18.8665 *** *** 
MVA/BVA 1,121 2.0053 1.3340 6,221 3.2357 1.7309 *** *** 
         
 
Panel B2     (Excluding Utilities and Financials) 
 Family Non-family Significance 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
Cash/BVA 848 0.1652 0.0975 5,182 0.2286 0.1400 *** *** 
DivYld 846 0.0068 0.0000 4,825 0.0041 0.0000 *** *** 
DivPay 788 0.1616 0.0000 4,048 0.1252 0.0000 *** *** 
Div/OIbD 798 0.0587 0.0000 4,115 0.0413 0.0000 *** *** 
BVA ($mil) 848 1,311.6205 125.1601 5,185 1,414.9730 100.0227  *** 
Log(BVA) 848 18.5873 18.5028 5,182 18.1056 18.2035 *** *** 
MVA/BVA 846 2.2399 1.5199 4,823 3.6974 2.0989 *** *** 
         
 
Panel B3     (Family Voting Power ≥  25% & Excluding Utilities and Financials) 
 Family Non-family Significance 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median 
Cash/BVA 496 0.1587 0.0973 5,182 0.2286 0.1400 *** *** 
DivYld 496 0.0068 0.0000 4,825 0.0041 0.0000 *** *** 
DivPay 470 0.1584 0.0000 4,048 0.1252 0.0000 ** *** 
Div/OIbD 473 0.0615 0.0000 4,115 0.0413 0.0000 *** *** 
BVA ($mil) 496 958.5841 104.5398 5,185 1,414.9730 100.0227 *  
Log(BVA) 496 18.4119 18.3663 5,182 18.1056 18.2035 *** * 
MVA/BVA 496 2.0900 1.4360 4,823 3.6974 2.0989 *** *** 
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Table 4.9 Cash Holdings and Dividend Policy – Multivariate Results 
Panels A1 through A4 of the table present results of GLS models, where the Compustat universe over 1993-2002 period is used as a sample while 
Panels B1 through B4 present results for the years 1996 through 2005. In Panels A1 and B1, the dependent variable is cash and short-term 
securities-to-book value of assets. In Panels A2 and B2, the dependent variable is dividend yield. In Panels A3 and B3, the dependent variable is 
dividend payout ratio. In Panels A4 and B4, the dependent variable is common dividends-to-operating income before depreciation. BVA is book 
value of assets. MVA/BVA is market value of assets-to-book value of assets. FFDum is a dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the 
observation is a family firm; and 0 otherwise. Time represents the dummy variables, which take the value 1 for each of the observation years; and 
0 otherwise, excluding the year 2002. Industry represents either 10 SIC manual divisions as presented in Kahle and Walkling (1996) (MD10), 38 
industries defined by Fama and French (FF38) or 2-digit SIC codes (SIC2). P-values adjusted for heteroskedasticity are in square brackets. 
Variables DivYld, DivPay and Div/OIbD are winsorized at 95th percentile while variable MVA/BVA is winsorized at 5th and 95th percentiles. 
 
Panel A1 Cash/BVA     (over 1993-2002 period) 
 Overall Excl. Utilities &Financials Family Voting Power ≥ 25% and 
Excl. Utilities &Financials 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
          
Log(BVA) -0.0143 -0.0123 -0.0117 -0.0140 -0.0111 -0.0108 -0.0136 -0.0108 -0.0105 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
MVA/BVA 0.0210 0.0166 0.0153 0.0205 0.0154 0.0144 0.0200 0.0148 0.0138 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
FFDum -0.0253 -0.0137 -0.0126 -0.0361 -0.0171 -0.0164 -0.0406 -0.0158 -0.0154 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry MD10 FF38 SIC2 MD10 FF38 SIC2 MD10 FF38 SIC2 
N 51,326 51,617 51,617 37,068 39,823 39,487 34,248 36,836 36,533 
Adj. R2 0.1828 0.2492 0.2703 0.1477 0.2277 0.2437 0.1424 0.2257 0.2420 
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Table 4.9 (continued) 
 
Panel A2 DivYld     (over 1993-2002 period) 
 Overall Excl. Utilities &Financials Family Voting Power ≥ 25% and 
Excl. Utilities &Financials 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
          
Log(BVA) 0.0016 0.0013 0.0015 0.0015 0.0013 0.0013 0.0015 0.0013 0.0013 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
MVA/BVA -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 [0.0001] [0.0447] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0177] [0.0056] [0.0248] [0.1529] [0.0819] 
          
FFDum 0.0008 0.0011 0.0012 0.0022 0.0015 0.0015 0.0023 0.0013 0.0013 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry MD10 FF38 SIC2 MD10 FF38 SIC2 MD10 FF38 SIC2 
N 51,321 51,612 51,612 37,068 39,824 39,488 34,249 36,838 36,535 
Adj. R2 0.2606 0.3457 0.4043 0.1369 0.1630 0.1801 0.1347 0.1597 0.1786 
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Table 4.9 (continued) 
 
Panel A3 DivPay     (over 1993-2002 period) 
 Overall Excl. Utilities &Financials Family Voting Power ≥ 25% and 
Excl. Utilities &Financials 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
          
Log(BVA) 0.0270 0.0209 0.0305 0.0377 0.0325 0.0330 0.0379 0.0328 0.0333 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
MVA/BVA -0.0003 0.0022 -0.0053 -0.0053 -0.0041 -0.0045 -0.0046 -0.0036 -0.0040 
 [0.7815] [0.0322] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0001] 
          
FFDum -0.0011 0.0028 0.0082 0.0304 0.0167 0.0170 0.0348 0.0148 0.0146 
 [0.7951] [0.4927] [0.0277] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0055] [0.0066] 
          
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry MD10 FF38 SIC2 MD10 FF38 SIC2 MD10 FF38 SIC2 
N 33,158 33,238 33,238 21,528 22,967 22,810 19,510 20,843 20,700 
Adj. R2 0.1646 0.2192 0.3740 0.1074 0.1273 0.1416 0.1082 0.1255 0.1425 
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Table 4.9 (continued) 
 
Panel A4 Div/OIbD     (over 1993-2002 period) 
 Overall Excl. Utilities &Financials Family Voting Power ≥ 25% and 
Excl. Utilities &Financials 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
          
Log(BVA) 0.0084 0.0064 0.0086 0.0112 0.0093 0.0095 0.0113 0.0095 0.0097 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
MVA/BVA 0.0027 0.0034 0.0014 0.0008 0.0010 0.0008 0.0009 0.0011 0.0009 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0155] [0.0013] [0.0066] [0.0034] [0.0007] [0.0029] 
          
FFDum 0.0039 0.0052 0.0069 0.0140 0.0096 0.0098 0.0151 0.0083 0.0084 
 [0.0019] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry MD10 FF38 SIC2 MD10 FF38 SIC2 MD10 FF38 SIC2 
N 37,602 37,632 37,632 26,146 28,045 27,823 23,796 25,566 25,361 
Adj. R2 0.1441 0.2037 0.2591 0.0957 0.1159 0.1337 0.0971 0.1157 0.1356 
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Table 4.9 (continued) 
 
Panel B1 Cash/BVA     (over 1996-2005 period) 
 Overall Excl. Utilities &Financials Family Voting Power ≥ 25% and 
Excl. Utilities &Financials 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
          
Log(BVA) -0.0129 -0.0114 -0.0105 -0.0121 -0.0099 -0.0093 -0.0115 -0.0094 -0.0088 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
MVA/BVA 0.0154 0.0116 0.0107 0.0152 0.0109 0.0102 0.0147 0.0104 0.0097 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
FFDum -0.0279 -0.0143 -0.0127 -0.0397 -0.0174 -0.0159 -0.0465 -0.0175 -0.0166 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry MD10 FF38 SIC2 MD10 FF38 SIC2 MD10 FF38 SIC2 
N 58,108 58,549 58,549 41,663 45,049 44,685 38,673 41,849 41,524 
Adj. R2 0.1723 0.2505 0.2755 0.1277 0.2234 0.2412 0.1212 0.2195 0.2378 
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Table 4.9 (continued) 
 
Panel B2 DivYld     (over 1996-2005 period) 
 Overall Excl. Utilities &Financials Family Voting Power ≥ 25% and 
Excl. Utilities &Financials 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
          
Log(BVA) 0.0014 0.0011 0.0013 0.0012 0.0010 0.0010 0.0012 0.0010 0.0010 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
MVA/BVA -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 [0.8498] [0.0792] [0.8594] [0.2637] [0.9272] [0.6707] [0.9875] [0.4464] [0.5936] 
          
FFDum 0.0011 0.0013 0.0014 0.0023 0.0016 0.0016 0.0026 0.0016 0.0015 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry MD10 FF38 SIC2 MD10 FF38 SIC2 MD10 FF38 SIC2 
N 58,101 58,541 58,541 41,662 45,048 44,684 38,673 41,849 41,524 
Adj. R2 0.2573 0.3332 0.4012 0.1155 0.1479 0.1635 0.1120 0.1433 0.1611 
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Table 4.9 (continued) 
 
Panel B3 DivPay     (over 1996-2005 period) 
 Overall Excl. Utilities &Financials Family Voting Power ≥ 25% and 
Excl. Utilities &Financials 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
          
Log(BVA) 0.0234 0.0184 0.0253 0.0314 0.0267 0.0269 0.0314 0.0270 0.0273 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
MVA/BVA 0.0019 0.0039 -0.0035 -0.0047 -0.0034 -0.0037 -0.0041 -0.0029 -0.0032 
 [0.0384] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0010] [0.0004] 
          
FFDum 0.0055 0.0101 0.0142 0.0350 0.0208 0.0202 0.0416 0.0219 0.0206 
 [0.1662] [0.0095] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry MD10 FF38 SIC2 MD10 FF38 SIC2 MD10 FF38 SIC2 
N 36,434 36,552 36,552 23,084 24,780 24,609 21,025 22,589 22,433 
Adj. R2 0.1706 0.2233 0.3656 0.0905 0.1166 0.1299 0.0890 0.1136 0.1308 
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Table 4.9 (continued) 
 
Panel B4 Div/OIbD     (over 1996-2005 period) 
 Overall Excl. Utilities &Financials Family Voting Power ≥ 25% and 
Excl. Utilities &Financials 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
          
Log(BVA) 0.0076 0.0060 0.0076 0.0097 0.0081 0.0082 0.0098 0.0082 0.0083 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
MVA/BVA 0.0030 0.0036 0.0019 0.0007 0.0009 0.0008 0.0008 0.0010 0.0009 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0195] [0.0009] [0.0043] [0.0036] [0.0003] [0.0011] 
          
FFDum 0.0071 0.0085 0.0098 0.0161 0.0116 0.0116 0.0183 0.0113 0.0114 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
          
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry MD10 FF38 SIC2 MD10 FF38 SIC2 MD10 FF38 SIC2 
N 41,506 41,554 41,554 28,315 30,542 30,311 25,902 27,965 27,754 
Adj. R2 0.1591 0.2132 0.2631 0.0860 0.1083 0.1246 0.0860 0.1064 0.1259 
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Table 5.1 Performance and Survival – Survival Statistics 
Panel A presents the overall survival statistics and Panel B presents the disaggregated survival statistics 
for family firms and non-family firms between January 2002 and December 2006. Delisting codes 200-
399 represent acquired companies and delisting codes 400-599 represent delisted companies for reasons 
other than acquisition. 
 
Panel A 
 Family Non-family 
 N Percentage N Percentage 
Survivor 792 75.21% 3,647 71.05% 
Delisting codes 200-399 145 13.77% 824 16.05% 
Delisting codes 400-599 116 11.02% 662 12.90% 
Total 1,053 100.00% 5,133 100.00% 
 
Panel B 
 Family Non-family 
Delisting codes N Percentage N Percentage 
100 792 75.21% 3,647 71.05% 
231 26 2.47% 219 4.27% 
232 1 0.09% 0 0.00% 
233 100 9.50% 475 9.25% 
241 16 1.52% 100 1.95% 
242 0 0.00% 2 0.04% 
244 0 0.00% 1 0.02% 
251 0 0.00% 1 0.02% 
261 0 0.00% 2 0.04% 
331 1 0.09% 18 0.35% 
332 0 0.00% 2 0.04% 
333 1 0.09% 0 0.00% 
341 0 0.00% 3 0.06% 
342 0 0.00% 1 0.02% 
450 1 0.09% 7 0.14% 
470 0 0.00% 8 0.16% 
504 0 0.00% 2 0.04% 
520 15 1.42% 82 1.60% 
551 4 0.38% 7 0.14% 
552 7 0.66% 121 2.36% 
560 7 0.66% 47 0.92% 
561 6 0.57% 38 0.74% 
570 24 2.28% 55 1.07% 
573 6 0.57% 2 0.04% 
574 5 0.47% 61 1.19% 
580 11 1.04% 53 1.03% 
582 1 0.09% 14 0.27% 
583 0 0.00% 1 0.02% 
584 21 1.99% 149 2.90% 
585 6 0.57% 13 0.25% 
587 2 0.19% 2 0.04% 
Total 1,053 100.00% 5,133 100.00% 
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Table 5.2 Performance – Unadjusted Average Daily Returns 
Panel A presents the average daily returns for various portfolios of family firms and non-family firms over various periods before and after 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Panel B presents the average daily return for various portfolios of family firms, where family’s voting power is at 
least 25%, and non-family firms over various periods before and after Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. T-test is utilized to test the difference in 
means. ***, **, * denote significance levels of 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A     (Overall) 
 All Survivors Delisting Codes 200-399 Delisting Codes 400-599 
Period F NF Diff. F NF Diff. F NF Diff. F NF Diff. 
             
0.5 years pre-SOX 0.0010 -0.0001  0.0010 0.0000  0.0007 0.0000  0.0008 -0.0010 * 
0.5 years post-SOX -0.0001 0.0000  -0.0002 -0.0002  -0.0001 0.0002  0.0003 0.0009  
       
1.5 years pre-SOX 0.0014 0.0009  0.0014 0.0009  0.0013 0.0010  0.0016 0.0006  
1.5 years post-SOX 0.0015 0.0017  0.0015 0.0016  0.0013 0.0018  0.0017 0.0021  
       
2.5 years pre-SOX 0.0010 0.0007  0.0010 0.0008  0.0009 0.0007  0.0009 0.0000  
2.5 years post-SOX 0.0013 0.0014  0.0013 0.0013  0.0013 0.0015  0.0012 0.0012  
       
3.5 years pre-SOX 0.0010 0.0009  0.0010 0.0010  0.0008 0.0009  0.0011 0.0008  
3.5 years post-SOX 0.0010 0.0011  0.0011 0.0010  0.0012 0.0013  0.0005 -0.0000  
       
4.5 years pre-SOX 0.0009 0.0008  0.0009 0.0009  0.0007 0.0007  0.0011 0.0008  
4.5 years post-SOX 0.0010 0.0010  0.0010 0.0010  0.0014 0.0015  -0.0007 -0.0006  
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Table 5.2 (continued) 
 
Panel B     (Family Voting Power ≥  25%) 
 All Survivors Delisting Codes 200-399 Delisting Codes 400-599 
Period F NF Diff. F NF Diff. F NF Diff. F NF Diff. 
             
0.5 years pre-SOX 0.0010 -0.0001  0.0010 0.0000  0.0005 0.0000  0.0012 -0.0010 ** 
0.5 years post-SOX 0.0001 0.0000  -0.0000 -0.0002  0.0002 0.0002  0.0005 0.0009  
       
1.5 years pre-SOX 0.0015 0.0009  0.0014 0.0009  0.0014 0.0010  0.0018 0.0006  
1.5 years post-SOX 0.0017 0.0017  0.0016 0.0016  0.0018 0.0018  0.0017 0.0021  
       
2.5 years pre-SOX 0.0010 0.0007  0.0010 0.0008  0.0008 0.0007  0.0009 0.0000  
2.5 years post-SOX 0.0014 0.0014  0.0014 0.0013  0.0016 0.0015  0.0012 0.0012  
       
3.5 years pre-SOX 0.0010 0.0009  0.0010 0.0010  0.0008 0.0009  0.0010 0.0008  
3.5 years post-SOX 0.0011 0.0011  0.0011 0.0010  0.0015 0.0013  0.0005 -0.0000  
       
4.5 years pre-SOX 0.0009 0.0008  0.0009 0.0009  0.0008 0.0007  0.0010 0.0008  
4.5 years post-SOX 0.0011 0.0010  0.0011 0.0010  0.0017 0.0015  -0.0000 -0.0006  
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Table 5.3 Performance – Adjusted Average Daily Returns 
Panel A presents the average daily returns adjusted using Fama-French three-factor model for various portfolios of family firms and non-family 
firms over various periods before and after Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Panel B presents the average daily return for various portfolios of family 
firms, where family’s voting power is at least 25%, and non-family firms over various periods before and after Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
Factor loadings of year t are used to adjust the returns of year t+1. T-test is utilized to test the difference in means. ***, **, * denote significance 
levels of 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. 
 
Panel A     (Overall) 
 All Survivors Delisting Codes 200-399 Delisting Codes 400-599 
Period F NF Diff. F NF Diff. F NF Diff. F NF Diff. 
             
0.5 years pre-SOX 0.0009 0.0001 *** 0.0010 0.0003 *** 0.0006 0.0003  0.0010 -0.0007 * 
0.5 years post-SOX 0.0008 0.0010  0.0007 0.0008  0.0007 0.0012  0.0010 0.0018  
       
1.5 years pre-SOX 0.0013 0.0009  0.0013 0.0009  0.0011 0.0010  0.0013 0.0004  
1.5 years post-SOX 0.0010 0.0010  0.0010 0.0009  0.0009 0.0011  0.0013 0.0015  
       
2.5 years pre-SOX 0.0009 0.0006  0.0009 0.0008  0.0007 0.0006  0.0007 -0.0001 * 
2.5 years post-SOX 0.0008 0.0008  0.0008 0.0007  0.0009 0.0009  0.0008 0.0007  
       
3.5 years pre-SOX 0.0007 0.0007  0.0007 0.0007  0.0005 0.0006  0.0008 0.0005  
3.5 years post-SOX 0.0006 0.0006  0.0006 0.0006  0.0008 0.0009  0.0002 -0.0005 * 
       
4.5 years pre-SOX 0.0007 0.0007  0.0007 0.0007  0.0005 0.0006  0.0009 0.0006  
4.5 years post-SOX 0.0006 0.0005  0.0006 0.0005  0.0010 0.0011  -0.0010 -0.0010  
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Table 5.3 (continued) 
 
Panel B     (Family Voting Power ≥  25%) 
 All Survivors Delisting Codes 200-399 Delisting Codes 400-599 
Period F NF Diff. F NF Diff. F NF Diff. F NF Diff. 
             
0.5 years pre-SOX 0.0009 0.0001 ** 0.0009 0.0003 ** 0.0004 0.0003  0.0013 -0.0007 ** 
0.5 years post-SOX 0.0010 0.0010  0.0009 0.0008  0.0011 0.0012  0.0012 0.0018  
       
1.5 years pre-SOX 0.0013 0.0009  0.0013 0.0009  0.0012 0.0010  0.0016 0.0004 * 
1.5 years post-SOX 0.0012 0.0010  0.0012 0.0009  0.0014 0.0011  0.0013 0.0015  
       
2.5 years pre-SOX 0.0008 0.0006  0.0009 0.0008  0.0007 0.0006  0.0008 -0.0001 * 
2.5 years post-SOX 0.0010 0.0008  0.0010 0.0007 * 0.0012 0.0009  0.0008 0.0007  
       
3.5 years pre-SOX 0.0007 0.0007  0.0007 0.0007  0.0005 0.0006  0.0008 0.0005  
3.5 years post-SOX 0.0008 0.0006  0.0008 0.0006 * 0.0012 0.0009  0.0003 -0.0005  
       
4.5 years pre-SOX 0.0008 0.0007  0.0008 0.0007  0.0006 0.0006  0.0009 0.0006  
4.5 years post-SOX 0.0007 0.0005 ** 0.0007 0.0005 ** 0.0015 0.0011  -0.0003 -0.0010  
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Table 5.4 Performance – Multivariate Results 
Panels A1 through A5 present results of OLS models where the dependent variable is the daily 
returns of the portfolios of family firms and non-family firms. Panels B1 through B5 present 
results of OLS models where the dependent variable is the daily returns of portfolios of family 
firms, where the family’s voting power is at least 25%, and non-family firms. Panels A1 and B1 
present the results for the year 2002; Panels A2 and B2 present the results for the period 2001-
2003; Panels A3 and B3 present the results for the period 2000-2004; Panels A4 and B4 present 
the results for the period 1999-2005; and Panels A5 and B5 present the results for the period 
1998-2006. MKTRF is the market factor, SMB is the size factor, and HML is the book-to-market 
factor of Fama-French three-factor model. FFDum is a dummy variable, which takes the value 1 
if the observation is a family firm; and 0 otherwise. SOXDum is a dummy variable, which takes 
the value 1 if the observation is in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 period; and 0 otherwise. 
FF*SOX is an interaction term of the variables FFDum and SOXDum. P-values adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity are in square brackets. 
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Table 5.4 (continued) 
 
Panel A1     (Overall & for 2002) 
 All Survivors 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
         
Intercept 0.0006 0.0004 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0007 0.0004 0.0005 -0.0000 
 [0.0001] [0.0258] [0.0747] [0.3505] [0.0001] [0.0088] [0.0021] [0.8860] 
MKTRF 0.7830 0.7830 0.7857 0.7857 0.8184 0.8184 0.8199 0.8199 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
SMB 0.5725 0.5725 0.5785 0.5785 0.5701 0.5701 0.5732 0.5732 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
HML 0.3606 0.3606 0.3717 0.3717 0.3529 0.3529 0.3587 0.3587 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
FFDum  0.0005  0.0012  0.0005  0.0011 
  [0.0708]  [0.0016]  [0.0259]  [0.0008] 
SOXDum   0.0006 0.0013   0.0003 0.0009 
   [0.0212] [0.0005]   [0.1591] [0.0055] 
FF*SOX    -0.0014    -0.0011 
    [0.0084]    [0.0115] 
         
N 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 
Adj. R2 0.9266 0.9270 0.9273 0.9285 0.9496 0.9500 0.9497 0.9506 
 
 
Panel A1     (Overall & for 2002) 
 Delisting Codes 200-399 Delisting Codes 400-599 
 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
         
Intercept 0.0006 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0006 0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0014 
 [0.0006] [0.0394] [0.4437] [0.5950] [0.1208] [0.6029] [0.4132] [0.0577] 
MKTRF 0.7447 0.7447 0.7483 0.7483 0.6070 0.6070 0.6159 0.6159 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
SMB 0.5963 0.5963 0.6044 0.6044 0.5517 0.5517 0.5715 0.5715 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
HML 0.3773 0.3773 0.3924 0.3924 0.3759 0.3759 0.4127 0.4127 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
FFDum  0.0002  0.0008  0.0006  0.0020 
  [0.5783]  [0.1241]  [0.4119]  [0.0607] 
SOXDum   0.0008 0.0014   0.0020 0.0034 
   [0.0221] [0.0058]   [0.0085] [0.0016] 
FF*SOX    -0.0011    -0.0027 
    [0.1070]    [0.0684] 
         
N 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 
Adj. R2 0.8571 0.8569 0.8583 0.8585 0.4578 0.4574 0.4642 0.4664 
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Table 5.4 (continued) 
 
Panel A2     (Overall & for 2001-2003) 
 All Survivors 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
         
Intercept 0.0011 0.0010 0.0011 0.0008 0.0010 0.0009 0.0011 0.0009 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
MKTRF 0.7699 0.7699 0.7698 0.7698 0.8076 0.8076 0.8076 0.8076 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
SMB 0.5930 0.5930 0.5928 0.5928 0.5902 0.5902 0.5897 0.5897 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
HML 0.2250 0.2250 0.2247 0.2247 0.2541 0.2541 0.2533 0.2533 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
FFDum  0.0002  0.0005  0.0002  0.0004 
  [0.3407]  [0.0287]  [0.1934]  [0.0238] 
SOXDum   -0.0001 0.0003   -0.0001 0.0001 
   [0.7138] [0.2120]   [0.3119] [0.5347] 
FF*SOX    -0.0007    -0.0005 
    [0.0327]    [0.0582] 
         
N 1,504 1,504 1,504 1,504 1,504 1,504 1,504 1,504 
Adj. R2 0.9034 0.9034 0.9034 0.9036 0.9297 0.9297 0.9297 0.9298 
 
 
Panel A2     (Overall & for 2001-2003) 
 Delisting Codes 200-399 Delisting Codes 400-599 
 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
         
Intercept 0.0010 0.0011 0.0011 0.0009 0.0012 0.0011 0.0010 0.0005 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0005] [0.2189] 
MKTRF 0.7176 0.7176 0.7176 0.7176 0.5832 0.5832 0.5833 0.5833 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
SMB 0.5957 0.5957 0.5955 0.5955 0.5763 0.5763 0.5776 0.5776 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
HML 0.2200 0.2200 0.2196 0.2196 0.0439 0.0439 0.0463 0.0463 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.2696] [0.2697] [0.2448] [0.2445] 
FFDum  -0.0001  0.0003  0.0003  0.0010 
  [0.6561]  [0.3691]  [0.4803]  [0.0794] 
SOXDum   -0.0001 0.0003   0.0004 0.0012 
   [0.7897] [0.3096]   [0.3201] [0.0507] 
FF*SOX    -0.0007    -0.0015 
    [0.0879]    [0.0767] 
         
N 1,504 1,504 1,504 1,504 1,504 1,504 1,504 1,504 
Adj. R2 0.8150 0.8150 0.8149 0.8151 0.4819 0.4817 0.4819 0.4824 
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Table 5.4 (continued) 
 
Panel A3     (Overall & for 2000-2004) 
 All Survivors 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
         
Intercept 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0007 0.0009 0.0008 0.0009 0.0008 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
MKTRF 0.7617 0.7617 0.7617 0.7617 0.7972 0.7972 0.7972 0.7972 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
SMB 0.5422 0.5422 0.5421 0.5421 0.5248 0.5248 0.5245 0.5245 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
HML 0.2670 0.2670 0.2668 0.2668 0.3034 0.3034 0.3027 0.3027 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
FFDum  0.0001  0.0003  0.0001  0.0002 
  [0.2957]  [0.0725]  [0.3184]  [0.1523] 
SOXDum   -0.0000 0.0002   -0.0001 -0.0000 
   [0.8039] [0.3796]   [0.2413] [0.9166] 
FF*SOX    -0.0004    -0.0003 
    [0.1354]    [0.3046] 
         
N 2,512 2,512 2,512 2,512 2,512 2,512 2,512 2,512 
Adj. R2 0.8824 0.8824 0.8824 0.8825 0.9051 0.9051 0.9051 0.9051 
 
 
Panel A3     (Overall & for 2000-2004) 
 Delisting Codes 200-399 Delisting Codes 400-599 
 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
         
Intercept 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0007 0.0006 0.0004 0.0005 0.0001 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0682] [0.0248] [0.8190] 
MKTRF 0.7000 0.7000 0.7000 0.7000 0.5849 0.5849 0.5850 0.5850 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
SMB 0.5267 0.5267 0.5270 0.5270 0.6159 0.6159 0.6164 0.6164 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
HML 0.2367 0.2367 0.2373 0.2373 0.0558 0.0558 0.0569 0.0569 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0637] [0.0636] [0.0590] [0.0589] 
FFDum  0.0000  0.0002  0.0004  0.0009 
  [0.9661]  [0.4020]  [0.1955]  [0.0522] 
SOXDum   0.0001 0.0003   0.0002 0.0007 
   [0.4557] [0.1825]   [0.5085] [0.1353] 
FF*SOX    -0.0004    -0.0009 
    [0.2543]    [0.1466] 
         
N 2,512 2,512 2,512 2,512 2,512 2,512 2,512 2,512 
Adj. R2 0.7943 0. 7943 0. 7943 0. 7942 0.5175 0.5176 0.5174 0.5177 
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Table 5.4 (continued) 
 
Panel A4     (Overall & for 1999-2005) 
 All Survivors 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
         
Intercept 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
MKTRF 0.7626 0.7626 0.7627 0.7627 0.7969 0.7969 0.7971 0.7971 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
SMB 0.5601 0.5601 0.5598 0.5598 0.5475 0.5475 0.5471 0.5471 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
HML 0.2915 0.2915 0.2913 0.2913 0.3287 0.3287 0.3284 0.3284 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
FFDum  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000 
  [0.8803]  [0.6714]  [0.8579]  [0.7908] 
SOXDum   -0.0002 -0.0002   -0.0003 -0.0002 
   [0.0498] [0.2845]   [0.0080] [0.0825] 
FF*SOX    -0.0001    -0.0000 
    [0.6535]    [0.8446] 
         
N 3,520 3,520 3,520 3,520 3,520 3,520 3,520 3,520 
Adj. R2 0.8816 0.8816 0.8817 0.8816 0.9021 0.9021 0.9023 0.9023 
 
 
Panel A4     (Overall & for 1999-2005) 
 Delisting Codes 200-399 Delisting Codes 400-599 
 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
         
Intercept 0.0008 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0003 0.0001 0.0008 0.0007 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0112] [0.4562] [0.0001] [0.0181] 
MKTRF 0.6937 0.6937 0.6935 0.6935 0.5719 0.5719 0.5727 0.5727 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
SMB 0.5240 0.5240 0.5243 0.5243 0.5950 0.5950 0.5936 0.5936 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
HML 0.2428 0.2428 0.2431 0.2431 0.0586 0.0586 0.0576 0.0576 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0268] [0.0267] [0.0293] [0.0293] 
FFDum  -0.0001  -0.0001  0.0004  0.0003 
  [0.3786]  [0.6368]  [0.1353]  [0.3858] 
SOXDum   0.0002 0.0002   -0.0009 -0.0010 
   [0.1641] [0.2572]   [0.0007] [0.0095] 
FF*SOX    -0.0001    0.0001 
    [0.8330]    [0.7902] 
         
N 3,520 3,520 3,520 3,520 3,520 3,520 3,520 3,520 
Adj. R2 0.7802 0.7801 0.7802 0.7801 0.4560 0.4562 0.4576 0.4577 
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Table 5.4 (continued) 
 
Panel A5     (Overall & for 1998-2006) 
 All Survivors 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
         
Intercept 0.0006 0.0006 0.0008 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006 0.0008 0.0008 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
MKTRF 0.7753 0.7753 0.7756 0.7756 0.8068 0.8068 0.8071 0.8071 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
SMB 0.5828 0.5828 0.5830 0.5830 0.5699 0.5699 0.5701 0.5701 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
HML 0.2857 0.2857 0.2860 0.2860 0.3197 0.3197 0.3200 0.3200 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
FFDum  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000  0.0001 
  [0.6694]  [0.5909]  [0.5969]  [0.6570] 
SOXDum   -0.0002 -0.0002   -0.0003 -0.0003 
   [0.0060] [0.0893]   [0.0007] [0.0199] 
FF*SOX    -0.0001    -0.0000 
    [0.7231]    [0.9012] 
         
N 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 
Adj. R2 0.8907 0.8906 0.8908 0.8908 0.9084 0.9084 0.9086 0.9085 
 
 
Panel A5     (Overall & for 1998-2006) 
 Delisting Codes 200-399 Delisting Codes 400-599 
 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
         
Intercept 0.0008 0.0009 0.0006 0.0007 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0009 0.0007 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.9624] [0.4808] [0.0001] [0.0149] 
MKTRF 0.6921 0.6921 0.6915 0.6915 0.5860 0.5860 0.5883 0.5883 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
SMB 0.5129 0.5129 0.5126 0.5126 0.6181 0.6181 0.6193 0.6193 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
HML 0.2162 0.2162 0.2157 0.2157 0.0560 0.0561 0.0580 0.0580 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0632] [0.0629] [0.0535] [0.0533] 
FFDum  -0.0001  -0.0001  0.0003  0.0003 
  [0.5390]  [0.7312]  [0.2938]  [0.4851] 
SOXDum   0.0004 0.0004   -0.0017 -0.0017 
   [0.0075] [0.0487]   [0.0001] [0.0001] 
FF*SOX    -0.0000    0.0000 
    [0.9123]    [0.9810] 
         
N 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 
Adj. R2 0.6760 0.6759 0.6764 0.6763 0.3667 0.3667 0.3714 0.3712 
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Table 5.4 (continued) 
 
Panel B1     (Family Voting Power ≥  25% & for 2002) 
 All Survivors 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
         
Intercept 0.0007 0.0004 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0007 0.0004 0.0005 -0.0001 
 [0.0001] [0.0883] [0.1509] [0.3985] [0.0001] [0.0575] [0.0226] [0.8103] 
MKTRF 0.7464 0.7464 0.7493 0.7493 0.7781 0.7781 0.7798 0.7798 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
SMB 0.5608 0.5608 0.5674 0.5674 0.5560 0.5560 0.5598 0.5598 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
HML 0.3519 0.3519 0.3642 0.3642 0.3494 0.3494 0.3564 0.3564 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
FFDum  0.0006  0.0012  0.0006  0.0011 
  [0.0665]  [0.0076]  [0.0447]  [0.0075] 
SOXDum   0.0007 0.0013   0.0004 0.0009 
   [0.0365] [0.0044]   [0.1818] [0.0280] 
FF*SOX    -0.0012    -0.0010 
    [0.0533]    [0.0761] 
         
N 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 
Adj. R2 0.8842 0.8848 0.8850 0.8862 0.9126 0.9131 0.9127 0.9137 
 
 
Panel B1     (Family Voting Power ≥  25% & for 2002) 
 Delisting Codes 200-399 Delisting Codes 400-599 
 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
         
Intercept 0.0006 0.0005 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0007 0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0015 
 [0.0083] [0.1470] [0.7620] [0.7240] [0.0831] [0.6363] [0.6685] [0.0853] 
MKTRF 0.6967 0.6967 0.7013 0.7013 0.6178 0.6178 0.6263 0.6263 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
SMB 0.5590 0.5590 0.5693 0.5693 0.5794 0.5794 0.5983 0.5983 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
HML 0.3367 0.3367 0.3559 0.3559 0.3837 0.3837 0.4190 0.4190 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
FFDum  0.0003  0.0006  0.0009  0.0024 
  [0.5485]  [0.4170]  [0.2844]  [0.0436] 
SOXDum   0.0011 0.0013   0.0019 0.0034 
   [0.0326] [0.0564]   [0.0233] [0.0042] 
FF*SOX    -0.0005    -0.0030 
    [0.5847]    [0.0756] 
         
N 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 504 
Adj. R2 0.7384 0.7381 0.7403 0.7396 0.4139 0.4140 0.4187 0.4214 
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Table 5.4 (continued) 
 
Panel B2     (Family Voting Power ≥  25% & for 2001-2003) 
 All Survivors 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
         
Intercept 0.0011 0.0009 0.0011 0.0008 0.0011 0.0009 0.0011 0.0009 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
MKTRF 0.7418 0.7418 0.7418 0.7418 0.7758 0.7758 0.7758 0.7758 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
SMB 0.5854 0.5854 0.5854 0.5854 0.5838 0.5838 0.5835 0.5835 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
HML 0.2212 0.2212 0.2211 0.2211 0.2529 0.2529 0.2524 0.2524 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
FFDum  0.0003  0.0006  0.0003  0.0005 
  [0.1506]  [0.0254]  [0.1220]  [0.0344] 
SOXDum   -0.0000 0.0003   -0.0001 0.0002 
   [0.9663] [0.2355]   [0.6174] [0.5048] 
FF*SOX    -0.0006    -0.0005 
    [0.0849]    [0.1482] 
         
N 1,504 1,504 1,504 1,504 1,504 1,504 1,504 1,504 
Adj. R2 0.8638 0.8639 0.8638 0.8640 0.8891 0.8892 0.8891 0.8893 
 
 
Panel B2     (Family Voting Power ≥  25% & for 2001-2003) 
 Delisting Codes 200-399 Delisting Codes 400-599 
 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
         
Intercept 0.0012 0.0011 0.0011 0.0009 0.0013 0.0011 0.0011 0.0005 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0010] [0.0001] [0.0007] [0.0005] [0.2698] 
MKTRF 0.6993 0.6993 0.6993 0.6993 0.5860 0.5860 0.5861 0.5861 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
SMB 0.5961 0.5961 0.5966 0.5966 0.5585 0.5585 0.5595 0.5595 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
HML 0.1972 0.1972 0.1980 0.1980 0.0758 0.0758 0.0777 0.0777 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0790] [0.0790] [0.0726] [0.0724] 
FFDum  0.0002  0.0003  0.0004  0.0013 
  [0.5928]  [0.4194]  [0.3844]  [0.0497] 
SOXDum   0.0001 0.0003   0.0003 0.0012 
   [0.6130] [0.4315]   [0.4895] [0.0669] 
FF*SOX    -0.0003    -0.0017 
    [0.5438]    [0.0572] 
         
N 1,504 1,504 1,504 1,504 1,504 1,504 1,504 1,504 
Adj. R2 0.7140 0.7138 0.7138 0.7136 0.4332 0.4331 0.4330 0.4339 
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Table 5.4 (continued) 
 
Panel B3     (Family Voting Power ≥  25% & for 2000-2004) 
 All Survivors 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
         
Intercept 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0007 0.0009 0.0008 0.0009 0.0008 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
MKTRF 0.7303 0.7303 0.7303 0.7303 0.7625 0.7625 0.7625 0.7625 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
SMB 0.5329 0.5329 0.5331 0.5331 0.5155 0.5155 0.5154 0.5154 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
HML 0.2556 0.2556 0.2559 0.2559 0.2906 0.2906 0.2904 0.2904 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
FFDum  0.0002  0.0003  0.0001  0.0002 
  [0.2543]  [0.1482]  [0.3305]  [0.3096] 
SOXDum   0.0001 0.0002   -0.0001 0.0000 
   [0.7202] [0.3718]   [0.6969] [0.9578] 
FF*SOX    -0.0003    -0.0001 
    [0.3651]    [0.6416] 
         
N 2,512 2,512 2,512 2,512 2,512 2,512 2,512 2,512 
Adj. R2 0.8432 0.8432 0.8431 0.8431 0.8648 0.8648 0.8647 0.8647 
 
 
Panel B3     (Family Voting Power ≥  25% & for 2000-2004) 
 Delisting Codes 200-399 Delisting Codes 400-599 
 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
         
Intercept 0.0009 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0006 0.0004 0.0005 0.0001 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0981] [0.0384] [0.8856] 
MKTRF 0.6848 0.6848 0.6848 0.6848 0.5759 0.5759 0.5759 0.5759 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
SMB 0.5372 0.5372 0.5379 0.5379 0.5808 0.5808 0.5814 0.5814 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
HML 0.2229 0.2229 0.2245 0.2245 0.0829 0.0829 0.0842 0.0842 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0114] [0.0114] [0.0103] [0.0103] 
FFDum  0.0001  0.0002  0.0005  0.0009 
  [0.5193]  [0.5837]  [0.1844]  [0.0592] 
SOXDum   0.0003 0.0003   0.0002 0.0007 
   [0.1703] [0.2874]   [0.4829] [0.1488] 
FF*SOX    -0.0001    -0.0009 
    [0.8950]    [0.1798] 
         
N 2,512 2,512 2,512 2,512 2,512 2,512 2,512 2,512 
Adj. R2 0.6988 0.6988 0.6989 0.6988 0.4528 0.4529 0.4527 0.4530 
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Table 5.4 (continued) 
 
Panel B4     (Family Voting Power ≥  25% & for 1999-2005) 
 All Survivors 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
         
Intercept 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0008 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
MKTRF 0.7320 0.7320 0.7322 0.7322 0.7630 0.7630 0.7631 0.7631 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
SMB 0.5508 0.5508 0.5506 0.5506 0.5383 0.5383 0.5380 0.5380 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
HML 0.2767 0.2767 0.2765 0.2765 0.3125 0.3125 0.3123 0.3123 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
FFDum  0.0001  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000 
  [0.6492]  [0.7201]  [0.6737]  [0.8607] 
SOXDum   -0.0001 -0.0001   -0.0002 -0.0002 
   [0.2101] [0.3958]   [0.0770] [0.1700] 
FF*SOX    -0.0000    0.0000 
    [0.9579]    [0.8634] 
         
N 3,520 3,520 3,520 3,520 3,520 3,520 3,520 3,520 
Adj. R2 0.8415 0.8415 0.8416 0.8415 0.8607 0.8607 0.8608 0.8607 
 
 
Panel B4     (Family Voting Power ≥  25% & for 1999-2005) 
 Delisting Codes 200-399 Delisting Codes 400-599 
 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
         
Intercept 0.0008 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0004 0.0001 0.0008 0.0007 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0211] [0.4877] [0.0003] [0.0321] 
MKTRF 0.6789 0.6789 0.6787 0.6787 0.5638 0.5638 0.5645 0.5645 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
SMB 0.5350 0.5350 0.5354 0.5354 0.5594 0.5594 0.5581 0.5581 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
HML 0.2250 0.2250 0.2254 0.2254 0.0808 0.0808 0.0798 0.0798 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0057] [0.0057] [0.0062] [0.0062] 
FFDum  0.0001  -0.0000  0.0004  0.0003 
  [0.7372]  [0.8995]  [0.1822]  [0.5484] 
SOXDum   0.0003 0.0002   -0.0009 -0.0010 
   [0.0764] [0.3730]   [0.0049] [0.0196] 
FF*SOX    0.0002    0.0003 
    [0.6080]    [0.6288] 
         
N 3,520 3,520 3,520 3,520 3,520 3,520 3,520 3,520 
Adj. R2 0.6704 0.6704 0.6706 0.6705 0.3881 0.3882 0.3893 0.3893 
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Table 5.4 (continued) 
 
Panel B5     (Family Voting Power ≥  25% & for 1998-2006) 
 All Survivors 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
         
Intercept 0.0007 0.0006 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0006 0.0008 0.0008 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
MKTRF 0.7473 0.7473 0.7476 0.7476 0.7760 0.7760 0.7763 0.7763 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
SMB 0.5785 0.5785 0.5786 0.5786 0.5651 0.5651 0.5653 0.5653 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
HML 0.2753 0.2753 0.2755 0.2755 0.3082 0.3082 0.3085 0.3085 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
FFDum  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0000 
  [0.4331]  [0.5905]  [0.4439]  [0.7417] 
SOXDum   -0.0002 -0.0002   -0.0002 -0.0003 
   [0.0503] [0.1638]   [0.0180] [0.0608] 
FF*SOX    0.0000    0.0001 
    [0.9918]    [0.7760] 
         
N 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 
Adj. R2 0.8540 0.8539 0.8541 0.8540 0.8705 0.8705 0.8706 0.8706 
 
 
Panel B5     (Family Voting Power ≥  25% & for 1998-2006) 
 Delisting Codes 200-399 Delisting Codes 400-599 
 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
         
Intercept 0.0010 0.0009 0.0007 0.0007 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0008 0.0007 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0033] [0.6916] [0.5582] [0.0014] [0.0510] 
MKTRF 0.6796 0.6796 0.6788 0.6789 0.5800 0.5801 0.5821 0.5821 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
SMB 0.5223 0.5223 0.5220 0.5220 0.5917 0.5917 0.5927 0.5927 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
HML 0.1979 0.1979 0.1973 0.1973 0.0886 0.0887 0.0904 0.0905 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0172] [0.0171] [0.0149] [0.0148] 
FFDum  0.0001  0.0000  0.0004  0.0002 
  [0.5032]  [0.8878]  [0.2175]  [0.6555] 
SOXDum   0.0005 0.0004   -0.0015 -0.0017 
   [0.0140] [0.1609]   [0.0001] [0.0008] 
FF*SOX    0.0002    0.0004 
    [0.6220]    [0.5635] 
         
N 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 4,489 
Adj. R2 0.5062 0.5062 0.5068 0.5067 0.2603 0.2604 0.2630 0.2629 
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Table 5.5 Survival – Statistical Distribution and Definition of Variables 
Below are the number of observations (N), mean, standard deviation (Std. Dev.), and various percentiles of the variables that are used in univariate 
and multivariate settings of analysis of family firm survival after Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Definitions of the variables are on the next page. 
 
  Percentiles 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min 1% 5% Median 95% 99% Max
FFDum 6,185 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
SrvDum 6,185 0.72 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
MrgDum 6,185 0.16 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
DlsDum 6,185 0.13 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
BVA ($ mil) 5,767 5,488.65 44,630.58 0.18 3.53 10.49 371.77 15,413.32 73,025.68 1,494,037.00
Log(BVA) 5,767 19.72 2.21 12.09 15.08 16.17 19.73 23.46 25.01 28.03
MVA/BVA 5,705 2.19 3.76 0.30 0.62 0.90 1.44 5.25 11.90 128.95
Debt/MVA 5,705 0.16 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.54 0.80 0.98
ROA 5,760 -0.13 1.40 -61.20 -2.22 -0.78 0.01 0.16 0.29 13.74
ChgSTD/BVA 6,171 0.00 0.56 -42.00 -0.30 -0.08 0.00 0.11 0.42 4.59
ChgBVA/BVA 5,767 0.49 23.65 -0.99 -0.69 -0.39 0.05 0.77 2.07 1,778.00
Accruals/OCF 4,421 1.01 4.77 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.30 2.85 13.04 138.19
ChgLog(Vol) 6,086 0.13 0.72 -4.46 -1.77 -0.97 0.10 1.30 2.38 5.14
Run-up1 6,185 0.14 0.60 -1.00 -0.95 -0.78 0.11 1.06 2.23 8.43
Run-up2 6,175 0.08 0.61 -1.00 -0.91 -0.72 0.04 0.91 1.93 20.59
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Table 5.5 (continued) 
 
Variable  Definition 
 
FFDum dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation is a family firm; 0 
otherwise 
SrvDum dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation survived between 
January 2002 and December 2006; 0 otherwise 
MrgDum dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation was acquired between 
January 2002 and December 2006; 0 otherwise 
DlsDum dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation was delisted for a reason 
other than acquisition between January 2002 and December 2006; 0 otherwise 
BVA   book value of assets 
MVA/BVA  market-to-book assets 
Debt/MVA total debt-to-market value of assets [total debt = long-term debt + short-term 
debt] 
ROA   return on assets, i.e. net income-to-book value of assets 
ChgSTD/BVA  one-year change in short-term debt-to-book value of assets 
ChgBVA/BVA  one-year change in book-value of assets-to-book value of assets 
Accruals/OCF absolute value of accruals-to-absolute value of operating cash flow [accruals = 
change in non-cash current assets – change in current liabilities (excluding 
short-term debt) – depreciation and operating cash flow = earnings before 
extraordinary items – accruals] 
ChgLog(Vol)  one-year change in natural logarithm of annual trading volume 
Run-up1  one-year stock return prior to last trade 
Run-up2  one-year stock return three months prior to last trade 
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Table 5.6 Survival – Univariate Results 
Panel A presents the univariate statistics of the accounting variables between family firms and non-family 
firms that are used in multivariate settings of analysis of family firm survival. Panel B presents the 
univariate statistics of the accounting variables between family firms, where the family’s voting power is 
at least 25%, and non-family firms that are used in multivariate settings of analysis of family firm 
survival. T-test is utilized to test the differences in means and Wilcoxon test is utilized to test the 
differences in medians. Variable definitions are on the previous page. ***, **, * denote significance 
levels of 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively. Variables MVA/BVA, ROA, ChgSTD/BVA, ChgBVA/BVA, and 
Accruals/OCF are winsorized at 5th and 95th percentiles. 
 
Panel A     (Overall) 
 Family Non-family Significance 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
SrvDum 1,053 0.7521 1.0000 5,132 0.7106 1.0000 *** *** 
MrgDum 1,053 0.1377 0.0000 5,132 0.1604 0.0000 * * 
DlsDum 1,053 0.1102 0.0000 5,132 0.1290 0.0000 * * 
BVA ($mil) 961 3,330.2460 343.0300 4,806 5,920.2461 378.2500 ***  
Log(BVA) 961 19.7162 19.6533 4,806 19.7154 19.7511   
MVA/BVA 954 1.8188 1.3117 4,751 2.2689 1.4725 *** *** 
Debt/MVA 954 0.1666 0.1129 4,751 0.1582 0.0996  ** 
ROA 961 -0.0359 0.0225 4,799 -0.1475 0.0137 *** *** 
ChgSTD/BVA 1,052 0.0020 0.0000 5,120 0.0005 0.0000  * 
ChgBVA/BVA 961 0.1016 0.0510 4,806 0.5694 0.0554   
Accruals/OCF 716 1.0842 0.2893 3,705 0.9949 0.2986   
ChgLog(Vol) 1,051 0.1856 0.1435 5,035 0.1176 0.0894 *** *** 
Run-up1 1,053 0.1854 0.1355 5,132 0.1333 0.1043 *** *** 
Run-up2 1,052 0.1278 0.0805 5,123 0.0688 0.0359 *** *** 
         
 
Panel B     (Family Voting Power ≥  25%) 
 Family Non-family Significance 
Variable N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median
SrvDum 541 0.7431 1.0000 5,132 0.7106 1.0000   
MrgDum 541 0.1146 0.0000 5,132 0.1604 0.0000 *** *** 
DlsDum 541 0.1423 0.0000 5,132 0.1290 0.0000   
BVA ($mil) 487 2,564.2108 212.1560 4,806 5920.2461 378.2500 *** *** 
Log(BVA) 487 19.3561 19.1728 4,806 19.7154 19.7511 *** *** 
MVA/BVA 484 1.7723 1.3222 4,751 2.2689 1.4725 *** *** 
Debt/MVA 484 0.1608 0.1063 4,751 0.1582 0.0996 ***  
ROA 487 -0.0344 0.0276 4,799 -0.1475 0.0137 *** *** 
ChgSTD/BVA 540 0.0073 0.0000 5,120 0.0005 0.0000  * 
ChgBVA/BVA 487 0.0651 0.0333 4,806 0.5694 0.0554  * 
Accruals/OCF 406 1.0227 0.2992 3,705 0.9949 0.2986   
ChgLog(Vol) 539 0.2122 0.1447 5,035 0.1176 0.0894 *** *** 
Run-up1 541 0.1750 0.1166 5,132 0.1333 0.1043  * 
Run-up2 541 0.1227 0.0581 5,123 0.0688 0.0359 * ** 
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Table 5.7 Survival – Multivariate Results 
Panels A1 through A3 present the odd ratios of logistic models of family firms and non-family 
firms, where the dependent variable is 1 if the observation did not survive between January 2002 
and December 2006; and 0 otherwise. Panels B1 through B3 present the odd ratios of logistic 
models of family firms, where the family’s voting power is at least 25%, and non-family firms, 
where the dependent variable is 1 if the observation did not survive between January 2002 and 
December 2006. Panels A1 and B1 present the odd ratios of logistic models using survivors and 
all delistings. Panels A2 and B2 present the odd ratios of logistic models using survivors and 
delistings due to acquisitions. Panels A3 and B3 present the odd ratios of logistic models using 
survivors and delistings due to a reason other than acquisitions. BVA is book value of assets. 
MVA/BVA is market value of assets-to-book value of assets. Debt/MVA is total debt-to-market 
value of assets. ROA is net income-to-book value of assets. ChgSTD/BVA is one-year change in 
short-term debt-to-book value of assets. ChgBVA/BVA is one-year change in book value of assets-
to-book value of assets. Accruals/OCF is the absolute value of accruals to absolute value of 
operating cash flow. ChgLog(Vol) is one-year change in the natural logarithm of annual trading 
volume. Run-up1 is one-year stock return prior to last trade. Run-up2 is one-year stock return 
three months prior to last trade. FFDum is a dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the 
observation is a family firm; and 0 otherwise. Industry represents 2-digit SIC codes (SIC2). P-
values adjusted for heteroskedasticity are in square brackets. Variables MVA/BVA, ROA, 
ChgSTD/BVA, ChgBVA/BVA, and Accruals/OCF are winsorized at 5th and 95th percentiles. 
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Table 5.7 (continued) 
 
Panel A1     (Overall & Survivor + All Delistings) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
         
Log(BVA) 0.752 0.752 0.756 0.765 0.762 0.765 0.764 0.761 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
MVA/BVA 0.700 0.700 0.745 0.747 0.725 0.747 0.750 0.728 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Debt/MVA 9.386 9.510 9.785 15.870 15.303 15.820 16.430 15.850 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
ROA 0.076 0.076 0.127 0.116 0.114 0.117 0.106 0.105 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
ChgSTD/BVA  0.729       
  [0.7122]       
ChgBVA/BVA   0.351 0.502 0.439 0.502 0.504 0.441 
   [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Accruals/OCF    1.102 1.091 1.102 1.104 1.092 
    [0.0750] [0.1155] [0.0762] [0.0723] [0.1125] 
Chg(LogVol)     1.128   1.125 
     [0.0197]   [0.0234] 
Run-up1      0.988   
      [0.8323]   
Run-up2       1.133 1.132 
       [0.0587] [0.0620] 
FFDum 0.734 0.733 0.722 0.669 0.659 0.669 0.665 0.655 
 [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0007] [0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0002] 
         
Industry SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 
N 5,700 5,700 5,700 4,383 4,336 4,383 4,378 4,331 
Pr(LR) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
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Table 5.7 (continued) 
 
Panel A2     (Overall & Survivor + Delistings via Acquisitions) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
         
Log(BVA) 0.897 0.897 0.895 0.890 0.888 0.911 0.902 0.900 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0024] [0.0006] [0.0006] 
MVA/BVA 0.711 0.711 0.742 0.715 0.694 0.748 0.710 0.690 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Debt/MVA 2.464 2.481 2.660 3.362 3.058 2.978 3.025 2.726 
 [0.0016] [0.0017] [0.0007] [0.0006] [0.0018] [0.0027] [0.0022] [0.0063] 
ROA 0.570 0.569 0.854 0.753 0.743 0.685 0.541 0.536 
 [0.0266] [0.0263] [0.5608] [0.3194] [0.3042] [0.2058] [0.0384] [0.0383] 
ChgSTD/BVA  0.818       
  [0.8565]       
ChgBVA/BVA   0.452 0.612 0.543 0.657 0.690 0.605 
   [0.0001] [0.0188] [0.0056] [0.0516] [0.0823] [0.0260] 
Accruals/OCF    0.944 0.936 0.922 0.931 0.923 
    [0.4257] [0.3754] [0.2859] [0.3416] [0.2922] 
Chg(LogVol)     1.118   1.108 
     [0.1046]   [0.1452] 
Run-up1      2.217   
      [0.0001]   
Run-up2       2.112 2.135 
       [0.0001] [0.0001] 
FFDum 0.704 0.703 0.692 0.640 0.633 0.646 0.638 0.633 
 [0.0020] [0.0019] [0.0012] [0.0013] [0.0011] [0.0021] [0.0015] [0.0013] 
         
Industry SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 
N 4,998 4,998 4,998 3,774 3,733 3,774 3,769 3,728 
Pr(LR) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
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Table 5.7 (continued) 
 
Panel A3     (Overall & Survivor + Delistings via a Reason other than Acquisitions) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
         
Log(BVA) 0.470 0.470 0.473 0.515 0.510 0.496 0.509 0.503 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
MVA/BVA 0.517 0.518 0.574 0.619 0.599 0.579 0.635 0.613 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Debt/MVA 105.341 116.260 109.936 179.516 189.928 147.631 154.952 163.966 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
ROA 0.008 0.008 0.017 0.014 0.014 0.035 0.024 0.023 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
ChgSTD/BVA  0.128       
  [0.1079]       
ChgBVA/BVA   0.205 0.361 0.313 0.346 0.355 0.303 
   [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Accruals/OCF    1.403 1.386 1.371 1.401 1.384 
    [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0004] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Chg(LogVol)     1.130   1.172 
     [0.0939]   [0.0307] 
Run-up1      0.165   
      [0.0001]   
Run-up2       0.422 0.413 
       [0.0001] [0.0001] 
FFDum 0.765 0.756 0.754 0.710 0.698 0.858 0.763 0.752 
 [0.0917] [0.0781] [0.0785] [0.0601] [0.0504] [0.4341] [0.1471] [0.1286] 
         
Industry SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 
N 4,874 4,874 4,874 3,792 3,754 3,792 3,787 3,749 
Pr(LR) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
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Table 5.7 (continued) 
 
Panel B1     (Family Voting Power ≥  25% & Survivor + All Delistings) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
         
Log(BVA) 0.751 0.752 0.755 0.771 0.768 0.771 0.770 0.767 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
MVA/BVA 0.703 0.703 0.751 0.755 0.733 0.755 0.758 0.736 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Debt/MVA 10.172 10.332 10.671 17.001 16.379 17.020 17.582 16.952 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
ROA 0.076 0.076 0.129 0.116 0.115 0.116 0.108 0.107 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
ChgSTD/BVA  0.703       
  [0.6931]       
ChgBVA/BVA   0.343 0.483 0.422 0.483 0.482 0.421 
   [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Accruals/OCF    1.126 1.114 1.126 1.125 1.113 
    [0.0372] [0.0606] [0.0372] [0.0387] [0.0633] 
Chg(LogVol)     1.118   1.115 
     [0.0372]   [0.0423] 
Run-up1      1.004   
      [0.9531]   
Run-up2       1.110 1.111 
       [0.1250] [0.1250] 
FFDum 0.698 0.697 0.685 0.672 0.656 0.672 0.666 0.650 
 [0.0053] [0.0053] [0.0036] [0.0060] [0.0038] [0.0060] [0.0050] [0.0032] 
         
Industry SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 
N 5,230 5,230 5,230 4,075 4,028 4,075 4,071 4,024 
Pr(LR) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 
128 
 
Table 5.7 (continued) 
 
Panel B2     (Family Voting Power ≥  25% & Survivor + Delistings via Acquisitions) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
         
Log(BVA) 0.894 0.895 0.893 0.897 0.894 0.920 0.908 0.906 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0078] [0.0019] [0.0018] 
MVA/BVA 0.720 0.720 0.750 0.726 0.705 0.761 0.718 0.698 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Debt/MVA 2.416 2.418 2.617 3.006 2.701 2.716 2.755 2.446 
 [0.0033] [0.0036] [0.0014] [0.0031] [0.0085] [0.0089] [0.0076] [0.0207] 
ROA 0.556 0.556 0.826 0.715 0.708 0.645 0.517 0.513 
 [0.0236] [0.0236] [0.4928] [0.2488] [0.2442] [0.1525] [0.0293] [0.0304] 
ChgSTD/BVA  0.975       
  [0.9827]       
ChgBVA/BVA   0.459 0.605 0.534 0.654 0.684 0.597 
   [0.0001] [0.0194] [0.0059] [0.0571] [0.0845] [0.0267] 
Accruals/OCF    0.955 0.948 0.935 0.940 0.931 
    [0.5478] [0.4861] [0.3989] [0.4294] [0.3711] 
Chg(LogVol)     1.110   1.105 
     [0.1380]   [0.1710] 
Run-up1      2.298   
      [0.0001]   
Run-up2       2.109 2.139 
       [0.0001] [0.0001] 
FFDum 0.592 0.592 0.584 0.592 0.582 0.616 0.594 0.586 
 [0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0012] [0.0043] [0.0033] [0.0094] [0.0051] [0.0042] 
         
Industry SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 
N 4,563 4,563 4,563 3,493 3,452 3,493 3,489 3,448 
Pr(LR) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
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Table 5.7 (continued) 
 
Panel B3     (Family Voting Power ≥  25% & Survivor + Delistings via a Reason other than Acquisitions) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
         
Log(BVA) 0.478 0.478 0.482 0.521 0.515 0.498 0.513 0.506 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
MVA/BVA 0.514 0.516 0.576 0.622 0.602 0.585 0.641 0.618 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Debt/MVA 124.485 138.982 131.686 229.606 244.920 179.592 189.568 202.497 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
ROA 0.008 0.007 0.017 0.014 0.014 0.033 0.024 0.023 
 [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
ChgSTD/BVA  0.109       
  [0.0941]       
ChgBVA/BVA   0.187 0.328 0.281 0.310 0.321 0.270 
   [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Accruals/OCF    1.455 1.440 1.399 1.443 1.429 
    [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Chg(LogVol)     1.124   1.170 
     [0.1243]   [0.0409] 
Run-up1      0.168   
      [0.0001]   
Run-up2       0.394 0.386 
       [0.0001] [0.0001] 
FFDum 0.854 0.844 0.836 0.789 0.766 0.987 0.880 0.853 
 [0.4337] [0.4007] [0.3777] [0.2968] [0.2437] [0.9561] [0.5828] [0.4984] 
         
Industry SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 SIC2 
N 4,470 4,470 4,470 3,520 3,482 3,520 3,516 3,478 
Pr(LR) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
 
